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Abstract:
Since 2005, publicly traded European companies are required to prepare their consolidated
fi nancial statements in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). 
This is the result of the so-called “IAS-Regulation” of the European Parliament and of the 
European Council (Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002) which formulates two objectives directly 
related to fi nancial reporting: (higher) comparability and transparency of fi nancial statements. 
With regard to transparency, researchers often rely on proxies to measure the quality of fi nan-
cial statements. In this dissertation, I follow this approach and examine the quality of IFRS 
fi nancial statements relying on different proxies, such as value relevance, the degree of earnings 
management, and disclosure quality.  The four papers in this dissertation cover research ques-
tions related to the determinants and consequences of managerial discretion in the three most 
important components of fi nancial statements: the balance sheet, the income statement, and 
the notes. In summary, this dissertation answers important questions concerning the quality of 
accounting under IFRS which have remained unanswered – and in some cases even unasked – 
until now.  Therefore, this dissertation has a material impact on the understanding of accounting 
quality under IFRS.
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1.1 Introduction
Since 2005, publicly traded European companies are required to prepare their consolida-
ted financial statements in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards
(IFRS). This is the result of the so-called “IAS-Regulation” of the European Parliament
and of the European Council (Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002) which formulates two ob-
jectives directly related to financial reporting: (higher) comparability and transparency of
financial statements.
Within accounting academia, various authors have analyzed the comparability of IFRS
statements, e.g. by examining cross-country accounting policy choices (see e.g. Kvaal
and Nobes (2010; 2012), Haller and Wehrfritz (2013)). With regard to transparency, rese-
archers often rely on proxies to measure the quality of financial statements. In this disser-
tation, I follow the latter approach and examine the quality of IFRS financial statements
relying on different proxies. One the one hand, I employ the concept of “value relevance”
which establishes a link between accounting data and capital market information. On the
other hand, I employ two different, but related concepts which are directly based upon the
information provided in the financial statements, namely “earnings quality” and “disclos-
ure quality”.
The four papers in this dissertation cover research questions related to the determinants
and consequences of managerial discretion in the three most important components of
financial statements: the balance sheet, the income statement, and the notes. The first
paper examines the quality of a “balance sheet item”, which is presented in the notes,
and investigates its value relevance. The second paper examines a possible consequence
of low accounting quality by investigating the association between earnings quality and
corporate social responsibility. The third paper also relies on information provided in the
income statement and examines recent changes to the accounting standard IAS 1. The
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fourth paper in this dissertation analyzes the overall effect of IFRS adoption in Germany
with regard to the quality of earnings and the quality of disclosures. The following figure
1.1 provides an overview of the manuscripts and how they relate to the aforementioned
components of financial statements.
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Figure 1.1: Structure of the dissertation manuscripts
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1.2 Overview of the Manuscripts
1.2.1 Discretion in the Accounting for Defined Benefit Obligations - An Empirical
Analysis of German IFRS Statements
The first paper in this dissertation – Discretion in the Accounting for Defined Benefit
Obligations - An Empirical Analysis of German IFRS Statements – analyzes the discretion
inherent in management’s pension assumptions and tries to answer the question, whether
this discretion is value relevant using sample of 123 German firms for the period of 2005-
2011.
To pursue this aim, the Defined Benefit Obligation (DBO) – which is the gross pension
obligation – is partitioned into two components based on the assumption that all deviati-
ons from the respective industry medians for the discount rate, the compensation growth
rate and the projected pension increases are driven by discretion. In doing so, we are able
to analyze the value relevance of the non-discretionary DBO as well as of the discretio-
nary DBO. The concept of value relevance is used to measure whether the benefits of
discretion – e.g. the possibility to communicate private information – outweigh the costs
– e.g. management’s opportunistic behavior (Dye and Verrecchia (1995)). It is based on
the assumption that accounting data is informative for addressees, if it results in price
revisions (Ball and Brown (1968)).
In contrast to US-based research (Hann et al. (2007)), we find that the discretionary com-
ponent is not value relevant for our German sample in overall terms and, hence, does
not increase the decision usefulness of the DBO beyond the non-discretionary part. We
provide an explanation in the country-specific characteristics of Germany: In contrast to
the US, pension accounting was less complex before the introduction of IFRS in 2005
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and still is less complex for many German companies applying German GAAP.1 Hence,
we argue that the increased scope for discretion is not priced by investors due to the lack
of experience with the complexity of IAS 19. However, we also find weak evidence that
the discretionary component is priced in case the pension plan is distinctly underfunded.
Under otherwise equal conditions, firms with underfunded plans have stronger incentives
to choose their actuarial assumptions opportunistically and, hence, we expect the capi-
tal markets to be more sensitive to actuarial information for these firms. According to
our results, the capital markets seem to punish a discretionary decrease of the obligations
whereas a more conservative estimation is cherished.
The contribution of this paper to accounting knowledge is twofold: First, we present com-
prehensive information on the development of actuarial assumptions in Germany over a
long timeframe from 2001 to 2011. Second, we contribute to the discussion of uniformity
versus flexibility in financial reporting (Hann et al. (2007)) as our results indicate that the
increased flexibility of IAS 19 as compared to pension accounting rules under German
GAAP does not necessarily lead to more decision-useful financial statements.
This paper is under review at the “Journal of Pension Economics and Finance”. An earlier
version of the paper has been published as HHL working paper. The paper is co-authored
by Henning Zu¨lch. The input of the submitting doctoral candidate includes the develop-
ment of the research question, the preparation of the theoretical and empirical basis, the
gathering of data and the execution of empirical analyses as well as the respective inter-
pretation and the preparation of the draft paper. Additionally, the author of this disser-
tation revised it to incorporate commentaries received from referees. In 2011, an earlier
version of the paper was presented at the annual meeting of the European Accounting
Association in Rome and at the 2nd Summer Program in Accounting Research (SPAR) in
Vallendar. Additionally, two descriptive articles, which are based on this study have been
1For example, under German GAAP, the discount rate is prescribed by the Federal Bank of Germany.
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published. In the article “Bilanzierung von Pensionsverpflichtungen deutscher Unterneh-
men nach IFRS – Empirische Erkenntnisse fu¨r die Jahre 2000 bis 2008”, published in
”Die Wirtschaftspru¨fung“, we discuss the overall development of actuarial assumptions
between 2000 and 2008 and in the article “Auswirkungen der Finanzkrise auf die Pen-
sionsbilanzierung nach IFRS und die Implikationen fu¨r die U¨berwachungsfunktion des
Aufsichtsrats - Eine empirische Analyse der Jahre 2005-2010”, published in ”Zeitschrift
fu¨r Corporate Governance“, we analyze the role of the supervisory board with regard to
pension assumptions during the financial crisis.2
1.2.2 The Association between Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Earnings
Quality - Evidence from European Blue Chips
The second paper in this dissertation – The Association between Corporate Social Re-
sponsibility (CSR) and Earnings Quality - Evidence from European Blue Chips – deals
with the question whether firms invest in CSR because they wish to act responsibly or be-
cause they are acting opportunistically. Based on the notion that it is socially responsible
to prepare transparent high-quality financial statements to facilitate decisions of statement
addressees, we investigate the association between CSR and earnings quality, which of-
ten serves as a proxy for the overall quality of financial reporting in accounting literature
(Francis et al. (2008)).
We hypothesize that the association is negative, i.e. firms with better CSR tend to have
lower earnings quality. There are several arguments which support our view: Drawing
upon principal-agent theory (Jensen and Meckling (1976)) and bounded rationality (Si-
mon (1955)), we argue that CSR information may lead to a decrease in the relative im-
portance of pure financial information in the decision-making process of investors. In the
same vein, one could think about firms buying a “reputation insurance” by investing in
2See Zu¨lch and Salewski (2012a) and Zu¨lch and Salewski (2012b).
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CSR, which gives managers a license to manage earnings (Kim et al. (2012)). Furthermo-
re, managers could decide to invest in CSR for reasons of self interest, i.e. to advance their
career or personal reputation, or because they believe that being a good corporate citizen
is worthwhile even when doing so is not in the best interest of shareholders (Moser and
Martin (2012)).
Based on a sample of 90 European firms in the period 2005-2009, we find support for our
hypothesis. To be more precise, we find that CSR is positively associated with the degree
of earnings management (Jones (1991)) and negatively associated with accounting con-
servatism (Basu (1997)) and accrual quality (Dechow and Dichev (2002)). In other words,
firms which are more actively engaged in earnings management, firms which report bad
news less timely and firms with lower quality accruals, have higher CSR scores.
Prior literature has examined the association between CSR and earnings quality in several
countries but delivered inconclusive results. On the one hand, some researchers find that
the association is negative (e.g. Prior et al. (2008)), while others find a positive association
(e.g. Kim et al. (2012), Choi and Pae (2011)). We try to reconcile these conflicting results
and provide a possible explanation by arguing that there are country-specific characteri-
stics which moderate the association between CSR and earnings quality.
This study contributes to accounting knowledge in the following ways: First, we develop
a new modification of the Jones (1991) model, which we believe to be more realistic for
IFRS samples. Second, we provide evidence that the association between CSR and ear-
nings quality differs between ’insider economies’ and ’outsider economies’ (Leuz et al.
(2003)). Last, our results show that the increasing trend to invest in CSR does not necessa-
rily lead to real changes in corporations. Rather, it is possible that this trend is driven by
opportunism.
The paper is intended for publication in the “Journal of Cleaner Production”. The paper
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is co-authored by Henning Zu¨lch. The input of the submitting doctoral candidate includes
the preparation of the theoretical and empirical basis, the gathering of data and the exe-
cution of empirical analyses as well as the respective interpretation and the preparation
of the draft paper. Additionally, the author of this dissertation revised it to incorporate
commentaries received from referees. In 2012, the paper has been presented at the Re-
search Forum of the Chair of Accounting and Auditing at HHL and at a shared doctoral
seminar with the University of Bremen. In 2013, the paper has been presented at the con-
ference of the Accounting Section of the German Academic Association for Business
Research (AS-VHB) (held together with the International Association for Accounting
Education and Research) and at the PhD summer school at HHL. Moreover, the paper has
been accepted for various international conferences, including the annual meeting of the
American Accounting Association in Anaheim, the 9th Workshop on European Financial
Reporting (EUFIN) in Valencia and the 6th International Workshop on Accounting and
Regulation in Siena. In addition, the paper has attracted intense media attention and was
covered in various press releases and blogs.
1.2.3 Reexamining OCI Pricing - Empirical Analysis of Reporting Location Changes
due to IAS 1 (rev. 2007)
The third paper in this dissertation – Reexamining OCI Pricing - Empirical Analysis of
Reporting Location Changes due to IAS 1 (rev. 2007) – investigates the pricing and the
reporting location of other comprehensive income (OCI). Within IFRS standard setting,
OCI has received wide attention starting with the convergence project “Financial State-
ment Presentation” of the standard setters IASB and FASB in 2004. The convergence
project has led to a revision of IAS 1, which sets out the regulations for the presentation
of financial statements. In the course of the revision, OCI gained importance because the
revised standard prescribes that OCI has to be presented in a single statement together
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with net income (single statement approach) or in a reconciliation immediately after the
income statement (two statement approach). Previously, OCI had to be presented in the
statement of changes in equity. The IASB motivates these changes with evidence in Hirst
and Hopkins (1998), Maines and McDaniel (2000) and Chambers et al. (2007). As these
studies are based on US-GAAP regulations, we investigate the revision of IAS 1 based
on an IFRS sample and aim to answer the questions whether OCI in general is helpful
in explaining stock returns and firm value and whether a more prominent presentation of
OCI has led to enhanced decision usefulness.
Accounting literature has proposed two possible approaches to analyze the decision use-
fulness of OCI information, namely the measurement approach and the informational
approach to value relevance (van Cauwenberge and de Beelde (2010)). While the former
is based on a valuation model which establishes a link between firm value and accoun-
ting data (e.g. Ohlson (1995; 1999), Feltham and Ohlson (1995)), the latter relies on the
assumption that accounting data is useful to investors if it shows up as a price revision
(Ball and Brown (1968)). In our paper, we rely on the informational approach to value re-
levance and hypothesize (i) that OCI is value relevant, (ii) that the change in the reporting
location has led to an improvement of information processing of investors and (iii) that
investors react in the same way to OCI information presented in a two statement approach
as compared to OCI information presented in a single statement approach.
We find evidence in support of our first two hypotheses. With regard to our third hypo-
thesis we find that OCI is not value relevant when presented in a two statement approach
and provide a possible explanation based on the concept of bounded rationality (Simon
(1955)), according to which investors seem to focus only on the most prominent display
of income.
The contribution of the paper to accounting knowledge is as follows: First, we discuss so-
me research design issues, which empirical accounting researchers are likely to face, na-
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mely the distinction between the measurement approach and the informational approach
to value relevance, the treatment of serial correlation in the residuals, and the specificati-
on of the dependent variable in return-based value relevance studies. Second, we provide
an investigation of the overall value relevance of OCI for an IFRS sample, because most
prior research is based on US-GAAP. Last, we shed some light on the question whether
the revision of IAS 1 in 2007 has led to the intended outcome.
A possible outlet for this paper is the journal “Problems and Perspectives in Manage-
ment”. The paper is co-authored by Paul Pronobis and Henning Zu¨lch. The development
of the research question and the execution of empirical analyses has been conducted by
all authors in collaboration. The additional input of the submitting doctoral candidate in-
cludes the preparation of the theoretical and empirical basis, the gathering of data, the
respective interpretation and the preparation of the draft paper.
1.2.4 Short-term and Long-term Effects of IFRS Adoption on Disclosure Quality and
Earnings Management
The fourth paper in this dissertation – Short-term and Long-term Effects of IFRS Adop-
tion on Disclosure Quality and Earnings Management – investigates the effect of IFRS
adoption on the transparency of financial reporting.
As a result of the so-called “IAS Regulation”, European firms are required to prepare their
consolidated financial statements in accordance with IFRS, if their securities are admitted
to trading on a regulated market within the EU (Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002). One of
the main objectives of the “IAS Regulation” is to ensure a high degree of transparency of
financial statements, which should enhance the functioning of capital markets and, finally,
foster macroeconomic developments (Bru¨ggemann et al. (2013)).
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We understand disclosure quality and earnings quality as two different, but related di-
mensions of transparency and, hence, analyze the effect of IFRS adoption on these two
constructs. With regard to earnings management, the findings of prior research are mi-
xed. Barth et al. (2008) find that IFRS statements exhibit less earnings management in
terms of earnings smoothness and loss avoidance as compared to local GAAP in 21 coun-
tries. On the other hand, Jeanjean and Stolowy (2008) who examine the impact of the
mandatory adoption of IFRS on earnings management in Australia, France, and the UK
conclude that the pervasiveness of earnings management behavior has not been reduced
by the introduction of the new accounting standards. In the same vein, van Tendeloo and
Vanstraelen (2005) and Callao and Jarne (2010) do not find a significant decrease in ear-
nings management through discretionary accruals for their German samples but increases
in several cases. Based on these findings and the notion that any set of accounting stan-
dards requires substantial judgment and estimates, we hypothesize that the introduction
of IFRS has led to an increase in earnings management. In a next step, we argue that
the degree of earnings management is reduced over time as preparers, users, auditors and
enforcers become more experienced and proficient in the application of international ac-
counting standards, IFRS compliance improves, the effects of IFRS 1 on the time series of
accounting numbers diminish, and common guidelines and interpretations of international
standards emerge.
Our next hypothesis follows prior literature (Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), Daske and Geb-
hardt (2006), Glaum et al. (2013)) which provides unanimous evidence for a positive ef-
fect of the adoption of international standards on disclosure quality. Moreover, we also
analyze the relation between earnings management and disclosure quality and hypothesi-
ze that disclosures have a constraining effect on the degree of earnings management.
Our sample composition is based on firms included in the “Best Annual Report” ’beauty
contest’ of the German business journal manager magazin and covers a time period from
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1995 to 2012. In this ’beauty contest’, financial statements are evaluated with regard to
different categories, including the content of disclosures. This score is suitable for our
analysis as it covers both the quality and the quantity of disclosures. To proxy for the
degree of earnings management, we rely on the modified Jones (1991) model of Kothari
et al. (2005).3
In summary, our hypotheses are supported by the results. We find that discretionary ac-
cruals increase in the early phase of the individual firms’ IFRS reporting period and de-
crease in the mature phase. With regard to disclosure quality, we find that IFRS adoption
leads to an increase in the quality of disclosures which is in line with prior research (Leuz
and Verrecchia (2000), Daske and Gebhardt (2006), Glaum et al. (2013)). Moreover, we
show that disclosures generally have a constraining effect on earnings management. Once
compliance, experience and enforcement improve in the mature phase of IFRS applicati-
on, these factors likely help to limit earnings management so that the marginal effect of
better disclosures is reduced.
With this paper, we satisfy the demand for studying a longer time horizon (Callao and
Jarne (2010)) after IFRS adoption which might help reconciling the conflicting results
of prior research and the underlying assumption of the European regulators introducing
IFRS to improve comparability and transparency of financial statements. Moreover, we
shed some light on the apparent association between disclosure quality and earnings ma-
nagement.
The paper is intended for publication in the “European Accounting Review”. It is co-
authored by Torben Teuteberg and Henning Zu¨lch. The development of the research ques-
tion and the preparation of the theoretical basis has been conducted by all authors. The
3In the paper “The Association between Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Earnings Quality –
Evidence from European Blue Chips” we have developed a further modification of the Jones (1991) model,
which serves as a robustness check here.
12
additional input of the submitting doctoral candidate includes the preparation of the em-
pirical basis, the gathering of data and the execution of empirical analyses. The respective
interpretation and the preparation of the draft paper has again been conducted by all aut-
hors. The paper has been presented at the 5th Doctoral Seminar on Accounting at HHL.
Furthermore, the paper has been submitted for the 37th Annual Congress of the Euro-
pean Accounting Association in Tallinn, for the X. Workshop on Empirical Research in
Financial Accounting in A Corun˜a and for the 76th conference of the German Academic
Association for Business Research (VHB) in Leipzig.
1.3 Principal Research Contributions
This dissertation answers important questions concerning the quality of accounting under
IFRS which have remained unanswered – and in some cases even unasked – until now.
The empirical studies present insights into the determinants and consequences of accoun-
ting quality for three of the most important components of financial statements, namely
the balance sheet, the income statement (including other comprehensive income) and the
notes.
Accounting literature has predominately focused on earnings as a means for measuring
accounting quality (Dechow et al. (2010)). For this reason, I also rely on earnings quality
in three of the four papers. Moreover, the first paper aims at the quality of a “balance
sheet item”, which is presented in the notes and investigates its value relevance. In addi-
tion, the earnings quality measure in the fourth paper is supplemented by the quality of
disclosures presented in the notes. In this dissertation, I try to clarify some issues which
empirical accounting researchers are likely to face and further develop the most widely
used approach to earnings quality, namely the degree of earnings management through
discretionary accruals.
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The first paper provides insights into the discretion inherent in the accounting for pension
obligations. As pensions often account for a substantial part of a firms’ balance sheet, a
deeper understanding of this discretion will help statement addresses in making sound
decisions. In this paper, I show that information about the discretionary component of the
defined benefit obligation is not processed by investors in an appropriate manner.
The second paper in this dissertation helps to understand a possible consequence of low
earnings quality by investigating the association between earnings quality and corporate
social responsibility. I show that firms which engage in earnings management more ac-
tively, report bad news less timely and have lower quality accruals tend to perform better
in corporate social responsibility. I argue that firms might invest in corporate social re-
sponsibility in order to conceal their low earnings quality. Moreover, this paper refines
the Jones (1991) model for discretionary accruals by taking into account intangible assets
and the discretion in the determination of amortization expenses.
The third paper in this dissertation deals with an important revision within IFRS, namely
the revision of IAS 1 in 2007, and provides insights into the consequences. I show that
the decision to present other comprehensive income at a more prominent position within
the financial statements has increased decision usefulness. However, I also show that the
option to present other comprehensive income in a two statement approach should be
scrutinized by the standard setter.
The fourth paper in this dissertation provides insights into the consequences of IFRS ad-
option in Germany in terms of earnings management and disclosure quality. I show that
– despite the assumed superiority of IFRS over German GAAP in terms of accounting
quality – the adoption of IFRS has initially led to an increase in discretionary accruals,
which is a proxy typically associated with earnings management. Furthermore, I show
that discretionary accruals decrease to a lower level in the more mature phase of IFRS
reporting and argue that this is driven by learning curve effects of preparers, auditors and
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users, increasing compliance, evolving enforcement, and the emergence of common gui-
delines and interpretations of international standards. Moreover, this paper provides im-
portant insights into the association between earnings management and disclosure quality
by showing that disclosures can have a constraining effect on earnings management.
In summary, this dissertation has a material impact on the understanding of accounting
quality under IFRS. Throughout the papers, I show that results obtained using US GAAP
data are not necessarily transferable to the European or German IFRS context. This fin-
ding is particularly important, because standard setters often implicitly assume this trans-
ferability. Moreover, my dissertation has considerable impact in academia because I pre-
sent a new variation of the most widely used proxy for the degree of earnings management
and provide a rigorous discussion of the measurement approach and the informational ap-
proach to value relevance.
Furthermore, there are some practical implications related to the findings of the studies
contained in this dissertation. Most importantly, (potential) shareholders should be aware
of the fact that financial statements can – to some extent – be managed and, hence, this
should be incorporated in their decision making processes. Moreover, they should take
into account that comparability of IFRS statements of companies from different countries
is not necessarily given, as there are country-specific characteristics which influence the
quality of accounting. This is also important for the standard setter IASB, whose aim is
to achieve comparability of financial statements. Due to these country-specific characte-
ristics this aim is still far from being reached.
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2.1 Introduction
One of the core tasks of the standardsetters IASB and FASB is to consider how much
scope for discretion the management should be allowed in the preparation of a company’s
financial statements. On the one hand it is argued that such managerial discretion could
lead to the manipulation of earnings by the management. Thus a significant part of the li-
terature about international accounting deals with the questions if – and why – managers
manipulate earnings, how they do it and what the consequences of this behavior might be.
Others believe that managerial discretion serves to communicate the management’s inter-
nal information to the statement addressees (Healy and Palepu (1993)). Thus, the question
if the management should be allowed a certain scope of discretion is mainly a question
of whether the advantages of private information being communicated outweigh the di-
sadvantages created by the management’s opportunistic behavior (Dye and Verrecchia
(1995)). However, earnings is not the only component of financial statements, in which
discretion can be used to influence investor’s perception.
Therefore, following the research approach of Hann et al. (2007) we examine this question
by means of a specific accounting measure which is to be disclosed in the notes - the de-
fined benefit obligation (DBO), i.e. the present value of future benefits already earned by
current and past employees. Within International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS),
the accounting for pensions, which often have a significant influence on the balance sheet
of companies, is covered by IAS 19: Employee Benefits. Although this standard deals with
several topics of benefits being granted to employees (such as wages, salaries or termi-
nation benefits), in the present paper we focus on defined benefit plans for two reasons:
The accounting for defined benefit plans is complex and offers substantial discretion to
the management.
Under IAS 19, defined benefit plans have to be actuarially evaluated before being reco-
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gnized on the balance sheet. These plans oblige the employer to make payments to the
employee after the occurrence of a specified event, such as the retirement of the employ-
ee. Due to the uncertainty of future events, the obligation has to be estimated considering
a number of parameters. In this context, IAS 19.72 differentiates between demographic
and financial assumptions.1 Amongst the main demographic assumptions relating to de-
fined benefit plans, IAS 19.72 (a) lists assumptions regarding the employee turnover and
the mortality rate. The financial assumptions essentially comprise, according to IAS 19.72
(b), such regarding the discount rate and the rate of compensation growth and future pen-
sion increases. IAS 19.78 prescribes that the discount rate is to be determined using the
return of high-class, fixed interest bearing corporate bonds. If there is no liquid market for
such corporate bonds, the market returns of government bonds should be used as the basis
for calculation. According to IAS 19.79, the discount rate only reflects the time value of
money – it does not, per definition, contain any risk component. In general it has to be
considered that the different benefit promises have different durations, which means that
different discount rates have to be applied. However, according to IAS 19.80, companies
can instead use a single, weighted discount rate reflecting the settlement dates, the sum
and the currency of the benefits to be paid. Regarding the measurement of obligations,
IAS 19.83 (a) demands that expected future rises in the income level are to be considered,
taking into account inflation, the duration of employment at the company, promotions,
and the structure of supply and demand on the labor market. Furthermore, adjustments
need to be taken into account, which are ascribed to legal or factual obligations. This is,
for example, necessary if a company has regularly adjusted pension payments by a com-
pensation for inflation in the past. As the determination of these financial parameters is
complex, flexible and hardly comprehensible to outsiders, there exists a significant scope
1In the paper at hand, we focus on the regulations that were in force during our main sample period 2005-
2011. Meanwhile, due to extensive criticism of the accounting of pensions, the IASB added the project
‘post-employment benefits (including pensions)’ to its agenda which led to a revised version of the standard,
published in June 2011 (See International Accounting Standards Board (2011)). However, the scope of
discretion that we analyze in this paper has not been subject to revision.
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of discretion for the management.2 This can either be used to communicate decision use-
ful, internal information about the nature of the obligation to the statement addressees, or
to manipulate both the balance sheet structure and the earnings.
To illustrate the scope for discretion within the determination of actuarial assumptions,
figure 2.1 shows the development of the discount rate of Lanxess AG, a large German
chemicals company (solid line) as compared to the development of the median discount
rate of the chemicals industry (dashed line). For 2005-2007, both lines roughly remain
in parallel with the discount rate of Lanxess AG exceeding that of the industry by ap-
proximately 0.5 percentage points. This may be caused by economic differences between
Lanxess AG and other chemicals companies, such as different age structures and hence,
different durations of pension obligations. In 2008, however, the discount rate of Lanxess
AG increased by 2.2 percentage points, while the industry median only increased by 0.6
percentage points. Having a look at the financial statement of Lanxess AG, the increase
is explained by higher market yields as a result of the financial crisis – certainly an event,
which impacted the competitors of Lanxess AG as well. We do not want to overstress
this example as there may be other reasons apart from the pernicious use of the discreti-
on granted by IAS 19. This is why, in the following, we want to introduce the research
approach applied and elaborate on our sample choice.
[Figure 2.1 about here]
To analyze the use of discretion in the context of the determination of financial assumpti-
ons, we examine the question how this discretion affects the value relevance of the disclo-
sed DBO and hence, lowers or increases the market value of equity. To this end, we
identify the component of the DBO which is not to be ascribed to discretion by replacing
2With respect to demographic assumptions, discretion is lower as most German companies use the same
mortality tables.
23
the company specific assumptions with their respective industry medians (Hann et al.
(2007)). The difference between the disclosed DBO and the identified non-discretionary
component constitutes our estimator for that component of the DBO which can be as-
cribed to discretion. Using our main sample, comprising the IFRS statements of listed
German companies in the period of 2005-2011, we examine the value relevance of this
discretionary component. More precisely, we examine (i) whether the discretionary com-
ponent increases the value relevance of the DBO and hence influences the market value
of equity3 and (ii) if the degree of underfunding moderates investor’s perception and their
equity valuations.
We limit the sample for our analysis to Germany due to the following reasons: First, all
companies operate within the same institutional and regulatory environment and are go-
verned by the same enforcement mechanisms (Ernstberger (2008), p. 14). Second, data
on actuarial assumptions had to be hand-collected as not all the information we nee-
ded was available in financial databases and the information available (Datastream items
#18806-#18847) was of poor quality. Third, Glaum (2009) notes that studies about pensi-
on accounting have up to this point almost exclusively been based on US-American data
and regulations. We aim to close this research gap with the present contribution. Last and
most important, pension accounting in Germany may deliver new insights to the debate
of uniformity versus flexibility in international accounting (Hann et al. (2007)): Pension
accounting was less complex in Germany before the introduction of IFRS for the consoli-
dated financial statements of listed companies in 2005. Furthermore, for a large number of
German companies it still is less complex as the determination of actuarial assumptions
under German GAAP – which is applicable for individual financial statements and for
companies which are not listed – differs from IFRS. Under German GAAP, discount rates
3In doing so, we want to shed further light on the question, if off-balance sheet information is value relevant
for investors.
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are not determined individually, but prescribed by the Federal Bank of Germany.4 Hence,
there is an ongoing debate in Germany, on whether the flexibility of IFRS regulations
leads to more decision-useful financial statements as compared to German GAAP.5 By
focusing on Germany, we aim at contributing to this country-specific debate. Furthermo-
re, our results may influence the overall debate of uniformity versus flexibility and deliver
interesting insights beyond the German case.
In summary, we find that the discretionary component is not value relevant in overall
terms. This result is in contrast to prior research (Hann et al. (2007)) which finds that –
under US-GAAP – discretion in the DBO is value relevant beyond the non-discretionary
component. We provide an explanation for this finding by stressing the country-specific
characteristics of Germany. Furthermore, we find weak evidence that the discretionary
component is incorporated in investor’s equity valuations in case the pension plan is dis-
tinctly underfunded.
This study is structured as follows: chapter 2.2 provides a short overview on the relevant
literature, while chapter 2.3 introduces our research approach and develops our hypothe-
ses. Chapter 2.4 presents our research results followed by a final conclusion in chapter
2.5.
2.2 Literature Review
There is an ongoing debate within international financial reporting research on how much
scope for discretion should be allowed to the management. Principally, this means weigh-
ing the benefits of discretion (communication of private information) against their costs
(opportunistic behavior by the management) (Dye and Verrecchia (1995)). The majority
4 See § 253(2) HGB (German commercial code).
5 See among others Pellens et al. (2008) and Zu¨lch and Salewski (2012).
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of works dealing with this question can be subsumed under the term earnings manage-
ment (a good introduction is provided by Schipper (1989), Healy and Wahlen (1999),
Dechow and Skinner (2000) and Dechow et al. (2010)). Earnings management is referred
to whenever managers apply discretion during financial reporting to either deceive the
statement users about the company’s performance or to influence specific accounting pa-
rameters, which could for example affect performance-based payment components (Healy
and Wahlen (1999)). However, this discretion might also serve to communicate compa-
ny internal, private information to the statement addressees (Schipper (1989), Healy and
Palepu (1993), Sankar and Subramanyam (2001)).
A large part of the literature on earnings management is based on the model of Jones
(1991), dividing accruals into a discretionary and a non-discretionary component. Sub-
ramanyam (1996), for instance, demonstrates that the discretionary accruals on average
increases the value relevance of earnings, whereas Guay et al. (1996) note that such a
differentiation of accruals tends to be defective. One possible way of avoiding such de-
fects is to examine only specific managerial decision processes (McNichols (2000)) – in
the particular case the accounting for pensions. The advantage of investigating these de-
cision processes is that researchers can use their expertise in a specific area to model the
discretion inherent in the decision processes in a reliable way.
Due to the following reasons, various researchers have chosen to analyze the decision
process of the accounting for pensions:6 First, pensions have a significant influence on
the companies’ balance sheet7 and second, there exists an enormous room for discretion
in the determination of the pension obligation. Furthermore, companies have to disclose
specifications of the essential parameters determining the amount of the pension obligati-
on, which gives the opportunity to analyze the extent to which these parameters are driven
by discretion. Looking at the United States, we find various studies which show that the-
6See Glaum (2009) for a comprehensive overview of the research on pensions.
7 In our sample, the Defined Benefit Obligations on average makes up 10.9% of beginning total assets.
26
se parameters can vary significantly between companies and that their determination is
influenced by management (Gopalakrishnan and Sugrue (1995), Godwin et al. (1996)).8
In general, pension research can be classified in such analyzing pension assets and such
analyzing pension liabilities. Considering pension assets, Bergstresser et al. (2006) and
Adams et al. (2011) analyze the opportunity to influence reported earnings through the
expected rate of return on pension assets. While Bergstresser et al. (2006) find that ma-
nagers manipulate earnings through their characterizations of pension assets and alter
investment decisions to justify these manipulations,9 Adams et al. (2011) come to the
conclusion that the expected rate of return on pensions assets is not overstated relative
to several benchmarks. On the other hand, there are several studies that focus on pension
liabilities. By providing evidence that companies select downward biased assumptions to
exaggerate the economic burden of their benefit plans when ‘hard’ freezing these plans,
Comprix and Muller (2011) support the relevance of research on discretion within the
determination of actuarial assumptions.10
Hann et al. (2007) also focus on pension obligations and – using a US sample – find that
discretion in the determination of the DBO serves to communicate value relevant infor-
mation to the capital market. They therefore conclude that imposing uniformity in the
choice of pension assumptions, on average, prevents communication of value relevant in-
formation through the DBO. In this paper, we follow the research approach introduced by
Hann et al. (2007). We first determine the non-discretionary component of the DBO by re-
placing the actuarial assumptions of management with their respective industry medians.
The discretionary component of the DBO is then deduced by the subtraction of this sum
8Apart from opportunistic motivation, the variation in these parameters can of course also reflect differences
in the respective pension plans (Blankley and Swanson (1995)).
9 A similar result can be found in Amir et al. (2010), who find that UK and US companies shifted pension
assets from equity to debt securities as a reaction to new disclosure requirements.
10 Further studies focusing on pension liabilities are Beaudoin et al. (2011), who fail to find incrementally
value relevant information as a result of the disclosure requirement of the funded status of the defined be-
nefit plans under SFAS 158 and Nakajima and Takafumi (2010), who analyze whether the capital markets
rationally anticipate the value implications of unrecognized pension obligations.
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from the disclosed DBO. One disadvantage of this approach is the fact that the amount
of the DBO is only disclosed in the notes. In this context, we must ask ourselves whether
statement addressees appreciate the notes at all, or whether the capital market appraises
them equally to the specifications made in the profit and loss statement or on the balance
sheet. Barth (1991), however, demonstrates that specifications regarding pension obligati-
ons are perceived by the market in a similar way to specifications about other obligations
reported on the balance sheet.
Furthermore, it should be noted that research on the association between market data and
accounting data has primarily focused on earnings information.11 However, we believe
that in the context of IFRS pension accounting, our approach of analyzing the DBO is
a suitable method to exploring the question whether the benefit of discretion in pension
accounting outweighs the inherent costs. For our sample period, IAS 19 allowed three
options with respect to the accounting for actuarial gains and losses. According to IAS
19.92-93D, the possible options were 1) the corridor approach, 2) any faster recognition
in income and 3) the recognition within equity. As most of the companies in our sample
either used option 1) or option 3), only a small part of actuarial gains and losses went
directly through the P&L, namely those exceeding the corridor under option 1) or tho-
se under option 2). Furthermore, IAS 19 (rev. 2011) eliminates this option for financial
years starting on or after 1 January 2013. From that date onwards, actuarial gains and
losses have to be recorded as remeasurements via other comprehensive income in equity.
Hence, we conclude that the link between actuarial assumptions and earnings is weak and
research with respect to the DBO is worthwhile.
11 See the reviews of Lev (1989) and Kothari (2001) and the argumentation of Huang and Zhang (2012).
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2.3 Research Approach
2.3.1 Determining the Discretionary Component of the DBO
The determination of that component of the DBO which can be ascribed to discretion
(henceforth DBOD) is based on Hann et al. (2007), who derive the discretionary compo-
nent DBOD from the difference between the DBO disclosed in the notes and that compo-
nent of the DBO which is not to be ascribed to discretion (DBOX). DBOX is determined
by replacing company specific actuarial assumptions with their respective industry me-
dians.12
We thus suggest that the DBO can be defined as13
DBO =
Pi,r,L( ˆKW(1 + g)N)
(1 + i)N
. (1)
In this context, Pi,r,L describes the present value factor of a pension which geometrically
progresses over a period L with pension increases of r and a discount rate of i, formally
expressed by14 Pi,r,L =
(1+i)L−(1+r)L
(i−r)(1+i)L (in contrast to our approach, Hann et al. (2007) do
not take into account the projected future pension increases in their segmentation of the
DBO). L defines the average life expectancy of an employee after retirement, K indicates
the proportion of the current wage level W, which is to be paid as a pension in N years.
Accordingly, ˆKW is our estimator for this relation. The factor (1+g)N is used to anticipate
future salary increases. It should be noted that N has to be equally applicable both to
12We base our classification of industry on the industry sector specifications of the German stock exchange,
see German Stock Exchange (2010).
13For reasons of clarity, we suppress both the time index and the company index.
14See Kruschwitz (2010), p. 113. Simple linear transformation leads to the notation of the present value
factor for a growing annuity, which is more commonly used in English-speaking countries. See among
others Ross et al. (2007).
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employees and to pensioners – it thus represents the average, weighted years to retirement
over both groups.15 In other words, the DBO is the present value of the predicted pension
ˆKW(1 + g)N , which has to be paid over a period of L years after retirement.
Determining the parameters i, g and r is straightforward, as these can be extracted directly
from the notes. This is not possible for L and N, meaning that two assumptions have to be
made:
Assumption regarding L: In 2005, the average remaining life expectancy of 65-year-
old men was approx. 16.5 years, that of 65-year-old women about 20 years.16 Thus,
for reasons of simplicity we assume an average remaining life time of L = 18 years.
Assumption regarding N: The average age in Germany in 2005 was about 42 years,17
while the average age of retirement was about 62 years.18 This would mean 20
years to retirement. Since N refers to both employees and pensioners, however,
we first determine an estimator to identify which proportion of each DBO is allot-
ted to pensioners. For this purpose, the benefit payments BP, which were due in
a specific period and disclosed in the notes, are multiplied by annuity present va-
lue factors PVF gained from the Professional Association of Mathematics Experts
of the Arbeitsgemeinschaft fu¨r betriebliche Altersversorgung e.V. (‘Commission for
Company Pension Schemes Inc.’) in Germany. The proportion of the DBO allotted
to pensioners can thus be defined as
λ =
BP · PVF
DBO
. (2)
15When calculating company-specific values for N, we assume N = 0 for pensioners.
16See specifications of the German Federal Statistical Office, to be viewed at:
https://www.destatis.de/DE/Publikationen/Thematisch/Bevoelkerung/Bevoelkerungsbewegung/
PeriodensterbetafelnPDF 5126202.pdf? blob=publicationFile.
17See German Federal Statistical Office (2007), p. 44.
18See Deutsche Rentenversicherung Bund (German pension fund Bund) (2008), p. 68.
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The proportion allotted to the employees thus amounts to ϕ = 1 − λ. This is mul-
tiplied by the original 20 years to retirement, providing a company- and period-
specific estimator for N in dependence to ϕ.
Apart from ˆKW, all elements of equation 1 are thus either known (i, r and g) or assumed
(L and N). Reordering equation 1, ˆKW can be determined as follows:
ˆKW =
DBO(1 + i)N
Pi,r,L(1 + g)N
. (3)
If we now replace the actuarial assumptions of the management (i, r and g) in equati-
on 1 by their respective industry medians (i∗, r∗ and g∗), the result is DBOX, the non-
discretionary component of the DBO.
DBOX =
Pi∗,r∗,L( ˆKW(1 + g∗)N)
(1 + i∗)N
. (4)
By subtracting
DBOD = DBO − DBOX (5)
we determine the discretionary component of the pension obligation DBOD.
By replacing actuarial assumptions with industry medians, we assume that all deviations
from the medians are ”discretionary“. However, some deviations reflect real economic
differences. For example, discount rates may differ if pension beneficiaries have different
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age structures and if pension obligations hence have different durations. Salary increase
rates may differ if companies face different labor-market supply and demand structures.
The research method developed by Hann et al. (2007) and now adopted by us cannot diffe-
rentiate between these real economic differences and what we call ”discretion“. However,
we do not believe that this renders the research approach unreliable and aim at an useful
contribution to pension accounting research.
2.3.2 Hypotheses Development
For the purpose of determining the value relevance of DBOD, we use regression models
with the market value of equity as of three month after balance sheet date as the depen-
dent variable. Accordingly, we assume that all companies have published their financial
statements until this date and that this information is reflected within the market value
of equity. The use of the market value of equity (in contrast to using returns) is suitable
for our study, since we examine the value relevance of a ”balance sheet item“. To be in
line with the accounting based valuation model suggested by Ohlson (1995), we correct
total liabilities for all items associated with pensions. In doing so, we can use the DBO as
explanatory variable, although it is not recognized directly on the balance sheet.19 Such
a specification, however, suffers from a number of econometric difficulties, mainly those
created by heteroskedasticity and scale effects (Brown et al. (1999)). To account for these
problems, all variables are standardized by sales. In addition, we apply time fixed effects
panel regressions with firm-clustered standard errors.
19Furthermore, such a model is in accordance with other contributions dealing with pension accounting
(Hann et al. (2007), Landsman (1986), Barth (1991), Barth et al. (1992)).
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2.3.2.1 Overall Value Relevance of the Discretionary Component
First, we want to analyze how the discretionary component DBOD is perceived by in-
vestors and if there is a difference in the perception compared to the non-discretionary
DBOX. Therefore, we examine the relative value relevance of the pension obligation with
and without discretion. For this, we compare the coefficients as well as the adjusted R2 of
the following models I and II which only differ by the fact that the DBO is disassembled
into DBOX and DBOD in model II:
MVEit =
2011∑
t=2005
αtIt + β1T Ait + β2NPT Lit + β3DBOit + β5NIit
+β6EMPit + β7RDit + β8LossDit + β9LossDit · NIit + ut (I)
MVEit =
2011∑
t=2005
αtIt + β1T Ait + β2NPT Lit + β3DBOX,it + β4DBOD,it
+β5NIit + β6EMPit + β7RDit + β8LossDit + β9LossDit · NIit + ut (II)
MVEit defines the market value of equity as of three month after balance sheet date of
company i at time t, T Ait and NPT Lit define total assets and non-pension total liabilities,
DBOit is the defined benefit obligation, DBOX,it the non-discretionary component of the
DBO, DBOD,it is the discretionary component and NIit is net income before extraordinary
items. The It are dummy variables implemented to account for differences over time.20
The general structure of the equations suits the accounting based valuation framework
20For reasons of comprehensibility, we only outline those time fixed effects in the model description and
suppress them in our estimation results in section 2.4.
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of Ohlson (1995). In addition, we incorporate the following control variables into our
model: RDit is research and development expense, EMPit is the average number of full-
time employees during a fiscal year and LossDit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
company makes losses and 0 otherwise. All variables apart from EMPit are divided by
total sales. EMPit and RDit are used to account for the service cost anomaly, i. e. the
unexpectedly positive relation between service costs and stock price (Barth et al. (1992)).
Subramanyam and Zhang (2001) demonstrate that the inclusion of EMPit and RDit into
the regression equation disposes of this anomaly.21
Hann et al. (2007) find no evidence that discretion impairs the value relevance of the
DBO under US-GAAP. Instead, they find that the discretionary component is value rele-
vant beyond the non-discretionary component. In contrast to the United States, however,
pension accounting in Germany was less complex before the mandatory introduction of
IFRS for consolidated financial statements in 2005, and for a large part of German com-
panies it still is less complex.22 Due to the transition towards IFRS, pension obligations
in Germany – and the scope for discretion – on average increased. However, we believe
that many investors in Germany still stick to the traditional German pension regime with
less heterogeneity and, therefore, adjust their equity valuations accordingly.
There are two arguments which support our view. First, we refer to Daske et al. (2008),
who show that only 26.9% of companies have been early voluntary IFRS adopters (and
9.2% late voluntary). Hence, the majority of companies adopted IFRS when they became
mandatory in 2005. Therefore, we assume that many investors only started to get ac-
quainted with the complex rules of IAS 19 later. Second, ownership concentration is high
in Germany (Leuz et al. (2003)), i.e. as compared to the United States, there are fewer
international investors. Taken together, we conclude that many shareholders of German
21The variable description is also summarized in table 2.
22For example, under German GAAP – which is applicable to individual financial statements and for com-
panies which are not listed – the discount rate is prescribed by the Federal Bank of Germany.
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companies – institutional as well as non-institutional – are lacking experience with IAS
19 in our sample period and therefore rather stick to the traditional, more conservative
and well-known German pension regime. Accordingly, we do not expect a significant
association between DBOD and MVE and our first hypothesis is:
H1: The discretionary component DBOD is not value relevant in overall terms in a
country with low experience in the complex rules of IAS 19 such as Germany.
2.3.2.2 Influence of the Funded Status on the Value Relevance of DBOD
Companies whose plans are strongly underfunded23 have, under otherwise equal condi-
tions, stronger incentives to reduce the DBO by an opportunistic choice of actuarial ass-
umptions. This is why we examine in accordance with Hann et al. (2007) whether there
is a difference with regard to the funded status of the obligations. We define the extent of
underfunding as the non-discretionary component of the obligation DBOX less the present
value of plan assets PA, divided by the disclosed DBO. In the following estimation equa-
tions III and IV, U indicates a dummy variable equal to 1 if the extent of underfunding is
above the median of underfunding over all companies, and 0 otherwise. Accordingly, we
split our sample in two subsamples and run the regressions III and IV individually.
MVEit =
2011∑
t=2005
αtIt + β1T Ait + β2NPT Lit + β3DBOX,it + β4DBOD,it + β5NIit
+β6EMPit + β7RDit + β8LossDit + β9LossDit · NIit + ut for Uit = 1 (III)
23By underfunded we mean that pension liabilities exceed pension assets.
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MVEit =
2011∑
t=2005
αtIt + β1T Ait + β2NPT Lit + β3DBOX,it + β4DBOD,it + β5NIit
+β6EMPit + β7RDit + β8LossDit + β9LossDit · NIit + ut for Uit = 0 (IV)
With these equations we are able to test whether the use of discretion of companies with
more funded plans is perceived differently from the use of discretion of companies with
distinctly underfunded plans. Due to the stronger incentives for those companies, we ex-
pect that the market is very sensitive to this information, which might counterbalance the
overall inexperience with IAS 19 (see H1). Therefore, we expect that equity valuations
are not adjusted to the traditional, more conservative case here and the discretionary com-
ponent is incorporated in equity valuations. Accordingly, we hypothesize as follows:
H2: The discretionary component DBOD is value relevant for companies with distinctly
underfunded plans.
2.3.3 Data Description
The empirical analysis is based on a sample which consists of the 160 companies from the
main indexes DAX, MDAX, TecDAX and SDAX of the German stock exchange. These
indexes comprise the largest and most traded listed German companies, which often serve
as benchmarks for smaller entities regarding the application of IFRS regulations.
First of all, in accordance with other studies (see for example Leuz et al. (2003), Francis
and Smith (2005) or Pronobis et al. (2009)), we eliminate all banking institutions and
insurance companies from the sample, as their balance sheet structure differs fundamen-
tally from the balance sheet structure of other companies, which would seriously affect
the comparability of the various entities. The basic data of the remaining 123 companies
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has been extracted from Thomson Reuters Datastream, while the relevant specifications
made in the notes concerning the financial assumptions – the discount rates, the rates
of compensation growth and future pension increases, etc. – had to be hand-collected
for the mentioned reasons. We restrict the main sample for our analysis to the period of
2005-2011 due to the mandatory IFRS-application from 2005 onwards. However, we will
provide information on the financial assumptions for the period of 2001 to 2011 (i.e. in-
cluding voluntary IFRS adopters) and additionally run robustness tests for this period.
Since the number of companies increases due to new entries into the indexes over the
years, we first gain a basis of 777 firm-year observations for our analysis. In a next step,
all those observations are eliminated, in which no (or insufficient) specifications were ma-
de regarding the pension obligations. We then determined the industry medians i∗, g∗ and
r∗ for the years 2005-2011, using the sector classification provided by the German stock
exchange.24 We decided to exclude all those sectors to which less than five companies
could be counted,25 since such a small number of companies cannot provide for the de-
termination of reliable medians. In all other sectors, i∗, g∗ and r∗ are determined for those
years in which observations could be gathered for at least five companies. All observa-
tions to which this does not apply were also eliminated, resulting in a further reduction
of our sample size. Our main sample was thus reduced to 98 companies and 624 firm-
year observations. To account for the effects of outliers, both the 0.5-percentile and the
99.5-percentile were winsorized (Tukey (1962), p. 18).
24The German stock exchange classifies each of the listed companies as belonging to one of the following
sectors: Automotive, basic resources, banking institutions, chemicals, construction, consumer, financial
services, food & beverages, industrial, insurance, media, pharma & healthcare, retail, software, technolo-
gy, telecommunication, transportation & logistics and utilities. For further information see German Stock
Exchange (2010).
25These are, apart from the already excluded sectors banking institutions and insurances: Basic resources,
food & beverages, software, technology, telecommunication and utilities.
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2.4 Results
2.4.1 Descriptive Analysis
Companies can influence the total sum of the DBO by choosing actuarial assumptions,
with higher (lower) interest rate or lower (higher) rate of compensation growth and fu-
ture pension increases respectively, resulting in a lower (higher) DBO. According to
IAS 19.120A (n), each company is obliged to specify the parameters they applied in the
notes. Panel A of table 1 provides an overview of the development of the discount rate (i),
the rate of compensation growth (g) and of future pension increases (r). As we want to
give a comprehensive overview on the development of these parameters, we aggregated
them for all industry sectors over the period 2001-2011, i. e. observations are also consi-
dered here which were later excluded from the study due to the marginal representation of
individual sectors in the sample or due to the restriction of the main sample used for the
regressions to 2005-2011. Not surprisingly, we find that the development of actuarial as-
sumptions to some extent depends on the development of macro-economic conditions.
Focusing on the discount rate i, we can see that the mean value decreases in the first half
of the decade reaching a minimum in 2005. Presumably due to the increased volatility
at the financial markets as a result of the financial crisis both the mean and the standard
deviation of the discount rate increase afterwards. While the mean value has reached the
same level as before the crisis in 2010, the standard deviation is still considerably larger in
2010 and 2011. Another indication for the increased heterogeneity in the observations is
the increased spread between the maximum and the minimum value from 2008 onwards,
presumably also a result of the financial crisis.
With respect to future salary increases g and future pension increases r, we can see an
analogous development with the mean of g (r) reaching its minimum in 2005 (2004) and
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its maximum in 2008 (2008). Taking into account the reverse impact of the discount rate
and the future salary/pension increases on the level of the DBO this result is somewhat
counterintuitive. Assuming opportunistic behavior of the management, we would expect
the discount rate and the future salary/pension increases to develop in opposite directions,
i. e. an increase in i is accompanied by a decrease in g/r and vice versa. However, this
result is only counterintuitive without taking into account the relative importance of the
parameters: As the discount rate has by far the highest impact it is possible that companies
tend to influence the level of the DBO only with the discount rate, i. e. g and r are of minor
importance.
As the interquartile range of i, g and r is small, the conclusion could possibly be drawn that
such lack of variability leaves little room for managers to exercise discretion. However,
taking into account the impact of a change in the discount rate on the pension obligation,
this conclusion might be premature.26
[Table 1 about here]
Panel B of table 1 presents the median value of the three parameters differentiated by
industry sectors. It must be noted that for the majority of sectors, the number of companies
necessary for the determination of the median could only be obtained after the transition to
mandatory IFRS accounting in 2005. That is why we restrict our sample for the following
analyses to 2005-2011. From this table we learn that there is substantial heterogeneity
between industry sectors. Within-industry variation (not depicted in the table) is lower,
but far from non-existent. However, heterogeneity per se is not a reason for criticism.
Due to a different structure of the workforce and different specifications of the respective
pension plans, certain heterogeneity in the actuarial assumptions is to be expected. So
26According to a rough rule of thumb for a German setting, a difference in the discount rate of one per-
centage point translates into a change in the pension provision of about 20 %. See Meyer-Schell and
Zimmermann (2008), p. 438.
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far, we learn that the flexibility granted by IAS 19 is used by the preparers of financial
statements.
Panel A of table 2 provides an overview of the main characteristics of our sample, whereas
Panel B shows pairwise Pearson (lower triangle) and Spearman (upper triangle) correla-
tions. A formal description of the variables is given below the table. All variables apart
from EMPit have been standardized by total sales.
[Table 2 about here]
Both mean and median (p(50)) for DBOD are negative but low, compared to DBO and
DBOX. Serving as reference, Hann et al. (2007) find even lower values for their US-
American sample, i.e. with mean and median equal to zero for all decimal places dis-
played. The negative sign indicates that the majority of companies tends to decrease their
obligation by choosing actuarial assumptions carefully. However, the magnitude of DBOD
indicates that by far the largest part of the DBO cannot be assigned to discretion. We be-
lieve that this does not contradict the analysis performed but even increases its value: If we
find that the discretionary component is value relevant to the markets, it has to be assessed
whether the discretion is used to communicate private information or to opportunistically
influence investors. If we fail to find value relevance this may be due to country-specific
characteristics as Hann et al. (2007) have shown that the discretionary component is pri-
ced in a manner similar to the non-discretionary component under US-GAAP.
When running our regressions, we face multicollinearity with respect to the variables T A
and NPT L. Given the fact, that these variables only differ by pension liabilities and the
book value of equity this does not come unexpected. However, as multicollinearity does
only affect confidence intervals27 and both variables are significant in our regressions, we
conclude that multicollinearity is not a problem for our dataset.
27 See Hill et al. (2008).
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2.4.2 Overall Value Relevance of the Discretionary Component
Table 3 summarizes the results of the estimations of models I and II. The only difference
between these two estimations is that the DBO functions as an independent variable in the
first estimation, being disassembled into the non-discretionary component DBOX and the
discretionary component DBOD in the second estimation. For reasons of completeness,
we depict the differences between the coefficients of model I and model II in the last row.
The differences are significant on a common level (except for NI, LossD, and LossD ·NI)
due to the different model specification. However, both the direction and the level of the
coefficients are comparable.
Most variables in model I point in the expected direction and are significant on a conven-
tional level. RD is insignificant but has not been removed from the regression to account
for the service cost anomaly (Barth et al. (1992)). For model II the same is true, with one
major difference: The decomposition of the DBO reveals that only the non-discretionary
part of the DBO, DBOX, is significant. The coefficient of DBOD is higher than the coeffi-
cient of DBOX, i. e. the discretionary part of the DBO tends to influence MVE positively.
However, as the coefficient is insignificant, we conclude that the discretionary component
is not value relevant in overall terms.
The missing value relevance in overall terms is in contrast to Hann et al. (2007) who
find that – under US-GAAP – the discretionary component is incrementally priced by the
market in a manner similar to the non-discretionary component. As the rules for pensi-
on accounting are comparable between US-GAAP and IFRS, we conclude that there are
country-specific characteristics which drive this deviation. From our point of view, cha-
racteristics driving the result are as follows: German investors are not experienced with
the complex rules of pension accounting under IAS 19, as pension accounting was less
complex in Germany before the introduction of IFRS for listed companies in 2005 and,
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hence, adjust their equity valuations accordingly. Taken together, our first hypothesis H1
is supported by the results.
[Table 3 about here]
To compare the two models we take a look at the adjusted R2. At 27.66%, it is marginally
higher for model II than it is for model I at 27.57%. However, there are various econo-
metric difficulties inherent in the simple comparison of the adjusted R2 of two models
(Greene (2003), p. 152-159 and Kennedy (2008), p. 87-88). We thus controlled whether
the difference between the adjusted R2 is significant on a common level by applying the
Vuong (1989) test, summarizing the result in the last column of the differences row. The-
refore, a superiority of model II over I in a statistical sense cannot be observed – due to
the insignificance of DBOD, this was to be expected.
2.4.3 Influence of the Funded Status on the Value Relevance of DBOD
The incentives to (downwardly) manipulate the total sum of pension obligations by a
careful choice of actuarial assumptions increase in correspondence with the underfunding
of plans. We used model III and model IV to verify the hypothesis that the discretionary
component DBOD is value relevant for companies with distinctly underfunded plans (H2).
The results are presented in table 4. Uit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the extent
of underfunding of company i at time t is above the median of underfunding over all
companies. Accordingly, we have split our sample into two subsamples, one including
companies with distinctly underfunded plans and the other including the remainder.
In general, both regressions suffer from the fact that fewer observations are used. Howe-
ver, with regard to model III, all variables (except for RD) are significant. Interestingly,
the coefficient for DBOD is significant on the 10% level. On the contrary, the coefficient
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for DBOD is insignificant for model IV, i.e. in cases where U is 0 and the pension obli-
gations are less underfunded. Therefore, we conclude that discretion in the determination
of the DBO is priced for companies with distinctly underfunded plans and our second
hypothesis is supported. However, the coefficient for DBOD in model III is positive, i. e. a
discretionary increase (decrease) in the overall obligation is accompanied by an increase
(decrease) in market value of equity. As an increased obligation results in higher (expec-
ted) future cash outflows and vice versa, a possible explanation is that investors cherish
a more conservative estimation and punish a discretionary decrease of the overall obliga-
tion which is in accordance with the traditional, more conservative accounting regime in
Germany.
[Table 4 about here]
2.4.4 Robustness
As market value of equity is driven in large extent by growth opportunities, we separately
incorporated one-year, three-year and five-year sales growth into our regression models
(not depicted). These variables were all insignificant and did not improve our models.
The insignificance of sales growth is surprising. However, we believe that the insignifi-
cance is driven by collinearity issues and therefore decided to present our results for the
regressions without sales growth.
We restricted our sample to the period of 2005 to 2011 due to the mandatory IFRS-
adoption for fiscal years beginning in 2005. As a robustness check, we included the years
2001 to 2004 (i.e. the voluntary IFRS-adopters) in our analysis and obtain qualitatively
similar results. The same applies for estimations without the adoption period 2005 and
for estimations without winsorized data.
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The validity of our results is strongly dependent on the functional determination of DBOD,
which is certainly not altogether free of mistakes. We are forced to make assumptions that
influence the amount of DBOD, particularly the fundamental assumption that the scope
of discretion might be determined by a deviation from the industry median, as well as
the assumptions regarding life expectancy (L) and the average years to retirement (N).
Thus, estimating the life expectancy after retirement to a general 18 years is an extreme
simplification. Insofar as there are differences between the various companies under ob-
servation (and undoubtedly there are), DBOD must be flawed. Also, the estimator of the
years to retirement N is based on assumptions, again distorting the determination of the
‘true’ discretionary component.
For this reason we estimated another regression based on Hann et al. (2007), identifying
the proportion of DBOD which can be deduced from the difference between the disclosed
actuarial assumptions and the respective industry medians:
DBOD,it
DBOit
= α + β1(iit − i∗it) + β2(git − g∗it) + β3(rit − r∗it) + ut (V)
Table 5 summarizes the results of this estimation. For the estimation of this model we
restricted our sample to those observations that have complete data for i, g and r. The
coefficients are significant and point in the expected direction. Furthermore, the value of
Ad justed R2 (0.8365) is of interest. It indicates that the significantly largest part of DBOD,itDBOit
can be ascribed to deviations between the disclosed i, g and r and the industry medians
(i∗, g∗ and r∗). This result demonstrates that in this context flawed assumptions about L
and N have less influence on the determination of DBOD. DBOD is mainly driven by
the deviations between the companies’ actuarial assumptions and the respective industry
medians.
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[Table 5 about here]
However, we do not want to conceal two further simplifications, which may lead to erro-
neous measurements: First, in the case of companies providing both domestic and foreign
pension plans, we assumed that the foreign pension plans are of minor importance. Thus
the determination of the scope of discretion in the DBO is only based on domestic actua-
rial assumptions, regardless of the fact that foreign assumptions might also play a role.
We justify this means however by the observation that only a very small proportion of
companies has foreign pension obligations, and that these are significantly lower than the
domestic ones. Second, regarding the specifications disclosed in the notes, it should be
stressed that interest rates as well as the rates of compensation growth and future pensi-
on increases are, contrary to the regulations of IAS 19.120A (n), not always provided in
absolute percentages. Some companies rather present a certain spread for the respective
parameters. However, as these spreads are small, we simply assume that the mean of these
spreads represents the true value of the respective assumptions. This then is incorporated
in the determination of both, the industry medians and DBOD.
2.5 Conclusion
In both accounting literature and standard setting, there is a lot of disagreement as to
the scope of flexibility a management should be allowed in their preparation of IFRS
statements. On the one hand it is argued that discretion may serve to better communicate
company internal information to the statement addressees. Others believe that discretion
might be used to manipulate the balance sheet structure and the earnings and, hence, ac-
counting standards should rather ensure uniform financial statements. The accounting for
pensions and in particular the determination of the defined benefit obligation (DBO) is
interesting for this question for two reasons: First, pensions have significant influence on
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the balance sheet of companies and second, there exists an extensive room for discretion
in the determination of the DBO.28 In this present study we identify that component of the
DBO which cannot be ascribed to discretion by replacing the essential actuarial assump-
tions – discount rate, rate of compensation growth and projected future pension increases
– with their respective industry medians. In calculating the difference between the non-
discretionary component and the disclosed DBO, we obtain that component which we
ascribe to discretion.
Prior research (Hann et al. (2007)) yields the result that the discretionary component of
the DBO contains value relevant information and hence advocates to keep the flexibility
within pension accounting. On the contrary, we hypothesize that the discretionary com-
ponent DBOD is not value relevant in Germany. We justify this hypothesis by the fact that
pension accounting in Germany was less complex before the mandatory introduction of
IFRS for consolidated financial statements in 2005. Hence, we hypothesize that investors
in German companies are less experienced with IAS 19 and therefore adjust their equi-
ty valuations to reflect the traditional, more conservative German pension regime. Based
on the Ohlson (1995) link between accounting data and firm value, we run two diffe-
rent regression models – one excluding and one including DBOD –, which support our
hypothesis as we find that DBOD is not value relevant in overall terms.
Furthermore, we analyze whether the degree of underfunding moderates investor’s per-
ception and their equity valuations. We hypothesize that investors are very sensitive to
pension information for companies with distinctly underfunded plans, which might coun-
terbalance the overall inexperience with IAS 19 for those companies. As DBOD is si-
gnificant at the 10% level for those companies, we find weak evidence that supports this
hypothesis. The sign of DBOD is positive for this regression, indicating that an increase
(decrease) in the obligation results in a higher (lower) equity valuation. A possible ex-
28Therefore, it is not surprising that we find considerable heterogeneity in the actuarial parameters.
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planation is that the markets cherish a more conservative estimation and punish a more
aggressive estimation of the overall obligation.
The contribution of our study to accounting knowledge is twofold: First, we provide com-
prehensive information on the development of actuarial assumptions in Germany over
the last decade. Second, we contribute to the discussion of uniformity versus flexibili-
ty in financial reporting with a country-specific result contradicting prior research (Hann
et al. (2007)) for Germany. Our results indicate that the increased flexibility of IAS 19 as
compared to pension accounting regulations under German GAAP does not necessarily
enhance the decision-usefulness of financial statements. Only for distinctly underfunded
pension plans, investors seem to process the difference between the individual actuarial as-
sumption and the industry’s median in their equity valuations. However, as the flexibility
of IAS 19 also has some disadvantages, namely those created by management’s opportu-
nistic behavior, the standardsetter should consider the experience of German companies
with a discount rate prescribed by a federal authority as part of a fundamental review of
pension and related benefits.29 Furthermore, it should be investigated if our results are
robust for other countries applying IFRS and if flexibility may become worthwhile in a
manner similar to the US when investors gain more experience with the complex rules of
IAS 19.
29According to the IASB, such a fundamental review is necessary but will not
be implemented before 2015. See http://www.ifrs.org/Current-Projects/IASB-Projects/
Post-employment-Benefits-(including-Pensions)/Pages/Post-employment-Benefits-(including-pensions)
.aspx.
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Figure 2.1: Discount rate of Lanxess AG (solid line) versus chemicals industry (dashed
line) 2005-2011
48
Panel A - Development of i, g and r
i 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Mean 0.0558 0.0557 0.0541 0.0502 0.0423 0.0445 0.0538 0.0588 0.0530 0.0481 0.4705
Standard deviation 0.0046 0.0039 0.0027 0.0039 0.0026 0.0031 0.0039 0.0049 0.0056 0.0051 0.0071
Minimum 0.0495 0.0488 0.05 0.0401 0.0359 0.031 0.0415 0.0427 0.03 0.0275 0.025
Maximum 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.0552 0.066 0.08 0.073 0.067 0.062
p(25) 0.05 0.0525 0.0525 0.0475 0.04 0.043 0.0525 0.0575 0.051 0.0453 0.046
p(50) 0.0575 0.0575 0.055 0.05 0.0425 0.045 0.055 0.059 0.0528 0.048 0.049
p(75) 0.06 0.0575 0.055 0.0525 0.044 0.0459 0.0577 0.06 0.055 0.0508 0.05
g
Mean 0.0236 0.0230 0.0243 0.0236 0.0225 0.0226 0.0257 0.0259 0.0243 0.0239 0.0227
Standard deviation 0.0103 0.0087 0.0077 0.0087 0.0080 0.0085 0.0093 0.0097 0.0097 0.0091 0.010
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maximum 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.0354 0.0418 0.05 0.049 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.0408
p(25) 0.02175 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.024 0.02 0.02 0.02
p(50) 0.0275 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.0272 0.025 0.025 0.025
p(75) 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.0275 0.0275 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
r
Mean 0.0159 0.0163 0.0168 0.0153 0.0150 0.0157 0.0174 0.0190 0.0183 0.0180 0.0150
Standard deviation 0.0030 0.0028 0.0039 0.0043 0.0037 0.0034 0.0042 0.0042 0.0040 0.0036 0.007
Minimum 0.012 0.012 0.01 0 0.009 0.0088 0 0 0.005 0.005 0
Maximum 0.02 0.02 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.0238 0.0285 0.0287 0.0315 0.026 0.061
p(25) 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.013 0.0138 0.015 0.0175 0.0167 0.0173 0.013
p(50) 0.015 0.015 0.0163 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.0175 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.0175
p(75) 0.0185 0.0193 0.0193 0.0175 0.0175 0.0175 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Panel B - Development of i∗ , g∗ and r∗ differentiated by industries
i∗ 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Automobile - - - 0.049 0.0425 0.045 0.055 0.0575 0.053 0.049 0.047
Chemicals - - - 0.05 0.0433 0.045 0.054 0.06 0.054 0.049 0.0475
Construction - - - - 0.04 0.045 0.0555 0.0595 0.054 0.0523 0.049
Consumer 0.05625 0.0575 0.055 0.0485 0.0413 0.043 0.055 0.059 0.05 0.0465 0.045
Industrial 0.06 0.0575 0.055 0.05 0.0425 0.045 0.054 0.0588 0.0528 0.05 0.0496
Media - - - - 0.0425 0.045 0.057 0.0575 0.051 0.0413 0.037
Pharma & Healthcare - - - 0.05 0.046 0.045 0.054 0.062 0.0525 0.047 0.049
Retail - - - - 0.04 0.045 0.056 0.06 0.054 0.048 0.053
Transp. & Logistics - - - - - - 0.055 0.06 0.0525 0.0463 0.0475
g∗
Automobile - - - 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.0273 0.0275 0.0268 0.0270 0.0243
Chemicals - - - 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.0275 0.0275 0.025 0.025 0.025
Construction - - - - 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.0263 0.025 0.0263 0.03
Consumer 0.02675 0.025 0.025 0.0225 0.0275 0.03 0.0325 0.035 0.03 0.0325 0.0325
Industrial 0.0275 0.025 0.0275 0.02625 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.0256 0.0251 0.025 0.025
Media - - - - 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.0175 0.0163 0.015
Pharma & Healthcare - - - 0.025 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.029 0.0294 0.0296
Retail - - - - 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.0258
Transp. & Logistics - - - - - - 0.025 0.0275 0.025 0.025 0.025
r∗
Automobile - - - 0.016 0.015 0.01625 0.0195 0.0185 0.0208 0.0201 0.0189
Chemicals - - - 0.0125 0.015 0.0165 0.0198 0.02 0.0175 0.0175 0.0175
Construction - - - - 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.02 0.0175 0.0175 0.0175
Consumer 0.0193 0.0185 0.0175 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.018 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.0175
Industrial 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.0175 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Media - - - - 0.015 0.015 0.0175 0.02 0.01125 0.01 0.02
Pharma & Healthcare - - - 0.015 0.01325 0.0155 0.0175 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.019
Retail - - - - 0.015 0.015 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.0195 0.019
Transp. & Logistics- - - - - - - 0.0188 0.02 0.0194 0.0169 0.0154
Panel A summarizes information on the discount rate i, the rate of compensation growth g and of future pension increases r over the period 2001-2011.
Panel B presents the median value of those parameters (highlighted with asterisks) differentiated by industry sectors as specified by the German
stock exchange. Missing values are due to the fact that not all sectors offer sufficient observations in all years.
Table 1: Development of actuarial parameters
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Panel A - Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min Max p(25) p(50) p(75)
MVEit 624 1.244 1.807 0.0098 11.626 0.338 0.718 1.362
T Ait 624 1.459 2.022 0.338 14.419 0.719 0.994 1.359
NPT Lit 624 1.392 2.013 0.318 14.201 0.661 0.915 1.252
DBOit 624 0.112 0.109 0.000 0.470 0.0278 0.077 0.165
DBOX,it 624 0.114 0.110 0.000 0.452 0.027 0.077 0.167
DBOD,it 624 -0.002 0.012 -0.050 0.037 -0.005 -0.000 0.003
NIit 624 0.0358 0.079 -0.286 0.205 0.014 0.041 0.070
RDit 624 0.024 0.030 0 0.144 0 0.016 0.035
EMPit 624 38,366 82,960 89 536,350 2,623 7,871 30,204
Panel B - Correlation Matrix
MVEit T Ait NPT Lit DBOit DBOX,it DBOD,it NIit RDit EMPit
MVEit 1 0.394*** 0.126*** -0.026 -0.031 0.036 0.459*** 0.096* -0.404***
T Ait 0.225*** 1 0.782*** 0.245*** 0.240*** 0.085** 0.193*** 0.123*** -0.081**
NPT Lit 0.195*** 0.988*** 1 -0.022 -0.030 0.138*** -0.058 0.125*** -0.035
DBOit -0.046 0.003 -0.077* 1 0.995*** -0.002 0.109*** 0.425*** 0.420***
DBOX,it -0.052 -0.005 -0.079** 0.992*** 1 -0.082** 0.101** 0.435*** 0.418***
DBOD,it 0.042 0.023 0.035 -0.076 -0.192*** 1 0.082** -0.048 0.014
NIit 0.153*** -0.160*** -0.200*** 0.124*** 0.012*** 0.000 1 0.157*** -0.084**
RDit 0.016 -0.113*** -0.178*** 0.309*** 0.301*** 0.022 0.082** 1 0.122***
EMPit -0.173*** -0.054 -0.039 0.306*** 0.329*** -0.185*** -0.008 0.029 1
Panel A provides an overview of the main characteristics of our sample over the period 2005-2011.
All variables except for EMPit have been divided by beginning total sales. Both the 0.5-percentile
and the 99.5-percentile were winsorized to account for outliers.
Panel B shows pairwise Pearson correlations (lower triangle) and pairwise Spearman correlations
(upper triangle). ***, ** and * show significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Variable definitions are as follows:
MVEit: Market capitalization as of three month after balance sheet date
of company i at time t
T Ait: Total assets of company i at time t
NPT Lit: Non-pension total liabilities of company i at time t
DBOit: Defined benefit obligation of company i at time t
DBOX,it: Non-discretionary proportion of DBOit of company i at time t
DBOD,it: Discretionary proportion of DBOit of company i at time t
NIit: Income before extraordinary items of company i at time t
RDit: Research and development expenses of company i at time t
EMPit: Average number of full-time employees during a fiscal year
of company i at time t
Table 2: Descriptive statistics, correlation matrix and explanation of variables
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Dependent Variable: MVE |Method: Panel Least Squares with period fixed effects | Total observations: 624 | Firm-clustered standard errors Ad j.R2
Model I: MVEit = β1TAit + β2NPTLit + β3DBOit + β5NIit + β6EMPit + β7RDit + β8LossDit + β9LossDitNIit + ut
Model II: MVEit = β1TAit + β2NPTLit + β3DBOX,it + β4DBOD,it + β5NIit + β6EMPit + β7RDit + β8LossDit + β9LossDitNIit + ut
Expected Sign + - - + +/- + - -
Estimation results
Model I: 0.79298 -0.92978 -1.84063 12.93873 -1.73·10−6 -1.01376 0.99923 -8.0462 0.2757
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.58) (0.00) (0.00)
Model II 0.83352 -0.98749 -1.97517 3.28551 12.9930 -1.48·10−6 -1.15534 1.00513 -8.12161 0.2766
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.53) (0.00) (0.02) (0.53) (0.00) (0.00)
Difference -0.04054 0.057715 0.13454 0.05427 -0.25·10−6 0.14158 -0.00589 0.07541 -0.0009
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.28) (0.00) (0.09) (0.38) (0.30) (0.40)
For these estimations we used panel least squares with period fixed effects and firm-clustered standard errors. For reasons of comprehensibility we do not depict the coefficients for the fixed effects.
For variable definitions see table 2. P-values in parentheses for coefficients and differences are two-sided. The p-value for the difference in Adj. R2 is based on the Vuong (1989)-Test.
In the last row, we depict the differences of the coefficients of model I and model II for reasons of completeness. These differences are mostly significant due to the different model
specification. However, both the direction and the level of the coefficients are comparable.
Table 3: Estimation results of model I and model II
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Dependent Variable: MVE |Method: Panel Least Squares with period fixed effects| Total observations: 624 | Firm-clustered standard errors Ad j.R2
Model III: MVEit = β1TAit + β2NPTLit + β3DBOX,it + β4DBOD,it + β5NIit + β6EMPit + β7RDit + β8LossDit + β9LossDitNIit + ut
(Uit = 1 | Observations: 294)
Model IV: MVEit = β1TAit + β2NPTLit + β3DBOX,it + β4DBOD,it + β5NIit + β6EMPit + β7RDit + β8LossDit + β9LossDitNIit + ut
(Uit = 0 | Observations: 330)
Expected Sign + - - + +/- + - -
Estimation results
Model III: 0.85165 -0.99779 -2.58588 11.0522 12.4759 2.23·10−9 0.58093 0.97167 -6.77898 0.3907
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.08) (0.00) (0.99) (0.77) (0.00) (0.04)
Model IV: 0.72116 -0.82980 -1.37565 0.22857 12.2532 1.39·10−6 0.13538 0.79477 -9.03781 0.2709
(0.07) (0.11) (0.08) (0.95) (0.00) (0.09) (0.95) (0.04) (0.03)
For these estimations we used panel least squares with period fixed effects and firm-clustered standard errors. For reasons of comprehensibility we do not depict the coefficients for the fixed effects.
For variable definitions see table 2. P-values in parentheses are two-sided. We have split our sample into two parts depending on the degree of underfunding Uit . which is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the extent of underfunding of company i at time t is above the median of underfunding over all companies and 0 otherwise.
Table 4: Estimation results of model III and model IV
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Dependent Variable: DBOD/DBO |Method: Panel Least Squares | Total observations: 491 Ad j.R2
Firm-clustered standard errors
Model V: DBOD,itDBOit = α +β1(iit − i∗it) +β2(git − g∗it) +β3(rit − r∗it) +ut
Expected Sign +/- - + +
0.00012 -14.69669 6.23484 7.16314 0.8365
(0.96) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
The validity of our results is strongly dependent on the functional deviation of that part of the DBO that we ascribe
to discretion. For this reason we estimated model V, the dependent variable being the discretionary DBO
divided by the total amount of the disclosed DBO. As explanatory variables we used the deviations between the
company-specific actuarial assumptions and the industry medians.
Table 5: Estimation result of model V
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3.1 Introduction
Leaders in public opinion, academics, consumers and investors have recently been ad-
vocating that businesses should not merely be geared toward profit at the expenses of
fulfilling their responsibilities to employees, the environment or society. Accordingly,
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has become a popular and increasingly used term
among firms, authorities and in the press in the last years (Ditlev-Simonsen (2011)). At
the beginning, non-financial reports of companies were likely to have titles related to ’en-
vironment’. As time went on, ’environment’ has been replaced by ’sustainability’ and
subsequently ’responsibility’.1 Ditlev-Simonsen (2011) provides evidence on this topic,
finding that CSR can, to some extent, be perceived as a trend and that the increase in the
number and scope of non-financial reports does not necessarily reflect the same degree of
change in corporations. With the growing importance of reporting about CSR activities
for firms, CSR-related research has grown as well. Many authors have investigated the
relation between CSR and financial performance and – in summary – find a positive rela-
tionship.2 This research approach, however, does not answer the question whether firms
that are highlighting their CSR activities have gone through internal changes and really
behave socially responsibly. For this reasons, we investigate the association between CSR
and earnings quality.3 This is based on the notion that it is socially responsible to pre-
pare transparent high-quality financial reports to facilitate decisions of statement users.
As prior research on this topic has primarily focused on the United States, we want to
explore the question for an European sample of firms applying IFRS. Our measure of
CSR is provided by Kirchhoff Consult AG, a German consulting firm, which issues the
1Today, the term ”Corporate Social Responsibility“ may be regarded as an umbrella term, covering dif-
ferent areas such as ’corporate citizenship’, ’corporate social performance’, ’corporate accountability’ or
’business ethics’. These terms are used more or less synonymously in accounting research.
2See section 3.2 of the present paper for further details.
3’Earnings quality’ is a common proxy for the overall quality of financial reporting, which can be defined as
an evaluation of the extent to which the financial reporting is free of manipulation and accurately reflects
the financial condition and operating success of a business.
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so-called ’Good Company Ranking’, a CSR ranking for the 90 largest European firms.
We employ three different dimensions of earnings quality. First, we employ the degree
of accrual based earnings management using (i) the performance adjusted modified Jo-
nes Model (Kothari et al. (2005)) and (ii) an IFRS-variation of this model considering
amortizable intangible assets. Second, we employ the degree of accounting conservatism
using a variation of the earnings-returns regression of Basu (1997) as proposed by Khan
and Watts (2009). Third, we use the quality of accruals in predicting operating cash flows
(Dechow and Dichev (2002)).
In summary, we find (i) that CSR is positively associated with the degree of earnings
management, (ii) that CSR is negatively associated with the degree of accounting con-
servatism and (iii) that CSR is negatively associated with accrual quality. In other words,
firms which conduct more earnings management, report bad news less timely and have
lower quality accruals, have higher CSR scores. Our results are in contrast to parts of
prior research. Therefore, we demonstrate that our results are robust to measurement er-
ror regarding both our measure of CSR and our measures of earnings quality. We argue
that there are country-specific factors which moderate the association between CSR and
earnings quality.
Our study contributes to accounting knowledge in the following ways: First, we employ
a variation of the performance adjusted modified Jones model, which we believe to be
more realistic for IFRS samples. To the best of our knowledge, such a variation has not
been proposed before. Second, combined with the results of prior research, we provide
evidence that the association between CSR and earnings quality differs between ’insider
economies’ and ’outsider economies’ (Leuz et al. (2003)). Last, our results show that
the increasing trend to invest in or to report about CSR activities does not necessarily
lead to real changes in corporations. Rather, it is possible that this trend is driven by
opportunism.
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The remainder of the paper at hand is structured as follows: Section 3.2 introduces related
literature and develops our hypothesis. Section 3.3 provides information on our research
approach, i.e. on our measure of CSR and on our measures of earnings quality. Section 3.4
presents our results next to different robustness checks, while section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
3.2.1 Literature Review
According to the most widely used definition of Carroll (1979; 1991), CSR comprises four
responsibilities for corporations, namely (1) the economic responsibility to be profitable,
(2) the legal responsibility to abide the laws of society, (3) the ethical responsibility to do
what is right, just and fair and (4) the philanthropic responsibility to be a good corporate
citizen by contributing resources for various kinds of social, educational, recreational or
cultural purposes. The first dimension (being profitable, i.e. increasing shareholder we-
alth) constitutes the foundation for the commitment to act socially responsible by taking
actions to improve employee, customer and community quality of life (i.e. serving other
stakeholders’ interests).4
A modern understanding of CSR can be found in European Commission (2011). The
Commission defines CSR as ”the responsibility of enterprises for their impacts on so-
ciety. Respect for applicable legislation, and for collective agreements between social
partners, is a prerequisite for meeting that responsibility. To fully meet their corporate
social responsibility, enterprises should have in place a process to integrate social, envi-
ronmental, ethical, human rights and consumer concerns into their business operations
and core strategy in close collaboration with their stakeholders, with the aim of:
4See also Porter and Kramer (2006) who state that firms are socially responsible, because it ”will improve
a company’s image, strengthen its brand, enliven morale and even raise the value of its stock“.
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• Maximizing the creation of shared value for their owners/shareholders and for their
other stakeholders and society at large;
• Identifying, preventing and mitigating their possible adverse impacts.“
Both definitions have in common that the creation of shareholder wealth is the basis for
the corporation’s socially responsible activities. Accordingly, there has been extensive re-
search on the relationship between CSR and financial performance. Waddock and Graves
(1997) analyze the association between CSR and prior financial performance (measured
as return on assets, return on equity and return on sales) and find that these are positively
related. The results of Ruf et al. (2001) point in the same direction, as they find that CSR is
positively associated with return on sales. Additionally, the authors provide a deeper theo-
retical framework by placing the relationship between CSR and financial performance in
the context of the well-established stakeholder theory. In summary, the authors conclude
that the dominant stakeholder group – shareholders – benefits when management meets
the demands of multiple stakeholders. Although most studies indicate that CSR is a de-
terminant of financial performance, some aspects of this research have been inconsistent,
e.g. the question which CSR measure should be used or which control variables should
be incorporated in the regressions. For this reason, Callan and Thomas (2009) provide an
update and reinvestigation of this matter. Even after this update, the general observation
that there is a positive relation between CSR and financial performance holds, implying
that the benefits associated with investment in socially responsible practices outweigh the
costs of doing so (Waddock and Graves (1997)).5
However, research on the relation between CSR and financial performance does not reflect
whether an improvement of CSR really leads to changes in corporations. Therefore, other
researchers investigate the relation between CSR and the quality of financial reporting
5A more comprehensive overview of this area of research is provided in Callan and Thomas (2009).
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which is usually approximated by means of earnings quality.6
To the best of our knowledge, the study of Chih et al. (2008) is the first to investigate this
relation. The authors use data of 1,653 firms from 46 countries which are included in the
FTSE Global index. They divide their sample in a CSR subsample and a non-CSR sub-
sample and investigate whether firms in their CSR subsample exhibit different characteri-
stics with regard to earnings management. They find that (i) an increase in CSR mitigates
earnings smoothing, (ii) an increase in CSR increases earnings aggressiveness and (iii) an
increase in CSR mitigates earnings losses and earnings decreases avoidance. Laksmana
and Yang (2009) examine the relationship between corporate citizenship (which is often
used synonymously for CSR) and four earnings attributes, namely persistence, predicta-
bility, smoothness and accrual quality.7 They find that firms with high CSR have earnings
that are more predictable, more persistent and smoother than the earnings of firms with
lower CSR. Hong and Andersen (2011) also explore the relationship between CSR and
earnings management. Using US-data, they find that more socially responsible firms have
higher quality accruals and less activity-based earnings management. Prior et al. (2008)
investigate the connection between CSR and earnings management using a sample of
593 firms from 26 countries. As a proxy for CSR they use data provided by Sustainable
Investment Research International (SiRi) Company Inc., while earnings management is
measured using the performance adjusted modified Jones Model (Kothari et al. (2005)).
The authors find a positive relation between CSR and earnings management, i.e. the more
earnings management, the better the CSR. Choi and Pae (2011) do not assume a unilateral
relation between CSR and earnings quality, as they run two different sets of regressions,
one using ethical commitment (another term which is often used synonymously for CSR)
as dependent variable, the other using earnings quality as the dependent variable. The
6See Dechow et al. (2010) or Healy and Wahlen (1999) for a comprehensive overview of earnings quality
research.
7See Francis et al. (2004) and Dechow and Dichev (2002).
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authors find that firms with a higher level of ethical commitment engage in less earnings
management, report earnings more conservatively, and predict future cash flows more ac-
curately than those with a lower level of ethical commitment. The most recent paper on
that topic is from Kim et al. (2012). Their study examines whether socially responsible
firms behave differently from other firms in their financial reporting. They find that social-
ly responsible firms are less likely (1) to manage earnings through discretionary accruals,
(2) to manipulate real operating activities and (3) to be subject of SEC investigations.
The authors use the by far largest sample of firms and enrich the research area with some
important insights. The paper of Kim et al. (2012) is part of a ’forum on corporate social
responsibility research in accounting’ in ’The Accounting Review’, which documents the
growing focus on CSR research within the accounting literature.
In summary, the results of previous research on the association between CSR and earnings
quality are mixed. While Prior et al. (2008) find a positive association between CSR and
the degree of earnings management, Choi and Pae (2011) and Kim et al. (2012) find that
CSR mitigates earnings management.8 Table 1 recapitulates the design and findings of
prior research regarding the relationship between CSR and earnings quality. We want to
contribute to this debate with a focus on European firms applying IFRS.
[Table 1 about here]
3.2.2 Hypothesis Development
According to stakeholder as well as shareholder theory, the main purpose of a firm’s
management is to increase shareholder wealth.9 As stated earlier, increasing shareholder
8The results of Chih et al. (2008) are somewhere in between.
9 Although shareholder theory and stakeholder theory are often seen as two opposing concepts, under both
theories profit generation is the outcome of a well-managed company. Stakeholder theory differs from
shareholder theory only by the fact that it recognizes that a firm can maximize value by understanding how
it interacts with its various stakeholders (see for example Pfarrer (2010)).
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wealth by being profitable forms the foundation of a firm’s socially responsible behavior
(Carroll (1991)).10 Therefore, a positive relation between CSR and financial performance
which has been evidenced in the literature is not surprising. However, the question remains
as to whether a good CSR is associated with a good quality of financial reporting.
A firm’s CEO that fosters the firm’s employees to act and the firm’s operations to be
socially responsible may justly be characterized as ”true and honest merchant“, a concept
which traces back to Balducci (1340):
”What Every True and Honest Merchant Must Have Within Himself. Integrity always
suits him, [l]ong foresight keeps him well, [a]nd what he promises doesn’t come lacking;
[a]nd he should be, if able, of beautiful and honest behaviour [a]ccording to what need
or reason he intends. And to buy cheap he sells dear, [b]eyond rebuke with a beautiful
welcome, [h]e awails himself of the church and gives for God, [h]e grows in a merit, and
sells with a word. Usury and the game of dice are forbidden [a]nd take away everything.
He writes his calculations well and does not err. Amen.“11
Following this concept, a positive relation between CSR and earnings quality could be
hypothesized, as a ”true and honest merchant“ is expected to make responsible decisions
and maintain transparency in financial reporting. This relation would also be in line with
prior results of Choi and Pae (2011) and Kim et al. (2012).
With regard to principal agent theory (Jensen and Meckling (1976)), corporate reporting is
often seen as solution to mitigate information asymmetry and conflicts of interest between
10Based on the work of Freeman (1984), Freeman et al. (2004), stakeholder theory can be complemented by
both transaction cost economics (Williamson (1975; 1985)) and the resource based view of the company
(Wernerfelt (1985), Barney (1986; 1991)). From a transaction cost economics perspective, firms that sa-
tisfy stakeholder demands or accurately signal their willingness to cooperate can often avoid higher costs
that result from more formalized contractual compliance mechanisms. From a resource-based perspective,
firms meeting stakeholder demands can see this as a strategic investment, requiring commitments beyond
the minimum necessary to satisfy stakeholders. From either perspective, improving CSR leads to higher
financial performance, whether it is due to reduced costs or increased revenues (Ruf et al. (2001)).
11Text quoted from Dotson (2002).
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the principal, i.e. shareholders, and the agent, i.e. the management (Ruhnke and Simons
(2012)). If principal agent theory is complemented by stakeholder theory, the principal
might as well represent other stakeholders such as society or government. In that case,
CSR reporting might mitigate information asymmetries with regard to the social or envi-
ronmental performance of the company (see figure 3.1).
[Figure 3.1 about here]
One aspect of this relation is of particular interest for the association between CSR and
earnings quality. The idea of bounded rationality (Simon (1955)) states that an indivi-
dual’s rationality is limited due to constraints of information, time or cognitive abilities.
Hence, she may not be able to use all information provided by a company or, in other
words, information regarding CSR activities may even replace pure financial informati-
on in her decision-making process. Hence, companies with low earnings quality may use
CSR reporting to cover up their earnings management activities through means of an ”in-
formation overload“.12 Furthermore, a report of Christian Aid, a British NGO, gives three
impressive examples of firms that put high effort in a good corporate image with respect
to CSR while at the same time not acting socially responsible (Christian Aid (2004)).
These firms are Shell, British American Tobacco and Coca-Cola – internationally known
large scale enterprises actively highlighting their socially responsible behavior (Chih et al.
(2008)).13 If those firms use CSR reporting to cover up their de facto socially irresponsi-
ble behavior, they may be actively engaged in earnings management as well. In the words
of Kim et al. (2012) firms may buy a form of reputation insurance, which gives them a
license to manage earnings. Investing in and reporting about CSR gives the impression
12See among others Agnew and Szykman (2005).
13We want to bring forward an important distinction here: Corporate Social Responsibility is often linked
with the idea of companies ’doing good’. However, companies also have the responsibility for ’avoiding
bad’ in order to prevent Corporate Social Irresponsibility (Lin-Hi and Mu¨ller (forthcoming in 2013)).
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of a transparent firm, while the firm is ”hiding“ behind transparency and engaging in ear-
nings management. This relation would also be in line with results of Prior et al. (2008).
Furthermore, managers may invest in CSR for reasons of self-interest. There may be in-
centives to do so to advance their careers or their personal reputation. These opportunistic
incentives are in contrast to our understanding of a ’true and honest merchant’. On the
other hand, a positive association between CSR and the degree of earnings management
might also be driven by the fact that managers might invest in CSR activities at the expen-
se of shareholders because they believe that being a good corporate citizen is worthwhile
even when doing so is not in the best interest of shareholders (Moser and Martin (2012)).
Managers who do so might try to cover up the pernicious impact of their CSR decisions
on shareholder wealth by managing the firm’s earnings. For example, in case of disasters
Deutsche Post DHL uses its worldwide logistics network to support disaster relief.14 This
decreases the firm’s earnings as there are no revenues but exceptional expenditures. In the
short run, Deutsche Post DHL might mitigate the negative impact on shareholder wealth
by managing their earnings upwards.15 Accordingly, they might engage in earnings mana-
gement to cover up their socially responsible behavior. Just like the motives for managing
earnings may be related to both, socially responsible as well as socially irresponsible acti-
vities, there is no clear consensus as to whether earnings management per se is pernicious
or beneficial to shareholders.16 In this paper, however, we mainly focus on the pernicious
impact of earnings management in line with the definitions of Schipper (1989) and Miller
and Bahnson (2002).
Taking together all arguments, we believe that there is more support for a negative relation
between CSR and earnings quality and, hence, our hypothesis is:
H1: CSR is negatively associated with earnings quality.
14See Kirchhoff Consult AG (2009) for further details and other examples.
15In the long run, however, the behavior might increase Deutsche Post DHL’s reputation and, hence, share-
holder wealth as well.
16See Ronen and Yaari (2008), pp. 25-26.
69
3.3 Research Design
3.3.1 Measurement of CSR
There are several sources of information about CSR.17 Although some researchers state
that CSR data of Kinder, Lydenberg and Domini (KLD) (KLD Research and Analytics,
Inc (2006)) has been established as de facto research standard for measuring CSR (Kim
et al. (2012)), we do not use this data. As a result of the prominence of the KLD data,
research on the relationship between CSR and earnings quality has up to this point mainly
focused on the United States (see Hong and Andersen (2011), Laksmana and Yang (2009),
Kim et al. (2012)). In contrast to this, we want to explore this topic in an European context
for firms applying IFRS. This is why we use CSR data provided by Kirchhoff Consult AG
(KC) (Kirchhoff Consult AG (2009)), a German consulting firm. KC issues the so-called
’Good Company Ranking’, providing CSR data for the 90 largest firms in Europe along
the dimensions society, employees, environment and corporate performance. From our
point of view, this ranking is the most comprehensive and sophisticated CSR ranking
for European firms. KC compiles information on CSR for every second year beginning
in 2005. The ’Good Company Ranking’ is available for 2005, 2007 and 2009 and by
assuming a linear relation we additionally calculate CSR scores for 2006 and 2008. In
each of the four dimensions, firms are rated on a range from one to 25, so that by summing
up a total CSR score of 100 can be achieved. As not all firms are continuously included
in the ranking, we use an unbalanced panel for our analyses.
The rating in the category society is based on an expert analysis conducted by the Center
for Corporate Citizenship of the Catholic University of Eichsta¨tt-Ingolstadt, Germany. It
evaluates firms with respect to their ’business case’ (value of social commitment of the
17An overview is given at http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/conferences/
2013-corporate-accountability-reporting/Pages/databases.aspx.
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firm for the firm), their ’social case’ (value of social commitment of the firm for the socie-
ty) and their transparency (credibility of communicated social commitment). The score in
the category employees is obtained using a comprehensible set of objective criteria evalua-
ting firms with respect to their ’HR strategy and ethical principles’, their ’implemented
social responsibility measures’, their ’human capital management’ and their ’corporate
communication of HR information’. In addition, firms have to meet some essential cri-
teria (publicly available code of conduct, HR strategy including reporting on risks and
opportunities, detailed reporting of staff development with respect to FTEs, wages and
motivation) to be able to receive top scores. The dimension environment is based on an ex-
pert analysis as well. It is structured along the lines ’integration of environmental factors
in business processes’, ’operational environmental performance’, ’environmental issues
along the value chain’, ’ecological innovations’ and ’communication with stakeholders
with regard to environmental issues’. In each of these categories, the group of experts
answers questions, such as ’Are environmental guidelines implemented?’, and awards
points to the firms. The consideration of the last dimension – performance – in a corpo-
rate social responsibility ranking might seem counterintuitive. However, CSR does not
stand for an enhancement of ethical and ecological standards disregarding the firm’s core
objective, i.e. maximizing shareholder wealth. At least in the long run, CSR is believed to
be of utmost importance for economic success. In the ranking, firms are evaluated based
on total shareholder return, EBIT-margin and volatility of cash flows as compared to the
benchmark index STOXX 50. Furthermore, points are awarded for transparent reporting,
e.g. releases of quarterly financial statements or good investor relations website.18
For the analysis of the association between corporate social responsibility and earnings
quality we only focus on the dimensions society, employees and environment and calcu-
late a new score CS Rnew by adding up these three components. This is done to prevent
18For further details on the four dimensions see Kirchhoff Consult AG (2009).
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problems of multicollinearity between the performance score in the KC ranking and our
measures of earnings quality. We include the original KC CS Rtotal score in our robustness
checks.
3.3.2 Measurement of Earnings Quality
In line with Choi and Pae (2011), we use three different measures of earnings quality
for our analysis, namely discretionary accruals, the degree of accounting conservatism
and the quality of accruals. We believe that the use of different perspectives of earnings
quality will improve the reliability of our results.
3.3.2.1 Discretionary Accruals
We estimate the following accrual models to obtain a proxy for the degree of discretionary
earnings management.
T Ait
Ait−1
= α0 + β1
1
Ait−1
+ β2
∆S alesit − ∆Receivablesit
Ait−1
+ β3
PPEit
Ait−1
(1)
+ β4ROAit + εit
T Ait
Ait−1
= α0 + β1
1
Ait−1
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T Ait is total accruals and is calculated as follows:19
T Ait = (∆Current assetsit − ∆Cashit)
− (∆Current liabilitiesit − ∆Current portion o f long term debtit
− ∆Income tax payableit) − Depreciation and amortization expenseit
Ait−1 is total assets used as a deflator in both models; PPEit is property, plant and equip-
ment and ROAit is lagged return on assets.20 Model 1 is known as the performance adjus-
ted modified Jones Model (Kothari et al. (2005)). We use this model instead of the (mo-
dified) Jones model because Kothari et al. (2005) show that it enhances the reliability of
earnings management research.21 The accrual process is defined as function of sales grow-
th (adjusted for growth in credit sales), PPE and return on assets. However, we also use
an additional variation of the model, which we implement because of the fact that we use
IFRS data. In model 2 we include amortizable intangibles (calculated as total intangible
assets less goodwill) scaled by lagged total assets. We do this because the other side of the
estimation equation (the accrual process) includes depreciation and amortization expense.
To explain that part of total accruals which is related to amortization, we believe that it is
appropriate to include amortizable intangibles. Comparing IFRS accounting principles to
US-GAAP, the recognition principles for intangible assets are less restrictive under IFRS
and, hence, intangible assets are more important for the balance sheet structure of firms
applying IFRS. For example, under IAS 38 firms are allowed to capitalize development
expenses when both economic and technical feasibilities are established while US GAAP
19Rephrased in Worldscope items total accruals is calculated as [#WC02201−#WC02003]− [#WC03051−
#WC018232 − #WC04828] − #WC01151
20For variable definitions see Appendix A.
21The Jones Model (Jones (1991)) and the modified Jones Model (Dechow et al. (1995)) will serve as a
robustness check.
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requires firms to expense these costs. In our sample, intangible assets (excluding good-
will) account for 6.3% of beginning total assets in 2005, while this proportion increases
to 10.9% in 2009. We understand this as an additional argument to include amortizable
intangible assets in our econometric model of the accrual process because the relative
importance of intangibles increased and disregarding intangibles would obscure an im-
portant area of managerial discretion. Accordingly, we believe that including amortizable
intangible assets in our model will lead to a more reasonable estimation.22
We separately estimate both models for each industry in our sample (classified using two-
digit SIC codes). The residuals of these two models serve as firm-year specific estimator
for the degree of earnings management. As earnings management might be income in-
creasing or income decreasing, we analyze the absolute value of discretionary accruals. If
H1 holds true, we expect a positive association between CSR and the degree of earnings
management.
3.3.2.2 Accounting Conservatism
The next dimension of earnings quality which we include in our analysis is the degree of
accounting conservatism. The most influential measure of accounting conservatism is the
reverse earnings-returns regression of Basu (1997). The model of Basu (1997) predicts
that bad news are recorded in the financial statements differently than good news, i.e.
economic losses are reflected within earnings earlier than economic gains. Following Choi
and Pae (2011) we use a variation of the original Basu (1997) model proposed by Khan
and Watts (2009), who establish a firm-year specific measure of accounting conservatism.
Therefore, we estimate the following cross sectional regression in each year
22However, the focus of the paper at hand is on the association between CSR and earnings quality. For this
reason, we do no present a more comprehensive comparison of this model with different accrual models
here.
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Eit/Pit−1 = α0 + β1Dit + Rit(µ1 + µ2S izeit + µ3MT Bit + µ4Leverageit) (3)
+ DitRit(ω1 + ω2S izeit + ω3MT Bit + ω4Leverageit)
+ δ1S izeit + δ2MT Bit + δ3Leverageit
+ δ4DitS izeit + δ5DitMT Bit + δ6DitLeverageit + εit
where Eit/Pit−1 is earnings scaled by lagged market value of equity, Rit is the annual stock
return for the twelve months ending three months after the balance sheet date, Dit is a
dummy variable equal to 1 when Rit < 0 and equal to 0 otherwise. S izeit is defined as
the natural logarithm of the market value of equity, MT Bit is the market to book ratio and
Leverageit is total long term and short term debt divided by market value of equity. The
good news timeliness measure from the Basu (1997) model is (µ1 + µ2S izeit + µ3MT Bit +
µ4Leverageit), whereas our measure of incremental timeliness for bad news over good
news is
CS core = ω1 + ω2S izeit + ω3MT Bit + ω4Leverageit
CS core can be calculated as a firm-year specific measure of accounting conservatism using
the coefficients of Model 3. Khan and Watts (2009) establish this simple but powerful
relation between firm characteristics – size, market-to-book ratio and leverage – and con-
servatism because evidence has shown that conservatism varies with these characteristics.
If H1 holds true, we expect a negative association between CSR and the degree of ac-
counting conservatism.
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3.3.2.3 Quality of Accruals
Our third measure of earnings quality is the quality of accruals. Following Dechow and
Dichev (2002) working capital accruals are modeled as a function of past, present and
future cash flows. The rationale behind this is that the purpose of accruals is to alter the
timing of cash flow recognition in earnings. If only short term accruals are considered,
the recognition in earnings of a specific cash inflow or outflow might be shifted by one
period forward or by one period backward. We use the negative of the root mean square
error (in other words: the negative of the standard deviation of residuals) of the following
model as our measure for the quality of accruals (QA), with a high value signifying a high
quality of accruals:
∆WCit
Ait−1
= α0 + β1
CFOit−1
Ait−1
+ β2
CFOit
Ait−1
+ β3
CFOit+1
Ait−1
+ εit (4)
Following Dechow and Dichev (2002), ∆WC is defined as change in accounts receiva-
ble plus change in inventory less change in accounts payable less change in income tax
payable plus change in other assets (net).
Due to the mandatory application of IFRS for listed European firms beginning in 2005,
the regression is run for each firm over an estimation period of 2005 to 2011, i.e. we only
have 6 observations per firm. As we use the negative of the root mean square error as
measure for accrual quality, QA is a firm-specific measure, in contrast to the previous two
measures – discretionary accruals and the degree of accounting conservatism – which are
firm-year-specific. As both issues certainly add some noise in our analyses, the results
should be interpreted with caution. If H1 holds true, we expect a negative association
between CSR and our measure of the quality of accruals.
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3.3.3 Research Model
We construct the following model I to test our hypothesis. The regression is run with
fixed effects for countries and industries and employs heteroskedasticity-adjusted robust
standard errors clustered by firm and year (Petersen (2009)).
CS Rnew,it = α0 + β1|DAit| + β2CS core,it + β3QAit + β4S izeit + β5Tobin′s Qit (I)
+ β6Leverageit + β7S ales growthit + β7LossDit + β8Negc f oDit
+
∑
it
γitCountryit +
∑
it
δitIndustryit + εit
To analyze the different components of the CSR score, we estimate the following models
with the three individual scores as dependent variables:
CS Rsociety,it = α0 + β1|DAit| + β2CS core,it + β3QAit + β4S izeit + β5Tobin′s Qit (II)
+ β6Leverageit + β7S ales growthit + β7LossDit + β8Negc f oDit
+
∑
it
γitCountryit +
∑
it
δitIndustryit + εit
CS Remployees,it = α0 + β1|DAit| + β2CS core,it + β3QAit + β4S izeit + β5Tobin′s Qit (III)
+ β6Leverageit + β7S ales growthit + β7LossDit + β8Negc f oDit
+
∑
it
γitCountryit +
∑
it
δitIndustryit + εit
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CS Renvironment,it = α0 + β1|DAit| + β2CS core,it + β3QAit + β4S izeit + β5Tobin′s Qit (IV)
+ β6Leverageit + β7S ales growthit + β7LossDit + β8Negc f oDit
+
∑
it
γitCountryit +
∑
it
δitIndustryit + εit
In the above equations, |DA|it is the firm-year specific absolute value of the residuals
from the performance adjusted modified Jones model or from the performance adjusted
modified Jones model considering intangibles, respectively, estimated for each industry
separately. CS core,it is the degree of accounting conservatism calculated using model 3,
QAit is the quality of accruals calculated using model 4, S izeit is the natural logarithm
of the market value of equity, Tobin′s Qit is the sum of total liabilities and market value
of equity divided by book value of total assets, Leverageit is the sum of long-term and
short-term debt divided by market value of equity, S ales growthit is the change in sales
divided by lagged sales, LossDit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm reports a loss
in t and 0 otherwise and Negc f oDit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm reports a
negative operating cash flow in t and 0 otherwise.
If H1 holds true, this would produce a positive coefficient for |DA| and negative coeffi-
cients for CS core and QA in regression I. This means that a higher CSR score is associated
with more accrual based earnings management, a lower degree of accounting conserva-
tism and a lower accrual quality. We incorporate several control variables in our regressi-
ons to avoid the problem of omitted variables that may affect earnings quality and CSR.
The selection of control variables follows Choi and Pae (2011). Prior studies show that
firm size is correlated with CSR (Waddock and Graves (1997), Prior et al. (2008)). This is
not surprising as bigger firms are likely to have more incentives to emphasize their com-
mitment to CSR. For this reason, we include S ize in our regressions. Furthermore, Choi
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and Jung (2008) show that CSR is positively correlated with Tobin′s Q and suggest that
the capital market values firms with a higher level of ethical commitment. To control for
this effect, we include Tobin′s Q as well. Choi and Pae (2011) predict a positive relati-
on between Tobin′s Q and CSR as firms with high Tobin′s Q may commit themselves
to a high level of CSR to sustain their position in the market. Furthermore, we include
Leverage to control for the leverage-related incentives for earnings management and for
the potential impact of leverage on CSR (Kim et al. (2012)) and S ales growth to account
for the impact which growth opportunities may have on both (Choi and Pae (2011)).
Following Choi and Pae (2011), we use two dummy variables: LossD, and Negc f oD.
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) show that firms tend to manage earnings to avoid losses
and Petroni (1992) shows that weak performance provides incentives to engage in ear-
nings management. The association between operating cash flows and accruals is well
documented in the literature (e.g. Dechow and Dichev (2002)). In contrast to Choi and
Pae (2011) we do not include a dummy for market-to-book ratio below 1, as we do not
see the additional benefit above Tobin′s Q.
To account for the effect of outliers, both the 0.5% percentile and the 99.5% percentile
have been winsorized for all variables (Tukey (1962)).
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Data Description and Univariate Analysis
As our selection of firms is based on the 2009 ’Good Company Ranking’, the sample is
biased towards large companies. However, these firms should provide a reasonable picture
of leading European firms.23 For these firms, we extract CSR scores from the 2005, 2007
23We need to emphasize that these companies are not necessarily representative for the vast number of smal-
ler European firms. Therefore, the association between CSR and earnings quality for smaller companies
is a possible area for future research.
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and 2009 ’Good Company Ranking’ and calculate CSR scores for the years 2006 and
2008 by assuming a linear relation between the years. This information is merged with
financial information for the years 2004 to 2011 extracted from Thomson Reuters Datast-
ream. Although our CSR sample ranges from 2005 to 2009, we include observations from
2004 to be able to calculate measures which are based on changes, and observations from
2010 and 2011 to have more observations to calculate our measures of earnings quality.
Our sample solely consists of firms applying IFRS, a set of accounting standards which
are commonly viewed as being of high-quality. Following prior studies (e.g. Leuz et al.
(2003) or Kim et al. (2012)), we eliminate banking institutions and insurance firms from
our sample as characteristics of accruals differ for these firms. After eliminating further
observations due to missing data, we obtain a final sample of 258 firm-year observations.
Table 2 summarizes the sample selection and provides information on the regional distri-
bution of the sample. The majority of our observations originates from Germany (103),
France (49) and the United Kingdom (48).
[Table 2 about here]
Table 3 gives an overview of the distribution of the different dimensions of the CSR-
score next to our measures of earnings quality and our control variables. The variables
are calculated as defined above. CS Rnew comprises the scores on the three individual
dimensions society, environment and employees, whereas CS Rtotal additionally comprises
the dimension performance. The value for the 25th of CS Rnew percentile is 37.35, i.e. even
firms with comparatively low CSR scores are awarded with some points. However, the
interquartile range amounts to 12.15 which allows for reasonable interference.
Regarding the measures for earnings quality, the mean of the absolute value of discretio-
nary accruals is at 0.057 (0.054) for the performance adjusted modified Jones Model (con-
sidering intangibles). This indicates that the amount of discretionary accruals used by a
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firm is on average at 5.7 % (5.4 %) of its beginning total assets. From a total of 258 ob-
servations, 122 (120) show positive discretionary accruals (not displayed). Accordingly,
more than half of the firms in our sample (136 resp. 138) decrease their earnings through
the use of discretion, e.g. to smooth earnings or ’to take a big bath’. However, there are
only 23 observations of firms making losses. Considering accounting conservatism, a va-
lue for CS core of 0.22 for the 75th percentile means that bad news are recognized timelier
than good news by 0.22 for firms in this percentile. The value for the 25th percentile is
negative at -0.16, i.e. these firms recognize good news even timelier than bad news so that
these firms cannot be characterized as ’conservative’ in the framework of Basu (1997)
and Khan and Watts (2009) at all. The final measure of earnings quality is the quality of
accruals (QA) showing an average value of -0.13.
Tobin′s Q is above 1 even for the 25th percentile, i.e. most firms are valued higher than
the book value of their assets. Leverage – calculated as total debt over market value of
equity – is below 1 for most of the firms. This is comparable to Khan and Watts (2009),
who find a median value of 0.385 for a sample of 115,516 US firm-year observations.
Sales growth is at 5.27% on average with the interquartile range at 11.14%.
[Table 3 about here]
Table 4 provides the correlation matrix for the variables used in our analysis with the
lower (upper) triangle reporting the Pearson (Spearman) correlations. Not surprisingly,
CS Rnew is positively correlated with the three subcategories society, employees and envi-
ronment as well as with the original CS Rtotal. The univariate analysis further reveals that
there is a significant, positive correlation (both Pearson and Spearman) between CS Rnew
and the absolute value for discretionary accruals and a negative Spearman correlation bet-
ween CS Rnew and the degree of accounting conservatism. This supports our hypothesis
but has to be challenged in the multivariate analysis. Furthermore, CS Rnew is positively
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correlated with S ize. As larger firms have higher incentives to invest in CSR, the market
seems to value this commitment. On the other hand, CS Rnew is negatively correlated with
S ales growth (Spearman correlation), i.e. highly dynamic firms tend to invest in other
things rather than in CSR and/or investments in CSR negatively impact growth.
Discretionary accruals from both models we use are highly correlated with each other
by construction. However, there is some deviation which results from the inclusion of
amortizable intangibles in the original performance adjusted modified Jones model. Both
measures, however, are positively correlated with LossD, and Negc f oD, i.e. poor perfor-
ming firms tend to conduct more earnings management.
[Table 4 about here]
3.4.2 Association between CSR and Earnings Quality
Table 5 provides the results of regression I with CS Rnew as dependent variable. The coeffi-
cient for |DA| is positive and significant at the 5 % level (1 % level), when the performance
adjusted modified Jones model (considering intangibles) is used. This indicates that the
more earnings management a firm conducts, the higher is the CSR score. Furthermore,
the coefficient for CS core is negative and significant at the 10 % level, indicating that a
higher degree of accounting conservatism leads to a lower value of the CSR score. The
coefficient for QA is also negatively significant at the 10 % level, which indicates that
CSR is negatively associated with accrual quality. Size is positive and significant. This
result is in line with the political cost hypothesis of Watts and Zimmerman (1986) which
points to the fact that larger firms have higher incentives to act socially responsible. These
firms are under higher attention of the press and of investors and, hence, are more concer-
ned about their public image. The association between CS Rnew and Tobin′s Q is negative
and significant. Choi and Pae (2011) suggest that firms with high Tobin′s Q may commit
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themselves to a high level of CSR to sustain their premier position in the market. This
would result in a positive association, which Choi and Pae (2011) detect for their Korean
sample. In the European case, however, this negative association indicates that the capital
market tends to punish the firm’s commitment to CSR as this may destroy shareholder
value.
Taken together, the results support our hypothesis of a negative association between CSR
and earnings quality. Firms which engage in earnings management more actively, report
bad news less timely and have lower accrual quality, show a higher CSR score.
[Table 5 about here]
In table 6, we investigate the role of the individual dimensions of CSR as defined by
the KC ranking. In particular, we analyze the drivers of the negative association between
CSR and earnings quality which we identified before. Panel A shows the results using the
original performance adjusted modified Jones Model, whereas Panel B shows the results
using our variation of this model. Apparently, the positive association between CSR and
the degree of earnings management (|DA|) is driven by the dimensions environment and
society. As the story of a good corporate citizen is easier to tell with these categories
(rather than with the category employees), we conclude that firms which actively engage
in earnings management tend to invest in the categories society and environment. In the
same manner, the negative association between CSR and CS core seems to be driven by the
dimension society. The negative relation between CSR and QA is driven by CS REmployees,
as the coefficient for QA is negative and significant at the 5 % level, i.e. firms with low
quality accruals show high values for CS REmployees.
[Table 6 about here]
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Table 7 provides the results of the estimation of regression I for two different subsamples.
Following Leuz et al. (2003) and La Porta et al. (1997; 1998) we classified the countries in
our sample based on institutional factors. The first subsample includes observations from
the United Kingdom which is characterized by a large stock market, low ownership con-
centration, extensive outsider rights and high disclosure (’outsider economy’). In contrast,
the other countries in our sample may be characterized as showing smaller stock markets,
higher ownership concentration, weaker investor protection and lower disclosure levels
(’insider economy’). Leuz et al. (2003) find that the degree of earnings management in-
creases in private control benefits and decreases in outside investor protection. Therefore,
we predict that firms from countries classified as ’insider economies’ are more likely to
invest in CSR to cover up their earnings management activities. Our result of a negative
association between CSR and earnings quality holds for the non-UK subsample, i.e. non-
UK firms which engage in earnings management more actively, report losses less timely
and have lower accrual quality, show a higher CSR score. When running the regression
for the UK, the low number of observations is a problem and, hence, the results should
be looked upon with caution, if at all. Panel B of table 7 provides tentative evidence that
the previously documented negative association between CSR and earnings quality does
not necessarily hold for ’outsider economies’ such as the UK. Together with the results
of prior research (e.g. Choi and Pae (2011) and Kim et al. (2012)), we conclude that the
acceptance of our hypothesis is driven by the non-UK observations and that there likely
are differences between ’insider economies’ and ’outsider economies’, which moderate
the relation between CSR and earnings quality.
[Table 7 about here]
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3.4.3 Robustness
Although we provide a possible explanation for the difference between our results and
those of parts of prior research (e.g. Choi and Pae (2011) and Kim et al. (2012)) by distin-
guishing between ’insider economies’ and ’outsider economies’ we ran various robustness
tests to further substantiate our findings.
3.4.3.1 Measurement Error in Earnings Quality Variables
On the one hand, there may be measurement error in our proxies for earnings quality.
For this reason, we have incorporated three different dimensions of earnings quality in
our original analyses and find results consistent with our hypothesis for all dimensions.
Furthermore, we ran different robustness checks which all yield qualitatively comparable
results (see below). We estimated regressions I to IV using discretionary accruals from the
Jones (1991) and the modified Jones model (Dechow et al. (1995)). These models differ
by the ones used for our analyses through the definition of the accrual process. While the
Jones model is estimated using the following equation
T Ait
Ait−1
= α0 + β1
1
Ait−1
+ β2
∆S alesit
Ait−1
+ β3
PPEit
Ait−1
+ εit
the modified Jones model additionally considers the change in credit sales:
T Ait
Ait−1
= α0 + β1
1
Ait−1
+ β2
∆S alesit − ∆Receivablesit
Ait−1
+ β3
PPEit
Ait−1
+ εit
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Both approaches yield results which are qualitatively comparable to those using models 1
and 2 (not reported).
Further, we have split our sample in two subsamples, one containing observations with
CS Rnew above its median (CSR subsample) and the other containing observations with
values below its median (non-CSR subsample). For these subsamples, we compare the
mean (median) for the three variables of earnings quality using two-tailed t-tests with
Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom (Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon tests). The results are pre-
sented in table 8. We find significantly higher means and medians for both models of
discretionary accruals for the CSR subsample as compared to the non-CSR subsample,
which supports our notion of a positive association between discretionary accruals and
CSR. With regard to CS core, we find a significantly lower median for the CSR subsam-
ple, indicating that firms in this subsample are less conservative, which also supports our
initial results, whereas we do not find significant differences for QA.
[Table 8 about here]
Furthermore, to control for multicollinearity, we successively estimated regression I with
only one dimension of earnings quality (|DA|, CS core or QA) as independent variable.
Again, this approach yields results which are qualitatively comparable to our results of
section 3.4.2 (not reported).
3.4.3.2 Measurement Error in CSR Variable
On the other hand, there might be measurement error in our CSR score. Our proxy for
CSR is created by a German consulting firm (KC). Therefore, one might argue that KC
does not have the expertise to create a CSR ranking for European companies. This may
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also serve as an alternative explanation of our mixed results for the UK subsample. To mit-
igate this concern, we have collected information on another CSR variable: The STOXX
Europe Sustainability Index represents European top leaders in terms of environmental,
social and governmental criteria. We have re-run our regression I for two subsamples, one
containing firms which are included in the index and the other containing the remainder.
The results are shown in table 9. For the sample of firms included in the STOXX Su-
stainability Index (see Panel A), we find a significantly positive association between the
degree of earnings management and the CSR score and a significantly negative associati-
on between accrual quality and the CSR score. Interestingly, we do not find any significant
relation between CSR and earnings quality for firms not included in the index. This leads
us to conclude that the relation is robust for firms that are leaders in CSR. Accordingly,
our analysis including this additional CSR variable supports our results of section 3.4.2
with regard to the degree of earnings management and accrual quality.
[Table 9 about here]
Furthermore, we re-ran our regressions with the original CSR score of KC, i.e. including
the performance dimension, and receive qualitatively similar results (not reported).
3.4.3.3 Additional Robustness Tests
To mitigate possible effects of the financial crisis on earnings quality and CSR, we re-ran
our estimations excluding the years 2008 and 2009 from the sample. The results of these
estimations are comparable to those in section 3.4.2. In a next step, we have standardized
all variables by deducting their mean and by dividing the difference by their standard
deviation (Laksmana and Yang (2009)). This is done because we have different units of
measurement (e.g. financial measures in Euro, CSR measure as score ranging from 0 to
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75). While the magnitude of the coefficients differs, the overall results stay the same (not
reported).
In summary, we conclude that our results are robust to both measurement error in ear-
nings quality proxies and measurement error in our CSR variable and, hence, the different
result as compared to Choi and Pae (2011) and Kim et al. (2012) is caused by country-
specific characteristics which moderate the association between CSR and earnings qua-
lity. We provide a possible explanation by distinguishing between ’outsider’ and ’insider
economies’: Following Leuz et al. (2003) the United States can be classified as ’outsider
economy’ which may serve as and explanation for our results differing from Kim et al.
(2012). Korea, however, is classified as ’insider economy’ with low legal enforcement
mechanism. Due to the low legal enforcement mechanism, firms from Korea may not be
forced to invest in CSR to the same extent as the firms in our analysis. This may explain
why the results of Choi and Pae (2011) differ from our results.
3.5 Conclusion
The present study examines the association between Corporate Social Responsibility
(CSR) and earnings quality. We hypothesize that there is a negative association between
these two constructs. Our findings support this hypothesis. Using the performance ad-
justed modified Jones model as well as a variation of it, we find that CSR is positively
associated with the degree of earnings management, i.e. the more earnings management
is conducted, the higher is the CSR score. Furthermore, we find that CSR is negatively
associated with the degree of accounting conservatism, i.e. the less timely bad news are
reported, the higher is the CSR score. Last, we find that CSR is negatively associated with
accrual quality, i.e. the lower the accrual quality, the higher is the CSR score.
Our results are in contrast to the findings of some parts of prior research (Choi and Pae
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(2011) and Kim et al. (2012)), which finds a positive association between CSR and ear-
nings quality. For this reason, we run different robustness checks with regard to measure-
ment error in our earnings quality proxies and measurement error in our CSR variable. Our
results are robust to different specifications of the accrual process and different specificati-
ons of the regression models. Furthermore, our results hold when considering companies
which are included in the STOXX Europe Sustainability Index, i.e. the results are robust
for leaders in CSR. However, our sample is biased towards larger companies. Hence, it is
unclear whether our results can be transferred to smaller European firms.
The contribution of this study to accounting knowledge is as follows: First, we employ a
variation of the performance adjusted modified Jones model which considers intangible
assets.24 In light of the increasing importance of intangible assets for IFRS statements,
we believe that this better describes the accrual process. However, since the focus of the
paper at hand is on the association between CSR and earnings quality, we do not present
a more comprehensive comparison of this model with other accrual models here. Second,
our result of a negative association between CSR and earnings quality is in contrast to
some parts of prior research. We argue that there are country-specific factors which mo-
derate the relation between CSR and earnings quality. Combined with the results of Choi
and Pae (2011) and Kim et al. (2012), the negative association between CSR and ear-
nings quality seems to be prevalent for continental European ’insider economies’ only.
Last, our results show that the increasing trend to invest in or to report about CSR acti-
vities is not necessarily accompanied by higher quality financial statements, or to put it
in other words: Based on the notion that it is socially responsible to prepare transparent
high-quality financial reports, our results show that the increasing CSR trend does not ne-
cessarily lead to real changes in corporations. It is also possible that firms invest in CSR
for opportunistic reasons, e.g. to cover up their earnings management activities.
24To the best of our knowledge there is no other paper that employs such a variation.
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Variable definitions
CSR variables
CS Rnew,it Sum of CSR rating of the categories society, employees and environment of firm i at time t, measured
as the sum of the four categories in the Kirchhoff Consult AG ’Good Company Ranking’.
CS Rtotal,it Total score of CSR rating of firm i at time t, measured as the sum of the four categories in the Kirchhoff
Consult AG ’Good Company Ranking’.
CS Rsociety,it Score of CSR rating of firm i at time t in the category society of the Kirchhoff Consult AG ’Good
Company Ranking’.
CS Remployees,it Score of CSR rating of firm i at time t in the category employees of the Kirchhoff Consult AG ’Good
Company Ranking’.
CS Renvironment,it Score of CSR rating of firm i at time t in the category environment of the Kirchhoff Consult AG ’Good
Company Ranking’.
CS Rper f ormance,it Score of CSR rating of firm i at time t in the category performance of the Kirchhoff Consult AG ’Good
Company Ranking’.
Earnings quality variables
|DA|it Absolute value of discretionary accruals of firm i at time t calculated using the performance adjusted
modified Jones Model (Kothari et al. (2005)) or an IFRS-variation of the performance adjusted modified
Jones Model under consideration of amortizable intangible assets, respectively.
CS core,it Asymmetric timeliness of earnings between bad news and good news of firm i at time t (Khan and
Watts (2009)).
QAit Quality of accruals of firm i at time t (Dechow and Dichev (2002)).
Control and other variables
S izeit Natural logarithm of the market value of equity of firm i at time t.
Tobin′s Qit Total labilities plus market value of equity divided by book value of total assets of firm i at time t.
Leverageit Total long-term and short-term debt divided by market value of equity of firm i at time t.
S ales growthit Change in sales divided by lagged sales of firm i at time t.
LossDit Indicator variable of firm i at time t equal to 1 if the firm reports a loss and 0 otherwise.
Negc f oDit Indicator variable of firm i at time t equal to 1 if the firm shows negative operating cash flows and 0
otherwise.
T Ait Total accruals of firm i at time t measured as (∆current assets − ∆cash) − (∆current liabilities −
∆current portion o f long term debt−∆income tax payable)−depreciation and amortization expense.
Ait−1 Total assets if firm i at time t-1.
PPEit Property plant and equipment of firm i at time t.
ROAit Return on assets of firm i at time t.
Amortizable intangiblesit Total intangible assets less goodwill of firm i at time t.
Eit Earnings of firm i at time t.
Pit−1 Market value of equity of firm i at time t-1.
Rit Annual stock return for the 12 month ending 3 month after the balance sheet date.
Dit Indicator variable equal to 1 if R¡0 and 0 otherwise.
MT Bit Market-to-book ratio firm i at time t.
∆WCit Change in working capital of firm i at time t. Calculated as ∆accounts receivable + ∆inventory −
∆accounts payable − ∆income tax payable + ∆other assets (net).
CFOit Operating cash flow of firm i at time t.
Appendix A: Variable definitions
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Figure 3.1: Principal-agent relation taking into account corporate (CSR) reporting
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Results of empirical studies investigating the association between CSR and EQ
Study (by year) Journal Sample period Sample size Country CSR variable EQ variables Association between CSR and EQ
Prior et al. (2008) CG 2002-2004 1,105 International
(26 countries)
CSR Score Discretionary EM - -
Chih et al. (2008) JBE 1993-2002 1,500 International
(26 countries)
1/0 Earnings smoothing,
Earnings Aggressiveness
and Loss Avoidance
+/-
Laksmana and Yang (2009) AiA 2001-2002 1,778 USA 1/0 Earnings Predictability,
Smoothness, Persistence
and Accrual Quality
+
Hong and Andersen (2011) JBE 1995-2005 6,956 USA 1/0 Accrual Quality and
activity-based EM
+
Choi and Pae (2011) JBE 1998-2008 242 South Korea CSR Score Discretionary EM,
Accounting Conservatism
and Accrual Quality
++
Kim et al. (2012) TAR 1991-2009 23,391 USA CSR Score Discretionary EM,
activity-based EM and
SEC investigations
++
Table 1: Results of empirical studies investigating the association between CSR and EQ
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Panel A – Sample composition
Investigation Sample
Original Sample 720
./. Years missing CSR data 270
./. Financial Service Companies 130
./. Missing (IFRS-)Data 62
Total 258
Panel B – Regional sample distribution
N
Germany 103
France 49
United Kingdom 48
Italy 16
Switzerland 15
Spain 11
Finland 5
Netherlands 5
Luxemburg 3
Sweden 3
Total 258
Table 2: Sample composition
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Distribution of variables
Continuous variables Observations 25th percentile Mean Median 75th percentile Standard Deviation
CS Rnew 258 37.35 42.95 44.25 49.50 9.79
CS Rtotal 258 52.60 57.79 58.90 64.80 10.78
CS Rsociety 258 11.45 14.50 15.08 18.40 5.16
CS Remployees 258 8.80 12.81 12.00 17.20 5.01
CS Renvironment 258 12.80 14.52 15.00 26.75 3.18
CS Rper f ormance 258 11.80 13.93 14.20 17.00 4.06
|DA|per f .Jones 258 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.08
|DA|per f .Jones considering intangibles 258 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.07
CS core 258 -0.16 0.03 0.08 0.22 0.64
QA 258 -0.15 -0.13 -0.09 -0.03 0.14
S ize 258 16.65 17.28 17.38 17.99 0.99
Tobin′s Q 258 1.09 1.53 1.33 1.73 0.63
Leverage 258 0.16 0.57 0.30 0.67 0.72
S ales growth 258 -0.02 0.05 0.04 0.11 0.17
Binary variables Observations Mean 0 1 Standard Deviation
LossD 258 0.09 235 23 0.29
Negc f oD 258 0.02 252 6 0.15
Table 3: Distribution of variables
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Pearson and Spearman correlation between CSR-scores, earnings quality variables and control variables
CS Rnew CS Rtot. CS Rsoc. CS Rempl. CS Renv. CS Rper f . |DA|1 |DA|2 CS core QA S ize Tobin′ s Q Lev. S ales gr. LossD Negc f oD
CS Rnew 1 0.88*** 0.85*** 0.68*** 0.69*** 0.02 0.11* 0.15** -0.15** 0.03 0.24*** -0.04 0.06 -0.18*** -0.05 -0.02
CS Rtot. 0.91*** 1 0.77*** 0.63*** 0.58*** 0.34*** 0.14** 0.14** -0.14** 0.02 0.32*** 0.09 -0.04 -0.06 -0.20*** -0.11*
CS Rsoc. 0.89*** 0.82*** 1 0.52*** 0.36*** -0.08 0.09 0.13** -0.09 0.07 0.32*** 0.13** -0.15** -0.07 -0.10 -0.01
CS Rempl. 0.73*** 0.69*** 0.58*** 1 0.20*** -0.12* 0.05 0.09 -0.04 -0.08 0.13** 0.04 -0.02 -0.14** -0.06 -0.07
CS Renv. 0.71*** 0.62*** 0.42*** 0.23*** 1 0.24*** 0.12* 0.12* -0.24*** -0.02 0.10 -0.22*** 0.28*** -0.23*** 0.02 0.00
CS Rper f . 0.04 0.35*** -0.06 -0.08 0.23*** 1 0.05 -0.01 -0.17*** -0.04 0.18*** 0.17*** -0.09 0.11* -0.29*** -0.15**
|DA|1 0.11* 0.08 0.09 0.02 0.14** -0.01 1 0.91*** -0.10 -0.09 -0.01 0.01 -0.04 -0.02 0.12** 0.12**
|DA|2 0.13** 0.08 0.10 0.05 0.14** -0.05 0.97*** 1 -0.07 0.10 -0.02 0.01 -0.03 -0.06 0.16*** 0.14**
CS core -0.09 -0.12* -0.14** -0.05 -0.02 -0.03 -0.08 -0.07 1 0.05 -0.17*** -0.12** 0.07 0.02 0.04 -0.02
QA 0.06 -0.03 -0.07 0.06 -0.11* 0.08 0.01 0.00 -0.04 1 0.15** -0.13** -0.05 -0.05 -0.02 0.00
S ize 0.30*** 0.37*** 0.39*** 0.16*** 0.09 0.18*** -0.08 -0.09 -0.13** -0.17** 1 0.42*** -0.48*** 0.15** -0.32*** -0.22***
Tobin′ s Q -0.01 0.07 0.13*** 0.08 -0.25*** 0.08 0.05 0.03 -0.32*** 0.17*** 0.38*** 1 -0.73*** 0.16*** -0.35*** -0.16**
Lev. 0.01 -0.09 -0.11* 0.00 0.17*** -0.16*** 0.09 0.10 0.12* -0.01 -0.41*** -0.45*** 1 -0.12* 0.21*** 0.12*
S ales gr. -0.10 -0.02 -0.03 -0.11* -0.13** 0.09 -0.08 -0.12* -0.02 -0.21*** 0.12** 0.07 -0.05 1 -0.23*** -0.15**
LossD -0.09 -0.23*** -0.16** -0.06 0.04 -0.27*** 0.17*** 0.19*** 0.10 0.07 -0.39*** -0.25*** 0.22*** -0.18*** 1 0.31***
Negc f oD -0.04 -0.13* -0.05 -0.06 0.02 -0.14* 0.20*** 0.22*** 0.01 0.09 -0.27*** -0.12* 0.21*** -0.14** -0.31*** 1
This table shows pairwise Pearson correlations (lower triangle) and pairwise Spearman correlations (upper triangle). ***, ** and * show significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
|DA1 | (|DA2 |) is the firm-year specific absolute value of the residuals from the performance adjusted modified Jones model (considering intangibles).
Table 4: Pearson and Spearman correlation between CSR-scores, earnings quality variables and control variables
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Dependent variable: CS Rnew
Performance adjusted modified Performance adjusted modified
Jones Model Jones Model considering
intangibles
Independent variables Beta t-value Beta t-value
Intercept -23.183 -1.67* -23.251 -1.53
|DA| 12.288 2.13** 15.136 2.88***
CS core -1.270 -1.78* -1.280 -1.82*
QA -11.042 -1.65* -10.995 -1.66*
S ize 4.058 4.59*** 4.054 4.64***
Tobin′s Q -3.570 -2.70*** -3.566 -2.73***
Leverage 1.320 0.94 1.299 0.95
S ales growth -7.508 -1.16 -7.254 -1.10
LossD -0.958 -0.39 -1.037 -0.44
Negc f oD 2.263 0.55 1.907 0.48
Industry dummies Included Included
Country dummies Included Included
R2 30.02% 30.35%
Ad justed R2 24.75% 25.11%
N 258 258
Variables are defined in Appendix A and the accruals models are described in the main text.
The sample consists of 258 observations of European firms in the years 2005-2009.
The regressions were run as OLS regressions that include fixed effects for countries
and industries (not tabulated). The analysis employs heteroscedasticity-robust standard
errors clustered by firm and year (Petersen (2009)). *, **, and *** represent significance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively, based on two-tailed t-tests.
Table 5: Estimation of regression I
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Panel A – Performance adjusted modified Jones Model
CS RS ociety CS REmployees CS REnvironment
Independent variables Beta t-value Beta t-value Beta t-value
Intercept -22.408 -3.05*** -0.136 -0.32 -0.639 -0.13
|DA| 5.051 1.45 -0.342 -0.13 7.579 2.84***
CS core -0.578 -20.36*** -0.247 -1.04 -0.446 -0.90
QA -4.533 -1.14 -4.792 -2.20** -1.697 -0.71
S ize 2.283 4.04*** 0.883 2.44*** 0.891 2.67***
Tobin′s Q -1.024 -1.38 -0.141 -0.35 -2.405 -4.17***
Leverage 0.001 0.00 0.451 1.13 0.869 2.82***
S ales growth -1.255 -0.80 -2.793 -3.07*** -3.459 -0.90
LossD -0.772 -0.64 -0.178 -0.20 -0.008 -0.01
Negc f oD 2.958 1.51 -0.043 -0.04 -0.739 -0.52
Industry dummies Included Included Included
Country dummies Included Included Included
R2 34.95% 20.25% 24.61%
Ad justed R2 30.05% 14.24% 18.93%
N 258 258 258
Panel B – Performance adjusted modified Jones Model considering intangibles
CS RS ociety CS REmployees CS REnvironment
Independent variables Beta t-value Beta t-value Beta t-value
Intercept -22.425 -3.07*** -0.103 -0.02 -0.723 -0.15
|DA| 6.635 2.14** 0.811 0.33 7.690 2.61***
CS core -0.578 -20.39*** -0.236 -0.98 -0.465 -0.94
QA -4.589 -1.15 -4.810 -2.21** -1.647 -0.71
S ize 2.281 5.10*** 0.880 2.42** 0.894 2.75***
Tobin′s Q -1.028 -1.38 -0.157 -0.39 -2.381 -4.14***
Leverage -0.012 -0.02 0.441 1.09 0.870 2.94***
S ales growth -1.139 -0.70 -2.766 -3.03*** -3.349 -0.87
LossD -0.820 -0.71 -0.223 -0.25 0.006 0.01
Negc f oD 2.772 1.52 -0.065 -0.06 -0.801 -0.57
Industry dummies Included Included Included
Country dummies Included Included Included
R2 35.25% 20.28% 24.51%
Ad justed R2 30.37% 14.27% 18.83%
N 258 258 258
Variables are defined in Appendix A and the accruals models are described in the main text. The sample
consists of 258 observations of European firms in the years 2005-2009. The regressions were run as OLS
regressions that include fixed effects for countries and industries (not tabulated). The analysis employs
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firm and year (Petersen (2009)). *, **, and ***
represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively, based on two-tailed t-tests.
Table 6: Estimation of regression I using individual components of the CSR score
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Panel A – ’Insider economies’ | Dependent variable: CS Rnew
Performance adjusted modified Performance adjusted modified
Jones Model Jones Model considering
intangibles
Independent variables Beta t-value Beta t-value
Intercept -33.574 -1.90* -33.220 -1.89*
|DA| 16.693 3.52*** 17.394 4.12***
CS core -2.700 2-96*** -2.802 -3.01***
QA -16.289 -2.11** -16-029 -2.06**
S ize 4.741 4.44*** 4.717 4.46***
Tobin′s Q -4.752 -2.51** -4.692 -2.47**
Leverage 1.211 0.88 1.207 0.90
S ales growth -8.082 -0.91 -7.931 -0.89
LossD -0.823 -0.31 -0.867 -0.33
Negc f oD 2.084 0.62 1.886 0.55
Industry dummies Included Included
Country dummies Included Included
R2 31.01% 31.05%
Ad justed R2 24.91% 24.94%
N 210 210
Panel B – ’Outsider economies’ | Dependent variable: CS Rnew
Performance adjusted modified Performance adjusted modified
Jones Model Jones Model considering
intangibles
Independent variables Beta t-value Beta t-value
Intercept -10.596 -0.76 -22.637 -1.77*
|DA| 8.830 1.01 23.145 1.65
CS core 0.583 1.04 0.573 1.18
QA 31.917 5.45*** 32.649 6.39***
S ize 3.423 5.50*** 4.040 6.82***
Tobin′s Q -0.542 -0.58 -0.408 -0.40
Leverage 15.338 5.44*** 16.553 4.87***
S ales growth -6.714 -1.05 -6.629 -0.99
LossD -4.768 -3.85*** -4.761 -4.08***
Industry dummies Included Included
R2 60.53% 63.58%
Ad justed R2 48.46% 52.99%
N 48 48
Variables are defined in Appendix A and the accruals models are described in the main text.
Panel A includes observations from ’insider economies’, whereas Panel B shows observations
from ’outsider economies’ (see Leuz et al. (2003)). The regressions were run as OLS
regressions that include fixed effects for countries and industries (not tabulated). The
analysis employs heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firm and year
(Petersen (2009)). *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively,
based on two-tailed t-tests.
Table 7: Estimation of regression I for ’insider economies’ and ’outsider economies’
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Comparison of means and medians
Non-CSR CSR Difference
Mean 0.049 0.065 0.016*
|DA|1 Median 0.028 0.035 0.007*
Mean 0.045 0.063 0.018*
|DA|2 Median 0.029 0.035 0.007**
Mean 0.065 -0.006 -0.072
CS core Median 0.082 0.081 -0.001***
Mean -0.137 -0.129 0.008
QA Median -0.099 -0.071 0.028
Variables are defined in Appendix A and the accruals models
are described in the main text. The sample consists of 258
observations of European firms in the years 2005-2009. ***, **
and * indicate that the means (medians) are significantly different
at the 1%-level, 5%-level and 10%-level, respectively, using a
two-tailed t-test with Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom
(Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test).
Table 8: Comparison of means and medians
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Panel A – Included in STOXX Sustainability index | Dependent variable: CS Rnew
Performance adjusted modified Performance adjusted modified
Jones Model Jones Model considering
intangibles
Independent variables Beta t-value Beta t-value
Intercept -13.583 -0.55 -14.202 -0.57
|DA| 18.876 2.50** 20.613 2.61***
CS core -0.719 -1.03 -0.756 -1.08
QA -14.086 -1.79* -13.933 -1.77*
S ize 3.519 2.61*** 3.565 2.64***
Tobin′s Q -2.871 -2.13** -2.781 -2.05**
Leverage 4.487 3.54*** 4.673 3.55***
S ales growth -4.948 -0.54 -4.911 -0.55
LossD -1.615 -2.29** -1.644 -2.42**
Negc f oD 6.536 3.65*** 6.063 3.73***
Industry dummies Included Included
Country dummies Included Included
R2 35.48% 35.87%
Ad justed R2 26.54% 26.99%
N 149 149
Panel B – Not included in STOXX Sustainability index | Dependent variable: CS Rnew
Performance adjusted modified Performance adjusted modified
Jones Model Jones Model considering
intangibles
Independent variables Beta t-value Beta t-value
Intercept -40.359 -1.40 -41.782 -1.49
|DA| 5.082 0.44 9.851 0.68
CS core -1.418 -1.59 -1.371 -1.48
QA -7.166 0.91 -7.396 -0.96
S ize 6.134 3.49*** 6.218 3.62***
Tobin′s Q -7.732 -3.04*** -7.780 -3.07***
Leverage 4.568 2.05** 4.524 2.03**
S ales growth -10.705 -1.80* -10.552 -1.87*
LossD -1.499 -0.40 -1.410 -0.37
Negc f oD -7.784 -1.63 -7.690 -1.62
Industry dummies Included Included
Country dummies Included Included
R2 60.27% 60.40%
Ad justed R2 52.33% 52.48%
N 109 109
Variables are defined in Appendix A and the accruals models are described in the main text.
Panel A consists of all firms which are included in the STOXX Europe Sustainability Index,
whereas Panel B consists of the remaining observations. The regressions were run as OLS
regressions that include fixed effects for countries and industries (not tabulated). The analysis
employs heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firm and year (Petersen (2009)).
*, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively,
based on two-tailed t-tests.
Table 9: Estimation of regression I for firms (not) included in STOXX Sustainability index
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4.1 Introduction and Background
Performance reporting according to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)
has experienced dynamic changes during recent years with more changes to the recogni-
tion, measurement and presentation of a company’s income numbers to come. Starting
with the convergence project “Financial Statement Presentation” of the standard setting
bodies IASB and FASB in July 2004, whose aim is the gradual revision and convergence
of the two standards IAS 1 “Presentation of Financial Statements” and SFAS 130 “Repor-
ting Comprehensive Income”, the presentation of other comprehensive income (OCI) has
shifted from the statement of changes in equity to a more prominent position within the
financial statements. The IASB motivates this with “evidence in several research studies
that users appear to react more to other comprehensive income information that is pre-
sented in the location in which they expect to see it and fail to react to information when
it appears in unexpected locations” (DP Financial Statement Presentation 2008, 3.31).
The first phase of the “Financial Statement Presentation” project was completed with the
issuance of the revised version of IAS 1 in September 2007. The most essential change
induced by IAS 1 (rev. 2007) was the following: For fiscal years beginning on or after
January 1st, 2009 firms are obliged to present both net income and dirty surplus income in
either one single statement of comprehensive income or in a two statement approach, i.e.
a separate income statement followed by a reconciliation of net income to comprehensive
income. By dirty surplus income we mean all income and expense items which are directly
booked into equity. IAS 1 does not give any conceptual advice which income or expense
items have to be recorded in other comprehensive income. This information, however, is
given in the individual standards. Hence, OCI comprises foreign currency adjustments,
changes in the fair value of available-for-sale financial assets, gains or losses from the
effective part of a cash flow hedge, actuarial gains or losses, the revaluation adjustment of
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tangible or intangible assets and the share of other comprehensive income of investments
in associated companies recorded at equity, as shown in table 1.
[Table 1 about here]
Previously, these components have only been displayed in a statement of changes in equi-
ty. The board justifies the change of the reporting location with (i) increased comparability
between IFRS and US-GAAP (DP Financial Statement Presentation 2008, 3.28) and (ii)
increased comprehensibility for users (DP Financial Statement Presentation 2008, 3.29).
In particular, it is aimed to reduce the risk that investors react inappropriately to OCI
information simply because it is presented at an “unexpected” location within the state-
ment (DP Financial Statement Presentation 2008, 3.31). While SFAS 130 allowed for a
presentation of OCI information either in the statement of comprehensive income or in
the statement of changes in equity until the issuance of ASU 2011-051 on June 15, 2011,
there is no longer such an option under IAS 1 (rev. 2007). Therefore, the revision of IAS
1 did not immediately lead to enhanced comparability between IFRS and US-GAAP.
The second argument is underpinned by the experimental studies of Hirst and Hopkins
(1998) and Maines and McDaniel (2000) and the empirical study of Chambers et al.
(2007) which are all based on US-GAAP. While the first two studies advocate a presen-
tation of OCI information at a prominent location (i.e. in the statement of comprehensive
income), Chambers et al. (2007) find evidence that OCI information is more value rele-
vant when disclosed in the statement of changes in equity, concluding that investors react
to OCI information when it is reported at the “expected” location. From our point of view,
this mixed evidence and contradictory reasoning, however, is a weak justification for the
revision of IAS 1.
1ASU 2011-05 requires firms to report OCI either as part of one comprehensive income statement or in a
separate statement immediately following the income statement.
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The second project phase has led to the issuance of a discussion paper in October 2008,
which proposes to present information about value creation (business activities divided in
operating and investing activities) separately from information about the way the business
is funded (financing activities). This presentation scheme is to be applied to the statements
of financial position, comprehensive income and cash flows (DP Financial Statement Pre-
sentation 2008, S4-5). These fundamental changes led to a fierce discussion and, finally, to
the board’s decision to engage in outreach activities before publishing an exposure draft.
Accordingly, these changes are not subject of our work and we focus on the analysis of
OCI presentation.
The core objective of IFRS financial statements is to provide information that is useful for
a wide range of users in making economic decisions. This information is aimed to help
users in predicting future cash flows and, in particular, their timing and certainty (IAS 1.9
(rev. 2007)).2 The board followed this objective when introducing IAS 1 (rev. 2007) as
it argued that the presentation of OCI information at a more prominent position would
increase comparability and comprehensibility. This is further supported by the reasoning
of Johnson et al. (1995) and Hirst and Hopkins (1998) who state that the inclusion of un-
realized wealth changes into comprehensive income increases transparency, visibility and
predictability of income and improves analyst’s consensus about stock values (Brimble
and Hodgson (2005)). On the other hand, however, it is argued that the inclusion of dirty
surplus items adds noise to comprehensive income. Therefore, at least two questions with
regard to the accounting under IFRS are still to be answered:
• Is OCI information helpful in explaining stock returns and firm value?
• Does a more prominent disclosure of OCI information lead to enhanced decision
usefulness?
2See also DP Financial Statement Presentation 2008, S3.
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If full market efficiency is assumed, neither the reporting location nor the condensation
of information about a firm’s financial situation to accounting numbers itself is necessary.
In this case, firms could merely disclose their general ledger without any summarization
to net income or comprehensive income and the markets would process this information
in an appropriate manner. However, under less than full market efficiency, financial state-
ment addressees rely on heuristics and summarizations of this information (Libby et al.
(2002)). Hence, the questions how income should be calculated and where it should be
reported deserve some attention. Proponents of a comprehensive presentation of income
argue that comprehensive income is the best approximation of economic income, i.e. the
maximum amount of dividends that can be distributed while retaining the same value of
net assets as in the beginning of the period. Apart from owner-related transactions, all
value changes above or below that level are considered as income (van Cauwenberge and
de Beelde (2007)). However, this definition is not as concise as it seems at first glance.
Due to uncertainty, part of comprehensive income may rather be an ex post capital read-
justment of the net asset value to be retained than real economic income (Lee (1985)). On
the other hand, proponents of net income argue that transitory earnings components are of
no use for valuation purposes. According to Ohlson (1999), transitory earnings are cha-
racterized by unpredictability, forecasting-irrelevance and value-irrelevance. Hence, once
net income is used to predict future income, transitory earnings should be ignored.
This paper is organized in five chapters. Chapter 4.2 briefly summarizes the current state
of research on the pricing of OCI information. Chapter 4.3 develops the hypothesis ack-
nowledging the proclaimed insufficient processing of OCI information. Chapter 4.4 pres-
ents the results of this quantitative empirical analysis and the paper finishes with a con-
clusion in chapter 4.5.
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4.2 Literature Review
Academic literature examining the decision usefulness of OCI information can be divided
in the one under the informational approach and the one under the measurement approach
to value relevance,3 whereas research on the prominence of OCI presentation is carried
out only incidentally, if at all (Rees and Shane (2012)).
The informational approach assumes accounting information to be only informative, if
it alters beliefs conditional upon other information available (van Cauwenberge and de
Beelde (2010)). Thus, an expectation model for the surprise component of earnings is
required. As a standard approach, prior literature has generally supposed that earnings
follow a random walk model (so called naı¨ve model).4 The most prominent studies inves-
tigating the information content of OCI (components) under the informational approach
to value relevance are Dhaliwal et al. (1999), Chambers et al. (2007), and Goncharov and
Hodgson (2011).5 Dhaliwal et al. (1999) examine whether net income or comprehensive
income is stronger associated with returns using a sample of 11,425 observations from the
years 1994 and 1995. As SFAS 130 has become effective for fiscal years beginning af-
ter December 15, 1997, as-if measures for other comprehensive income items have been
calculated from balance sheet items. Furthermore, the authors analyze which performan-
ce measure better predicts future cash flows. Dhaliwal et al. (1999) find that only the
marketable securities adjustment improves the association between income and returns.
Comprehensive income in general is not more strongly associated with returns than net
income, the latter being superior in explaining current market value and in predicting fu-
ture cash flows. They conclude that comprehensive income is no better measure of firm
3Please refer to Appendix A of this paper for a formal derivation of the general model specification under
both approaches.
4While other, more sophisticated approaches to earnings expectations have been developed, the naı¨ve model
seems to be working surprisingly well.
5For further studies see Cheng et al. (1993), Barth and Clinch (1998), O’Hanlon and Pope (1999), Isidro
et al. (2006), Biddle and Choi (2006) and Hodder et al. (2006).
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performance and that – except for the marketable securities adjustment – the components
of other comprehensive income merely add noise to the income figure. Chambers et al.
(2007) provide a reexamination similar to Dhaliwal et al. (1999). The additional contri-
bution lies in the fact that they use data from the period after the application of SFAS
130. Therefore, they are able to compare results of as-if measures for OCI-items and as-
reported measures. In contrast to most evidence in prior research, they find that OCI-items
are priced by investors on a dollar-for-dollar basis. They conclude that inferences from
as-if measures may be irrelevant. Furthermore they provide evidence that investors pay
greater attention to OCI information reported in the statement of changes in equity com-
pared to a comprehensive income statement. Goncharov and Hodgson (2011) extend this
empirical evidence by researching local GAAP data from 16 European countries. Using
as-if estimates of OCI items they run different tests which allow them to draw inferences
for different impact metrics such as information, measurement, prediction and conditional
conservatism issues. They find that operating net income is the dominant decision-relevant
measure with OCI reported individually and delineated by its unrealized nature. Howe-
ver, as the authors are forced to also use as-if measures of OCI items, the conclusion that
inferences may be irrelevant may also apply to their study. Furthermore, Fieberg (2012)
shows that results from papers applying levels models might be defective as statistical
properties such as the use of non-stationary variables in time-series and panel analysis
and scale effects in cross-sectional analysis may cause invalid inferences.6
In contrast, the measurement approach rests on the theoretical concepts of the residual in-
come valuation model (RIM), which can be attributed to Feltham and Ohlson (1995) and
Ohlson (1995; 1999). The papers of Cahan et al. (2000) and Brimble and Hodgson (2005)
use this concept to investigate the value relevance of net income versus other compre-
6Fieberg (2012) directly refers to papers that are based on the Ohlson (1995)-framework. However, the
results regarding the statistical properties should be similar for studies using the informational approach to
value relevance. Hence, in most cases a return specification should be the appropriate way to test for value
relevance.
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hensive income (components).7 Cahan et al. (2000) examine whether information about
individual OCI components (asset revaluations and foreign currency adjustments) is in-
crementally value relevant above aggregate comprehensive income and whether the re-
quirement to disclose OCI information in a statement of changes in equity results in a
change of incremental value relevance. Brimble and Hodgson (2005) test the value re-
levance of comprehensive income and its individual components using a sample of 90
Australian firms. Although both papers refer to the valuation model of Ohlson as a basis
for their work, they neither state the necessary assumptions and restrictions nor make any
predictions with regard to the coefficients. Cahan et al. (2000) find that neither asset re-
valuation increments nor foreign currency adjustments have incremental value relevance
above aggregate comprehensive income. Furthermore, they find that the requirement to
disclose this information in a statement of changes in equity does not change their value
relevance. Brimble and Hodgson (2005) compare the coefficients and Ad j. R2 of three mo-
dels with either net income, comprehensive income or net income plus the individual OCI
components as independent variables. Their major finding is that net income is superior
as a general core valuation component when compared to comprehensive income.
In summary, prior research on OCI and its individual components almost exclusively fo-
cuses on the pricing and information content, while the location of OCI (in a statement
of changes in equity, in a statement of comprehensive income or in a reconciliation from
net income to comprehensive income) is only dealt with incidentally. Furthermore, pri-
or research should be interpreted with caution due to the use of as-if estimates and due
to the use of levels models without giving attention to statistical properties. Hence, in-
ferences drawn from this research may be irrelevant. Moreover, apart from Goncharov
7Furthermore, there are several papers which solely investigate the value relevance of net income or of
its components whose model specification can be attributed to the measurement approach (e.g. Amir and
Lev (1996), Aboody and Lev (1998) or Alford et al. (1993)). However, these papers do not discuss the
underlying theory but are rather (mostly implicitly) motivated by work of Easton and Harris (1991) and
Ali and Zarowin (1992), who find that both levels and changes of earnings produce coefficients which are
significantly different from zero.
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and Hodgson (2011), who partially use IFRS data, all papers employ samples based on
US-GAAP. That is why this study sets out to examine the pricing and the location of OCI
components for a sample using IFRS as-reported data.
4.3 Research Approach and Hypotheses Development
4.3.1 Overall Value Relevance of Net Income versus Other Comprehensive
Income
We estimate the following basic model in order to investigate the informational value
relevance of OCI:
RETit = β0 + β1
NIit
MVEit−1
+ β2Loss + β3
Loss · NIit
MVEit−1
+ β4
NIit−1
MVEit−1
(I)
+ β5
OCIit
MVEit−1
+
∑
γiIndustryi +
∑
δtYeart + εit
We consider a variable to be value relevant when it is significant in this equation and
therefore helps in explaining abnormal stock returns. The variables used are defined as
follows: RET is abnormal return adjusted for dividends calculated as difference between
the firm’s stock return over a time period spanning from prior year’s date of earnings an-
nouncement to current year’s date of earnings announcement and the market return over
the same time period. Market returns are calculated using the Carhart (1997) four-factor
model, which is an extension of the well-known Fama and French (1993) three factor
model.8 NI is net income before preferred dividends and OCI is other comprehensive
8In addition to the factors “return minus market return”, “small minus big” and “high minus low”, the
Carhart (1997) four-factor model additionally comprises a momentum factor.
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income. MVE is the market value of equity used as denominator throughout the models.
Loss is a dummy equal to 1 if the firms make losses and 0 otherwise. With this dummy we
control for the differential valuation of negative earnings (Hayn (1995)). Additionally, we
include industry and time dummies and run the regression with two-way clustered stan-
dard errors (Petersen (2009)) to account for serial correlation over both, firms and time.
All variables have been winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile to control for outliers.
In this equation, lagged net income serves as expectation model for net income so that
the joint coefficient of NIit and NIit−1 is that for the surprise component of earnings. As
OCI is transitory, we do not include an expectation variable for OCI, implying that the
best possible estimate is zero. In their US-GAAP based study, Chambers et al. (2007) find
that OCI is not significantly different from one and conclude that it is priced “dollar-for-
dollar, consistent with economic theory”, referring to the work of Ohlson (1995; 1999).
Although they refer to this theory (and therefore the measurement approach to value rele-
vance), their model specification is not in line with the Ohlson (1995; 1999) framework,
because it lacks variables for the changes in net income and other comprehensive income.
Please refer to Appendix A for a discussion of model specification issues. As equation I
can be classified under the informational approach to value relevance, there is no theory
which allows us to predict values for the coefficients. However, in case OCI contains va-
lue relevant information, it should lead to a significant coefficient and therefore our first
hypothesis is
H1: OCI is value relevant and, hence, the coefficient for OCI, β5, is signifi-
cantly different from zero.
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4.3.2 Implications of Changes in the Reporting Location
We also strive to analyze changes induced by the change of the reporting location due to
the revision of IAS 1. To this aim, we estimate the following model:
RETit = β0 + β1
NIit
MVEit−1
+ β2Loss + β3
Loss · NIit
MVEit−1
+ β4
NIit−1
MVEit−1
(II)
+ β5
S CE OCIit
MVEit−1
+ β6
Prominent OCIit
MVEit−1
+
∑
γiIndustryi + εit
In addition to the variables above and following Chambers et al. (2007) we divide OCI
in those observations recorded within the statement of changes in equity (S CE OCI) and
those recorded in a more prominent location (Prominent OCI). Hence, these variables
are included to capture the effect of the change in the regulation of IAS 1. In contrast
to equation I, we estimate this regression without year-dummies because these dummies
would catch at least part of the impact of the change in the reporting location. Further-
more, a sufficient control for time effects is provided by the fact that the variables are
standardized by beginning of period market value of equity and by the fact that we use
standard errors clustered by firms and years. While the experimental studies of Hirst and
Hopkins (1998) and Maines and McDaniel (2000) find that the presentation of OCI in
a statement of comprehensive income enhances the transparency of financial statements,
Chambers et al. (2007) find empirical evidence that OCI is value relevant only when it
is reported in a statement of changes in equity. They conclude that investors process this
information when it is reported in the “expected” location. In contrast to the conclusion
of Chambers et al. (2007), the IASB justifies the amendment to IAS 1 with the reduction
of the risk that investors react inappropriately to OCI information simply because it is
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presented at an “unexpected” location (DP Financial Statement Presentation 2008, 3.31),
implying that the statement of changes in equity is an “unexpected” location. Therefore,
the argumentation of the IASB is inconsistent at this point. However, despite the incon-
sistency of the referenced literature, we share the view of the IASB that a more prominent
disclosure of OCI information is likely to result in more decision useful and more value-
relevant financial statements. Our view is supported by the concept of bounded rationality
(Simon (1955)), which states that an individual’s rationality is limited due to constraints
of information, time or cognitive abilities. Hence, she may not be able to process all infor-
mation provided by a company and rely on simple heuristics. In case she mainly focuses
on the result of the company, the change of the reporting location of OCI may lead to the
effect that she includes OCI in her decision-making process. Therefore, we hypothesize
as follows:
H2: If OCI information is disclosed in a statement of changes in equity,
the information processing of investors is impaired, and hence, the coeffi-
cient β5 should be statistically insignificant. Furthermore, if the change in
the reporting location led to an improvement of information processing (as
proclaimed by the IASB), the coefficient β6 should be statistically signifi-
cant.
Furthermore, Rees and Shane (2012) point out that academic research lacks an analysis
of whether there are differences in value relevance between the single-statement and the
two-statement approach, which is of substantial concern to financial statement users and
standard setters. They argue that although the two reporting choices seem to show only
little differences, “we should not fall into the same mindset from only a few years ago,
when researchers assumed that the location of information within financial statements is
irrelevant to investors”. With our dataset, we are able to fill this research gap by estimating
the following model:
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RETit = β0 + β1
NIit
MVEit−1
+ β2Loss + β3
Loss · NIit
MVEit−1
+ β4
NIit−1
MVEit−1
(III)
+ β5
S CE OCIit
MVEit−1
+ β6
S ingle OCIit
MVEit−1
+ β7
Two OCIit
MVEit−1
+
∑
γiIndustryi + εit
In this equation, OCI is divided in three variables which indicate if it is reported wi-
thin the statement of changes in equity (S CE OCI), within a single-statement approach
(S ingle OCI) or within a two-statement approach (Two OCI). If companies in our da-
taset decided to adopt the two-statement approach, in most cases the reconciliation from
net income to total comprehensive income follows on the page directly after the separate
income statement. Therefore, our third hypothesis is:
H3: Investors react to OCI information presented in a single-statement ap-
proach in the same way as presented in a two-statement approach. In this
case, there should be no significant difference in the magnitude or the si-
gnificance of the coefficients β6 and β7.
4.3.3 Value Relevance of Individual OCI Components
In addition to the overall analysis of the value relevance of OCI components, we also set
out to analyze the value relevance of individual OCI components. To this end, we estimate
the following equation:
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RETit = β0 + β1
NIit
MVEit−1
+ β2Loss + β3
Loss · NIit
MVEit−1
+ β4
NIit−1
MVEit−1
(IV)
+ β5
FOREXit
MVEit−1
+ β6
AFS it
MVEit−1
+ β7
HEDGEit
MVEit−1
+ β8
PENS it
MVEit−1
+ β9
REVit
MVEit−1
∑
γiIndustryi +
∑
δtYeart + εit
FOREX is foreign currency adjustments recognized in accordance with IAS 21, AFS is
changes in the fair value of available-for-sale financial assets recognized in accordance
with IAS 39, HEDGE is gains or losses from the effective part of a cash flow hedge
recognized in accordance with IAS 39, PENS is actuarial gains or losses recognized in
accordance with IAS 19 and REV is the revaluation adjustment of tangible and intangible
assets recognized in accordance with IAS 16 and IAS 38, respectively. Foreign currency
adjustments result from changes in the parent’s and a foreign subsidiary’s exchange rate
(IAS 21.32). In case these changes reflect economic conditions in the related countries
the adjustments can be informative which then is priced by the market (Chambers et al.
(2007)). Prior US-GAAP research, however, shows mixed results. While Soo and Soo
(1994) and Bartov (1997) find that foreign currency adjustments are not priced in some
cases and positively priced in other cases, the larger part of research finds evidence of a
positive pricing.9 That is why we expect β5 to be positive and significant. There are several
studies showing a positive association between changes in the fair value of available-for-
sale financial assets and firm valuation (Ahmed and Takeda (1995), Petroni and Wahlen
(1995), Carroll et al. (2003) and Chambers et al. (2007)) and, hence, we expect β6 to be
positive. Research on the value relevance of gains or losses from the effective part of a
9E.g. Pinto (2005) and Chambers et al. (2007).
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cash flow hedge is scarce. Campbell (2009) finds no significant association between un-
realized gains or losses from cash flow hedges and contemporaneous returns which may
be explained by the fact that accounting rules for cash flow hedges are likely to make
it difficult for investors to price them straight away. By extending the return period to 2
years, however, he finds a negative association which is consistent with the notion that an
unrealized gain suggests that the price of the underlying hedged item moved in a direction
that negatively affects the firm. Therefore, we expect β7 to be either insignificant or nega-
tive. IAS 19 requires actuarial gains and losses to be recognized in other comprehensive
income. These result from an unexpected development of actuarial assumptions – finan-
cial assumptions (discount rate, projected salary increases projected pension increases)
as well as demographic assumptions (mortality, employee turnover, early retirement). In
case actuarial gains and losses comprise additional information regarding either the eco-
nomic conditions or the firm’s workforce, the coefficient β8 should be positive. This would
also be in line with prior results of Biddle and Choi (2006). However, Biddle and Choi
(2006) only use as-if measures for actuarial gains and losses and, hence, their inferences
might be defective. In contrast, Chambers et al. (2007) do not find a significant associa-
tion between as-reported pension adjustments and returns; therefore, we do not expect a
significant β8 here. With regard to revaluation adjustments recorded in equity, studies of
Cahan et al. (2000), Easton et al. (1993) and Aboody et al. (1999) show a significantly po-
sitive relation to returns. On the other hand, Brimble and Hodgson (2005) and Goncharov
and Hodgson (2011) do not find a significant association. Due to the fact that the latter
study is partially based on IFRS data, we do not make a prediction for the coefficient β9
here.
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4.4 Results
4.4.1 Data Description
Our analysis is based on the main indexes DAX, MDAX, TecDAX and SDAX of the Ger-
man stock exchange. These indexes comprise the largest and most traded listed German
companies, which often serve as benchmarks for smaller entities regarding the application
of IFRS regulations. As the application of IFRS became mandatory in the European Uni-
on for financial years starting on or after January 1, 2005, our sample ranges from 2005 to
2011, i.e. there are four years (2005-2008) in which OCI components had to be presented
within a statement of changes in equity and three years (2009-2011), in which these had
to be presented either in a single statement of comprehensive income or in a reconciliati-
on between net income and comprehensive income. In accordance with other studies (e.g.
Ely and Waymire (1999) or Leuz et al. (2003)), we eliminate all banking institutions and
insurance companies from the sample. The basic data of the remaining companies has
been extracted from Thomson Reuters Datastream, while the individual components of
OCI as well as the reporting location have been hand-collected from the financial state-
ments because this information is not available for IFRS firms in electronic databases.
As the distinction between the single-statement approach and the two-statement approach
often is difficult when the reconciliation from net income to comprehensive income is on
the same page as the separate income statement, these observations have been treated as
single-statement approach.
We focus on Germany for several reasons: First, all companies operate within the same
institutional and regulatory environment and are governed by the same enforcement me-
chanisms (Ernstberger (2008)). Second, the constraint to hand-collect OCI data naturally
limits the scope of our analysis. Third, although most prior research focuses on the Uni-
ted States, there are few papers that deal with the value relevance of earnings (excluding
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OCI) in Germany (Harris et al. (1994), Joos and Lang (1994) and Booth et al. (1997)). In
summary, these papers show that there is a significant association between returns and ear-
nings in Germany. However, these papers use German GAAP data, an accounting system
which differs fundamentally from US GAAP and IFRS because it allows for the creation
of large hidden reserves and is rather directed towards debt holders than towards equi-
ty holders. As German GAAP has been replaced by IFRS for the consolidated financial
statements of listed German companies from 2005 onwards, we also want to reinvestigate
this association for German companies applying IFRS.
Panel A of Table 2 gives an overview of the distribution of variables used in our analysis
next to information about the reporting location of OCI. All variables have been standar-
dized by beginning of period market value of equity. Both mean and median of RET are
negative at -0.082 and -0.130, respectively. As RET is abnormal return calculated as the
difference between the firm’s stock return and the market return over the period between
two earnings announcement dates, actual stock returns are on average lower than expected
returns. Average (median) NI is at 0.046 (0.060) as compared to -0.002 (-0.000) for OCI,
or in other words: Average NI is at 4.6% of beginning of period market value of equity,
whereas average OCI is only at -0.2% of beginning of period market value of equity. The
mean value for S CE OCI is negative at -0.002, whereas the mean of Prominent OCI is
positive at 0.001. As IAS 1 (rev. 2007) obliged firms to report OCI at a more prominent
location from financial years beginning on or after January, 1 2009, a look at the deve-
lopment of OCI over time seems worthwhile. This information is depicted in panel B of
Table 2. Interestingly, the mean value for OCI becomes positive with the more prominent
disclosure requirement. A possible explanation may be that firms started managing OCI
from that point in time onwards.10 Further support for this view is provided by the fact
10For a research overview of firm’s earnings management activities see Dechow et al. (2010) or Healy and
Wahlen (1999). Up to now, this research solely focuses on managers manipulating a firm’s net income.
To the best of our knowledge, it has not yet been investigated whether OCI is subject to manipulation as
well.
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that the mean value for OCI when it is reported in a two-statement approach (i.e. in a less
prominent location) is negative in 2009 and 2011 and only slightly positive in 2010. We
conclude that firms might manage OCI when it is reported as part of a comprehensive
income statement.
[Table 2 about here]
Table 3 provides the correlation matrix for the variables with the lower (upper) triangle
reporting the Pearson (Spearman) correlations. RET is positively correlated with NI at
the 1% level as well as with OCI at the 5% level. The univariate analysis further reveals
that the latter association is driven by the observations with OCI recorded in a single
statement approach. Although this points in the direction that S ingle OCI is more value
relevant than S CE OCI and Two OCI, this has to be examined in the multivariate analy-
sis. In accordance with prior studies, the OCI components with the strongest association
with RET are FOREX (significant at 1%) and AFS (significant at 10%). NI is not si-
gnificantly correlated with OCI, except for OCI recorded in a single-statement approach.
The latter, however, seems spurious as there are no causalities between net income and
other comprehensive income other than those created by firm size. Furthermore, except
for REV , OCI is significantly correlated with its components.
[Table 3 about here]
4.4.2 Overall Value Relevance of Net Income versus Other Comprehensive
Income
Table 4 sows the results of the estimation of equation I. All variables of interest are signi-
ficant at the 1% level. The coefficient for NI is at 2.41 as compared to 1.58 for OCI. The
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difference in the coefficients is statistically significant (p-value of 0.04), implying that net
income contains more value relevant information. In a next step, we estimated equation I
without OCI as explanatory variable. This results in a decrease in the explanatory power
of the model from 24.16% to 23.26%. The decrease, however, is not statistically signifi-
cant (Vuong (1989) Z-statistic of 1.04). Chambers et al. (2007) find that OCI is priced on
a dollar-for-dollar basis in their sample and argue that this is in line with economic theory.
Despite the fact that their model specification does not fit to the measurement approach to
value relevance, we want to verify their result for our sample. For this reason, we also tes-
ted whether the coefficient for OCI is significantly different from one and find that it is not
(p-value of 0.24). In summary, our first hypothesis is supported by the results. OCI infor-
mation is processed by the markets as a value relevant metric, although the change in R2
due to the inclusion of OCI into the estimation equation is not statistically significant.
[Table 4 about here]
4.4.3 Implications of Changes in the Reporting Location
Panel A of table 5 depicts the results of the estimation of equation II. In this equation,
the OCI variable has been split in two components based on the IASB’s notion that inves-
tors may react differently to OCI information in case it is presented at an “unexpected”
location. Following the IASB’s view, we hypothesize that OCI information disclosed in
a statement of changes in equity is not incorporated in investor’s equity valuations and,
hence, there is no significant association to returns. Furthermore, we hypothesize that the
change in the regulation of IAS 1 led to an improvement of investor’s information pro-
cessing. With table 4 we have shown that OCI is value relevant in overall terms. The
decomposition of OCI in S CE OCI and Prominent OCI reveals that this result is driven
by the observations with OCI disclosed at a more prominent location as the coefficient for
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Prominent OCI is significant at the 5% level, whereas the coefficient for S CE OCI is insi-
gnificant. Apparently, our second hypothesis is supported, as the revision of IAS 1 in 2007
leads to better information processing of investors who seem to now incorporate OCI in
their equity valuations. In a next step, we test whether there is a difference in the value
relevance of OCI between a single-statement approach and a two-statement approach. Pa-
nel B of table 5 shows the results of the estimation of equation III. Interestingly, OCI is
only significant (at the 1% level) when it is reported in a single statement together with
net income. In this case, there is no statistically significant difference in the coefficients
for S ingle OCI and NI, implying that they are equally value relevant. Our hypothesis,
however, was that the coefficients for S ingle OCI and Two OCI do not differ, because
in most cases the reconciliation from net income to comprehensive income is provided
on the page directly following after the income statement. In contrast to our hypothesis,
OCI disclosed in a two-statement approach is not value relevant, implying that investors
do not process this information equally. This may be explained by the concept of boun-
ded rationality (Simon (1955)), which implies that investors seem to focus only on the
most prominent display of income. Hence, the IASB’s approach to grant companies with
the accounting choice here, results in a contradiction to the IASB’s goal – to reduce the
risk that investors react inappropriately (or even not at all) to OCI information. Therefore,
we recommend reconsidering this accounting choice. In case the IASB wants other com-
prehensive income to be treated in the same way as net income, a mere single-statement
approach should be considered.
[Table 5 about here]
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4.4.4 Value Relevance of Individual OCI Components
Table 6 shows the estimation results of equation IV. The coefficients for the variables
NI, Loss, Loss · NI and lagged NI are comparable to those of equation I. With regard to
the individual components of OCI, we find that none of the coefficients is significant at
conventional levels. The coefficients for FOREX (3.91) and AFS (4.17) are positive and
borderline significant at 11% and 12%, respectively. This result is in line with prior rese-
arch, which finds positive, significant pricing of foreign currency translation adjustments
(e.g. Pinto (2005) and Chambers et al. (2007)) and positive, significant pricing of changes
in the fair value of available-for-sale financial assets (e.g. Ahmed and Takeda (1995) and
Carroll et al. (2003)).11 The coefficient for gains and losses from the effective part of a
cash flow hedge (HEDGE) is not significant, which is in line with our expectation. In
contrast to the results of Biddle and Choi (2006), we do not find a significant associa-
tion between returns and actuarial gains and losses (PENS ). As our result is consistent
with Chambers et al. (2007), we conclude that the inferences of Biddle and Choi (2006)
are biased due to the use of as-if measures of actuarial gains and losses. Furthermore, the
coefficient for revaluation adjustments of tangible and intangible assets (REV) is insignifi-
cant, which is consistent with the results of Brimble and Hodgson (2005). They provide a
theoretical explanation for this insignificance which we would like to transfer to our sam-
ple:12 Given a negative mean value for asset valuations in our sample from 2008 onwards
and “assuming mainly operating assets, and an expectation of reasonably permanent in-
come from continued operations, asset revaluations should not have a significant price
impact” because these asset price changes are likely to reflect mainly a change in the risk
or the competitive environment of the company which is likely already priced through net
income.
11Furthermore, when added separately to the regression without the other OCI components, FOREX is
significantly positive at the 10% level.
12See Brimble and Hodgson (2005), pp. 20-21.
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Furthermore, there are only 33 non-zero observations for revaluation adjustments in our
sample and, hence, our results should be treated with caution.
[Table 6 about here]
4.4.5 Robustness
It is an important decision in empirical accounting research how to handle possible cor-
relation in the residuals across firms or time when a panel dataset is used. The methods
applied by researchers range from no adjustment over White (1980)-adjusted standard
errors, Fama and MacBeth (1973)-adjusted standard errors and clustered standard errors
to the inclusion of dummy variables. Recently, Petersen (2009) analyzed the presented
approaches and examined how the methods compare and how to select the correct one. In
case there is a firm and a time effect in the data, the best standard errors are produced by
clustering across firms and over time. To test whether there are such effects in our data we
followed the approach proposed by Petersen (2009) and estimated equation I with diffe-
rent standard error adjustments and compared the results as shown in table 7. The White
adjusted standard errors are smaller than the standard errors clustered across firms, years,
or both. Hence, there is some evidence for correlation across residuals, although the diffe-
rence is not large. The estimation with standard errors clustered across firms and time, on
average, produces the largest standard errors. For this reason, we use this method in our
analysis. Employing White-adjusted standard errors or standard errors clustered across
only one dimension on average decreases the standard errors and improves our results in
terms of significance of the coefficients.
[Table 7 about here]
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As an additional robustness check, we estimated equations I and II with de-meaned va-
riables. This approach deducts the year-specific mean from the variable to purge it from
time-effects. The results are shown in table 8. While the result for equation I is compa-
rable to our initial analysis, the result for equation II differs in terms of the significance
of S CE OCI. We interpret this as follows: Consider a company with OCI of 100 in the
year 2010. In case the mean value of OCI over all companies in 2010 equals 100 the
observation of company A will not be used for the estimation as it does not contain any
additional information. These changes in the relative importance of observations may lead
to a change in the significance of the results. As these changes only result from data trans-
formation issues, we deem our initial approach with standard errors clustered across firms
and time to be more appropriate.
[Table 8 about here]
Our initial analysis can be attributed to the informational approach to value relevance.
However, as a robustness check we estimated the following models, which fit to the mea-
surement approach:13
RETit = β0 + β1
NIit
MVEit−1
+ β2Loss + β3
Loss · NIit
MVEit−1
+ β4
∆NIit
MVEit−1
(V)
+ β5
OCIit
MVEit−1
+ β6
∆OCIit
MVEit−1
+
∑
γiIndustryi +
∑
δtYeart + εit
13Please refer to Appendix A for a derivation of the general model under both approaches.
128
RETit = β0 + β1
NIit
MVEit−1
+ β2Loss + β3
Loss · NIit
MVEit−1
+ β4
∆NIit
MVEit−1
(VI)
+ β5
S CE OCIit
MVEit−1
+ β6
∆S CE OCIit
MVEit−1
+ β7
Prominent OCIit
MVEit−1
+ β8
∆Prominent OCIit
MVEit−1
+
∑
γiIndustryi + εit
The results are shown in table 9. The inclusion of ∆OCI in equation V results in a decrease
of the t-statistic of the level of OCI. Hence, only the change in OCI seems to be value
relevant under the measurement approach. The same applies for the estimation of equation
VI as shown in panel B of table 9. Here, ∆Prominent OCI is the only value relevant OCI
variable. We interpret this as additional evidence that the revision of IAS 1 in 2007 led to
a change in the information processing of investors with regard to OCI.
[Table 9 about here]
As a last robustness check, we changed the definition of our independent variable. In our
initial analysis, abnormal returns have been calculated over a time period spanning from
prior year’s date of earnings announcement to current year’s date of earnings announce-
ment. We believe that this definition is the best to analyze the value relevance of financial
statements because it controls for the normal development of stock markets and prevents
double-counting. However, various definitions of returns have been employed in accoun-
ting research, differing by the decision to use raw returns or market-adjusted abnormal
returns and by the time period used to estimate returns. Therefore, we also estimated
equation I with abnormal returns and raw returns calculated over the firm’s financial year,
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over 12 months starting 3 months after the balance sheet date and over 15 months starting
at the balance sheet date, respectively. Although the coefficients differ slightly, the signi-
ficance of OCI is confirmed, as shown in panel A of table 10. Estimating equation II with
the different return specifications, results in the outcome depicted in panel B of table 10.
When abnormal returns are calculated over 15 months, the coefficient for Prominent OCI
becomes insignificant, whereas the other abnormal return specifications support our re-
sults of section 4.4.3. Considering raw returns, S CE OCI is significantly positive in all
regressions and hence, the conclusion would differ if we used these return specifications.
Apparently, the correct return specification is a core area of discretion for researchers
which significantly affects the outcome.
[Table 10 about here]
4.5 Conclusion
The present study examines the value relevance of other comprehensive income (OCI) and
its individual components using a sample of listed German companies ranging from 2005
to 2011. Moreover, we analyze whether the revisions of IAS 1 in 2007 led to changes
in the information processing of investors. Due to the revision, firms were obliged to
present OCI either in a single-statement approach or in a two-statement approach for
financial years beginning on or after January, 1st 2009. Prior to this, OCI was reported in
a statement of changes in equity.
We find that OCI is value relevant in overall terms and show that this result is robust to
different model specifications and different specifications of the dependent variable. Fur-
thermore, based on the argumentation of the IASB and the concept of bounded rationality,
we hypothesize that the revision of IAS 1 led to a change in the information processing
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of investors. By splitting OCI along the reporting location, we find that OCI reported at a
more prominent location is value relevant, whereas OCI reported in a statement of chan-
ges in equity is not. In a next step, we show that OCI is only value relevant when it is
reported in a single-statement together with net income. Although the goal of the IASB
– to reduce the risk that investors react inappropriately (or not at all) to OCI informa-
tion – is generally met, we see this as evidence that the accounting choice between the
single- and the two-statement approach should be questioned. Last, we analyze the value
relevance of the individual OCI components and find that foreign currency translation ad-
justments and changes in the fair value of available-for-sale financial assets are the only
OCI components which are (borderline) significant when OCI is disassembled.
Prior research on the value relevance of OCI mainly used US-GAAP data, whereas re-
search using IFRS data is scarce. We supplement the study of Goncharov and Hodgson
(2011), who analyze the empirical impact of net income and comprehensive income com-
ponents across 16 European countries partially using IFRS data by the use of as-reported
OCI data. To the best of our knowledge, there is no other study entirely using as-reported
IFRS data. With regard to US-GAAP, Chambers et al. (2007) find that as-reported OCI
is priced by investors and that investors pay greater attention to OCI reported in the state-
ment of changes in equity. While the first result is confirmed in our analysis, we find that
investors process OCI data only when it is reported at a more prominent location.
The contribution of our paper to accounting knowledge is as follows: First, we provide a
formal derivation of the general models under the informational approach and the measu-
rement approach to value relevance in Appendix A. We do this because we believe that
many researchers who motivate their model specification with the work of Ohlson (1995;
1999) are not aware of the inherent shortcomings and consequences. Second, we discuss
some issues which empirical accounting researchers are likely to face, namely the treat-
ment of serial correlation in the residuals and the specification of the dependent variable
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in return-based value relevance studies. Third, we provide an investigation of the overall
value relevance of OCI for an IFRS sample because most prior research is based on US-
GAAP and fourth, we shed some light on the question whether the revision of IAS 1 in
2007 led to the intended outcome. Based on our research, we appreciate the revision of
the standard but recommend reconsidering the accounting choice between a single- and a
two-statement approach.
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Appendix A
Measurement Approach to Value Relevance
Under the measurement approach to value relevance, the regression model of a value
relevance study is derived from a valuation model, which establishes a link between firm
value and accounting data. The most prominent class of such a valuation model is the
residual income valuation model (RIM), which can be attributed to Feltham and Ohlson
(1995) and Ohlson (1995; 1999).
Ohlson (1995) derives the following valuation equation:
MVEit = BVEit + α1Xait + α2Vit (A.1)
where MVEit is the market price of equity, BVEit is the book value of equity, Xait is
abnormal earnings, Vit is a proxy for other information, α1 is ωi/(1 + r − ωi), α2 is
(1 + r)/[(1 + r − ωi)(1 + r − φi)], r is the risk free rate, ωi is the persistence parame-
ter of abnormal earnings and φi is the persistence parameter of other information. Both
persistence parameters are restricted to be non-negative and less than one, the last condi-
tion is assumed to guarantee stationarity.
This equation is based on three assumptions:
1. The dividend-discount model applies;14
2. Clean surplus accounting applies;
14The concept of the dividend-discount model is based on the application of the net present value model
in answer to problems in company valuation. See Williams (1938) pp. 55 f and Miller and Modigliani
(1961) p. 412.
133
3. An autoregressive process on abnormal earnings (linear information dynamics) ap-
plies:
a) Xait+1 = ωiX
a
it + Vit + ε1,it+1 and
b) Vit+1 = φiVit + ε2,it+1
Defining abnormal earnings as Xait = Xit − rBVEit and substituting in A.1 yields the levels
equation
MVEit = (1 − α1r)BVEit + α1Xit + α2Vit (A.2)
Commonly, the definition for abnormal earnings is Xait = Xit − rBVEit−, i.e. abnormal
earnings are calculated by deducting a charge from income for the use of beginning of
period capital. The definition used here, however, deducts a charge from income for the
use of end of period capital. There are two justifications for this definition: First, one
could think of this as full profit distribution with earnings equaling dividends and, hence,
BVEit = BVEit−1. Second, as abnormal earnings are ex post calculated at time t, the book
value of equity of time t is also known and, hence, may be used for the calculation as
well. The only papers investigating the value relevance of OCI based on the measurement
approach are Cahan et al. (2000) and Brimble and Hodgson (2005). If we understand them
correctly, this definition has implicitly been taken into account to derive their econometric
specification by application of the following steps:
Taking first differences of A.2 results in the following equation:
∆MVEit = (1 − α1r)∆BVEit + α1∆Xit + α2∆Vit (A.3)
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Reordering the clean surplus equation
BVEit = BVEit−1 + Xit + DIVit
∆BVEit = Xit − DIVit,
applying it to A.3 and transferring dividends to the left side of the equation yields
∆MVEit − (1 − α1r)DIVit = (1 − α1r)Xit + α1∆Xit + α2∆Vit
Finally, dividing by beginning of period market value of equity results in the return equa-
tion of A.1:
RETit = (1 − α1r) XitMVEit−1 + α1
∆Xit
MVEit−1
+ α2
∆Vit
MVEit−1
(A.4)
These equations can be econometrically estimated if and only if some further restricti-
ons are considered. One must require that other information Vit is irrelevant in predicting
market value. Furthermore, both r and ωi have to be identical over all firms (van Cauwen-
berge and de Beelde (2010)). Under inclusion of a constant term, equations A.2 and A.4
can then be written as econometric models
MVEit = β0 + β1BVEit + β2Xit + εit (M.1)
RETit = β0 + β1
Xit
MVEit−1
+ β2
∆Xit
MVEit−1
+ εit (M.2)
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In a subsequent paper, Ohlson shows that equation A.1 can be generalized to a case which
permits two earnings components, core earnings (X1,t) and transitory earnings (X2,t):15
MVEit = BVEit + α1Xa1,it + α2X2,it + α3Vit (B.1)
For this equation a triangular structure of the autoregressive process on abnormal earnings
is assumed:
Xait+1 = ωi,11X
a
it + ωi,12X2,it + γ1Vit + ε1,it+1,
X2,it+1 = ωi,22X2,it + γ2Vit + ε2,it+1 and
Vit+1 = φiVit + ε3,it+1.
Just like above (and including the same assumptions and restrictions), equation B.1 can
be transformed into a levels equation without abnormal earnings
MVEit = (1 − α1r)BVEit + α1X1,it + (α1 + α2)X2,it + α3Vit (B.2)
and into a return equation
RETit = (1 − α1r) X1,it + X2,itMVEit−1 + α1
∆X1,it
MVEit−1
+ (α1 + α2)
∆X2,it
MVEit−1
+ α3
∆Vit
MVEit−1
(B.3)
15See Ohlson (1999).
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with α1 = ω11/(1 + r − ω11) and α2 = ω12(1 + r)/(1 + r − ω11)(1 + r − ω12).
Given the same critical restrictions as before, these equations can be transformed into
econometric models:
MVEit = β0 + β1BVEit + β2X1,it + β3X2,it + εit (M.3)
RETit = β0 + β1
X1,it
MVEit−1
+ β2
∆X1,it
MVEit−1
+ β3
X2,it
MVEit−1
+ β4
∆X2,it
MVEit−1
+ εit (M.4)
One claimed advantage of the measurement approach to value relevance is that it allows
for the prediction of regression coefficients. Failure to find the predicted coefficients then
allows for inferences regarding “relevance” and “reliability” of the accounting data. Ac-
cording to Ohlson (1999)ω11 is restricted to be between 0 and 1. Hence, for very persistent
abnormal earnings (values close to 1) the expected coefficients for β1 and β2 are positive
but notably below 1. For transitory abnormal earnings (values close to 0), these coeffi-
cients are closer to 1. The coefficients for ∆X1,it and ∆X2,it, on the other hand, are usually
higher than 1 for persistent abnormal earnings and close to zero for transitory abnormal
earnings. The interpretation is straightforward: In case abnormal earnings are transitory,
than the best estimation for next year’s earnings are today’s earnings. In case abnormal
earnings are more persistent, the change in earnings is the more value relevant metric.
Because none of the empirical papers we know of discusses the shortcomings inherent
in the model, the reference to the Ohlson (1995; 1999) model often seems spurious. In
the words of van Cauwenberge and de Beelde (2010), “it seems not exaggerated to claim
that the functional specifications under the so-called measurement approach are no less
ad hoc than the specifications under the informational perspective.”
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Informational Approach to Value Relevance
In contrast to the measurement approach to value relevance, the informational approach
is less restrictive with regard to the model specification. Studies under this approach only
rely on the assumption that accounting data is useful for investors if it shows up as price
revision (Ball and Brown (1968)). In other words, accounting information is only informa-
tive, if it alters beliefs conditional upon the other information available (van Cauwenberge
and de Beelde (2010)). As the informational approach requires an expectation model for
the surprise component of earnings, the standard approach is to assume a random walk
model. Therefore, the specification that naturally corresponds to the informational ap-
proach is a first difference relation between returns and changes in income:16
RETit = β0 + β1∆Xit + εit
In this equation, last year’s earnings serve as expectation for today’s earnings. Explicitly
incorporating both variables in the model results in:
RETit = β0 + β1Xit + β2Xit−1 + εit (M.5)
In M.5, X may either be net income or comprehensive income.
16See van Cauwenberge and de Beelde (2010) for further details and a more rigorous discussion of model
specification issues.
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Variable definitions
RETit Abnormal return of firm i at time t adjusted for dividends calculated as difference between the
firm’s stock return over a time period spanning from prior year’s date of earnings announcement
to current year’s date of earnings announcement and the market return over the same time period.
Market returns are calculated using the Carhart (1997) four-factor model, which is an extension of
the well-known Fama and French (1993) three-factor model. In addition, other return specifications
are used in the Robustness section as indicated in table 10.
NIit Net income before preferred dividends of firm i at time t.
MVEit Market value of equity of firm i at time t.
Lossit Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firms i makes losses at time t and 0 otherwise.
OCIit Other comprehensive income of firm i at time t.
S CE OCIit Other comprehensive income of firm i at time t reported in a statement of changes in equity.
Prominent OCIit Other comprehensive income of firm i at time t reported either in a single-statement approach or
in a two-statement approach.
S ingle OCIit Other comprehensive income of firm i at time t reported in a single-statement approach.
Two OCIit Other comprehensive income reported of firm i at time t in a two-statement approach.
FOREXit Foreign currency adjustments of firm i at time t recognized in accordance with IAS 21.
AFS it Changes in the fair value of available-for-sale financial assets of firm i at time t recognized in
accordance with IAS 39.
HEDGEit Gains or losses from the effective part of a cash flow hedge of firm i at time t recognized in
accordance with IAS 39.
PENS it Actuarial gains or losses of firm i at time t recognized in accordance with IAS 19.
REVit Revaluation adjustment of tangible and intangible assets of firm i at time t recognized in accordance
with IAS 16 and IAS 38, respectively.
Appendix B: Variable definitions
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OCI components and their relevant standards
OCI Component Standard in force during Standard in force from
our sample period January, 1 2013
Foreign currency adjustments IAS 21.39 (c) IAS 21.39 (c)
Changes in the fair value of available-for-sale
financial assets IAS 39.55 (b) IAS 39.55 (b)
Gains or losses from the effective part of a
cash flow hedge IAS 39.95 (a) IAS 39.95 (a)
Actuarial gains or losses IAS 19.93A IAS 19.57 (d)
Revaluation adjustment of tangible assets IAS 16.39-40 IAS 16.39-40
Revaluation adjustment of intangible assets IAS 38.85-86 IAS 38.85-86
Share of other comprehensive income of investments
in associated companied recorded at equity IAS 28.11 IAS 28.27
Table 1: OCI components and their relevant standards
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Panel A - Descriptive statistics
Continuous variable Mean Std. Dev. Min p(25) p(50) p(75) Max Firm-years
RETit -0.082 0.569 -1.053 -0.382 -0.130 0.091 3.328 772
NIit 0.046 0.125 -0.529 0.030 0.060 0.089 0.464 775
OCIit -0.002 0.031 -0.117 -0.010 0.000 0.006 0.107 775
S CE OCIit -0.002 0.012 -0.071 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.042 775
Prominent OCIit 0.001 0.027 -0.107 -0.002 0.000 0.003 0.100 775
S ingle OCIit 0.003 0.022 -0.117 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.107 775
Two OCIit -0.002 0.016 -0.117 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.100 775
FOREXit 0.001 0.020 -0.054 -0.004 0.000 0.004 0.086 775
AFS it 0.000 0.008 -0.030 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.056 775
HEDGEit -0.001 0.016 -0.081 -0.002 0.000 0.001 0.063 774
PENS it -0.002 0.011 -0.066 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.032 775
REVit 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 774
Panel B - Development of the mean of OCI over time
OCI variable 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
OCIit -0.006 0.000 -0.018 0.001 0.015 -0.004
S CE OCIit -0.004 -0.002 -0.008 0.000 0.000 0.000
Prominent OCIit -0.001 0.001 -0.009 0.001 0.015 -0.004
S ingle OCIit 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.015 -0.004
Two OCIit -0.001 0.000 -0.009 -0.002 0.001 -0.000
Panel A of Table 2 exhibits summary statistics of the main variables used in our analysis, Panel B summarizes
the mean value of OCI reported at different locations over the period 2006-2011. OCI data has been hand-
collected from the financial statements. The data for all other variables was taken from the Thomson Reuters
Worldscope database. All variables are defined in Appendix B.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics and the development of the mean of OCI over time
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Pearson-Spearman Correlation among Regression Variables
RETit NIit OCIit S CE OCIit Prominent S ingle Two OCIit FOREXit AFS it HEDGEit PENS it REVit
OCIit OCIit
RETit 1 0.1878 0.0670 -0.0111 0.0888 0.1097 -0.0051 0.1447 0.0199 -0.0469 -0.0756 0.0440
(0.00) (0.06) (0.78) (0.01) (0.00) (0.89) (0.00) (0.58) (0.19) (0.04) (0.22)
NIit 0.1502 1 -0.0295 -0.0084 -0.0208 -0.0344 0.0155 -0.0039 -0.0355 -0.0349 0.0058 0.0064
(0.00) (0.41) (0.82) (0.57) (0.34) (0.67) (0.91) (0.33) (0.33) (0.87) (0.86)
OCIit 0.0790 -0.0556 1 0.4945 0.8262 0.6738 0.4395 0.5934 0.1936 0.4263 0.1316 0.0127
(0.03) (0.12) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.73)
S CE OCIit 0.0034 0.0165 0.4527 1 0.0070 0.0216 -0.0202 0.3860 0.1423 0.2095 -0.0169 0.0502
(0.93) (0.65) (0.00) (0.85) (0.55) (0.58) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.64) (0.16)
Prominent OCIit 0.0847 -0.0733 0.8884 0.0058 1 0.8410 0.5369 0.4442 0.1453 0.3470 0.1553 -0.0103
(0.02) (0.04) (0.00) (0.87) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.78)
S ingle OCIit 0.0963 -0.0986 0.7322 0.0225 0.8162 1 0.0123 0.3829 0.1234 0.3087 0.0593 -0.0258
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.53) (0.00) (0.73) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.10) (0.48)
Two OCIit 0.0146 0.0079 0.5145 -0.0221 0.5884 0.0144 1 0.2060 0.0847 0.1383 0.1880 0.0190
(0.69) (0.83) (0.00) (0.54) (0.00) (0.69) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.60)
FOREXit 0.1668 -0.0173 0.6028 0.2810 0.5549 0.4953 0.2624 1 0.0202 -0.0226 -0.2517 -0.0071
(0.00) (0.63) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.58) (0.53) (0.00) (0.85)
AFS it 0.0638 0.0548 0.3924 0.2563 0.2875 0.2992 0.0847 0.0831 1 0.0299 -0.0838 0.0281
(0.08) (0.13) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.41) (0.02) (0.44)
HEDGEit -0.0433 -0.0911 0.6120 0.2899 0.5453 0.4590 0.3014 0.0475 0.0327 1 0.0764 0.0232
(0.23) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.19) (0.36) (0.03) (0.52)
PENS it -0.0269 -0.0103 0.1609 -0.0022 0.1737 0.0629 0.2143 -0.2839 -0.0409 0.0109 1 0.0631
(0.46) (0.77) (0.00) (0.95) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) (0.26) (0.76) (0.08)
REVit 0.0175 0.0008 0.0040 -0.0152 0.0016 -0.0066 0.0121 0.0136 0.0771 -0.0915 -0.0010 1
(0.63) (0.98) (0.91) (0.67) (0.96) (0.85) (0.74) (0.71) (0.03) (0.01) (0.98)
Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficients are shown in the lower (upper) triangle of the table. Two-tailed p-values are presented in parentheses. All variables are defined in Appendix B.
Table 3: Pearson-Spearman correlation matrix
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Results for the overall value relevance of OCI
Equation No. I I without OCI
Dependent variable RETit RETit
Variables Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
NI 2.406*** 3.82 2.322*** 3.98
Loss -0.011 -0.19 -0.021 -0.33
Loss · NI -2.896*** -3.15 -2.871*** -3.26
Lagged NI -0.496*** -3.39 -0.511*** -3.10
OCI 1.577*** 3.20
Industry dummys Included Included
Year dummys Included Included
R2 24.16% 23.26%
Ad justed R2 22.01% 21.19%
Firm − years 688 688
Vuong Z-statistic 1.0423
(0.29)
This table shows the coefficients and t-statistics for estimating Equation I
as an OLS regression that includes fixed effects for fiscal year and industry
(not tabulated) next to the same estimation without OCI. The analysis employs
heteroskedasticity-adjusted robust standard errors clustered by firm and year
(Petersen (2009)). The regression is estimated with an intercept inculded
(not tabulated). ***, **, and * denote p-value significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% levels, based on two-tailed tests. The p-value for the Vuong (1989)
test is given in parentheses. All variables are defined in Appendix B.
Table 4: Results for the overall value relevance of OCI
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Panel A - Results for the reporting location Panel B - Results for the analysis of single
of OCI statement approach vs. two statement
approach
Equation No. II III
Dependent variable RETit RETit
Variables Coefficient t-statistic Variables Coefficient t-statistic
NI 2.079*** 2.80 NI 2.086*** 2.86
Loss -0.022 -0.27 Loss -0.022 -0.28
Loss · NI -2.710*** -3.70 Loss · NI -2.705*** -2.79
Lagged NI -0.540*** -3.70 Lagged NI -0.529*** -3.77
S CE OCI 1.379 0.68 S CE OCI 1.330 0.64
Prominent OCI 1.452** 1.96 S ingle OCI 2.019*** 3.20
Two OCI 0.335 0.28
Industry dummys Included Industry dummys Included
R2 8.64% R2 8.89%
Ad justed R2 6.60% Ad justed R2 6.70%
Firm − years 688 Firm − years 688
This table shows the coefficients and t-statistics for estimating Equations II and III as OLS regressions
that include fixed effects for industry (not tabulated). In contrast to table 4, the regressions do not include
dummy variables for fiscal years. We do this, because these dummies would capture at least part of the
impact of the change in the regulation of IAS 1. The analysis employs heteroskedasticity-adjusted robust
standard errors clustered by firm and year (Petersen (2009)).The regressions are estimated with an intercept
included (not tabulated). ***, **, and * denote p-value significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, based on
two-tailed tests. All variables are defined in Appendix B.
Table 5: Results for the analysis of the reporting location
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Results for the individual OCI components
Equation No. IV
Dependent variable RETit
Variables Coefficient t-statistic
NI 2.334*** 4.58
Loss -0.012 -0.17
Loss · NI -2.852*** -3.49
Lagged NI -0.442*** -3.32
FOREX 3.909 1.56
AFS 4.162 1.55
HEDGE -0.129 -0.11
PENS 1.178 1.11
REV -95.441 -0.86
Industry dummys Included
Year dummys Included
R2 25.80%
Ad justed R2 23.23%
Firm − years 688
This table shows the coefficients and t-statistics for estimating Equation IV
as an OLS regression that includes fixed effects for fiscal year and industry
(not tabulated). The analysis employs heteroskedasticity-adjusted robust
standard errors clustered by firm and year /Petersen (2009)). The regression
is estimated with an intercept included (not tabulated). ***, **, and * denote
p-value significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, based on two-tailed tests.
All variables are defined in Appendix B.
Table 6: Results for the individual OCI components
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Comparison of different standard-error adjustments
Equation No. I with different standard error adjustments
Dependent variable RETit
Variables Coefficient White-adjusted SE clustered SE clustered SE clustered
SE by firm by year by firm and year
NI 2.406 0.48 0.63 0.49 0.62
Loss -0.011 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.05
Loss · NI -2.896 0.63 0.92 0.65 0.91
Lagged NI -0.492 0.22 0.15 0.22 0.15
OCI 1.577 0.75 0.49 0.77 0.46
Industry dummys Included
Year dummys Included
Equation No. I with different standard error adjustments
and without dummies for fiscal years
Dependent variable RETit
Variables Coefficient White-adjusted SE clustered SE clustered SE clustered
SE by firm by year by firm and year
NI 2.080 0.49 0.74 0.50 0.73
Loss -0.021 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.07
Loss · NI -2.710 0.66 0.97 0.65 0.96
Lagged NI -0.544 0.22 0.15 0.22 0.15
OCI 1.384 0.76 0.95 0.80 0.92
Industry dummys Included
This table shows the results of the estimation of Equation I with different standard error adjustments.
Both OLS regressions include fixed effects for industries (not tabulated), whereas the first estimation
additionally includes dummies for fiscal years (not tabulated). All variables are defined in Appendix B.
Table 7: Robustness – comparison of different standard error adjustments
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Panel A - Estimation of Equation I Panel B - Estimation of Equation I
with de-meaned variables with de-meaned variables
Equation No. I II
Dependent variable RETit RETit
Variables Coefficient t-statistic Variables Coefficient t-statistic
NI 2.181*** 4.39 NI 2.181*** 4.39
Loss -0.109* -1.73 Loss -0.109* -1.71
Loss · NI -2.578*** -3.55 Loss · NI -2.587*** -3.55
Lagged NI -0.449*** -2.58 Lagged NI -0.449*** -2.59
OCI 1.596*** 3.18 S CE OCI 1.592** 2.21
Prominent OCI 1.596** 3.42
Industry dummys Included Industry dummys Included
Year dummys Included
R2 9.89% R2 9.89%
Ad justed R2 8.02% Ad justed R2 7.88%
Firm − years 688 Firm − years 688
This table shows the coefficients and t-statistics for estimating Equations I and II with de-meaned variables.
This approach deducts the year-specific mean from the variables to purge it from time effects. Both OLS
regressions include fixed effects for industries (not tabulated), whereas the first estimation additionally
includes dummies for fiscal years (not tabulated). The analysis employs heteroskedasticity-adjusted robust
standard errors clustered by firm and year (Petersen (2009)). The regression is estimated with an intercept
(not tabulated). ***, **, and * denote p-value significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, based on two-tailed
tests. All variables are defined in Appendix B.
Table 8: Robustness – analysis with de-meaned variables
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Panel A - Results for the overall value relevance Panel B - Results for the reporting location under
of OCI under the measurement approach the measurement approach
Equation No. V VI
Dependent variable RETit RETit
Variables Coefficient t-statistic Variables Coefficient t-statistic
NI 1.579** 2.47 NI 1.579** 2.45
Loss -0.036 -0.57 Loss -0.036 -0.56
Loss · NI -2.773*** -2.69 Loss · NI -2.772*** -2.66
∆ NI 0.445*** 3.05 ∆ NI 0.445*** 3.02
OCI -0.789 -0.80 S CE OCI -1.174 -0.51
∆ OCI 2.110*** 3.08 ∆ S CE OCI 2.033 1.06
Prominent OCI -0.718 -0.66
∆ Prominent OCI 2.103*** 2.68
Industry dummys Included Industry dummys Included
R2 10.82% R2 10.82%
Ad justed R2 8.83% Ad justed R2 8.56%
Firm − years 688 Firm − years 688
This table shows the coefficients and t-statistics for estimating Equations V and VI as an OLS regression that
includes fixed effects for industry (not tabulated). The analysis employs heteroskedasticity-adjusted robust standard
errors clustered by firm and year (Petersen (2009)). The regression is estimated with an intercept included (not
tabulated). ***, **, and * denote p-value significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, based on two-tailed tests.
All variables are defined in Appendix B.
Table 9: Robustness – measurement approach to value relevance
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Panel A - Results for the overall value relevance of OCI for different return specifications
Equation No. I I I I I I I I
Dependent variable Abnormal RETit Abnormal RETit Abnormal RETit Abnormal RETit Raw RETit Raw RETit Raw RETit Raw RETit
Calculation period Prior year’s earnings Firm’s financial year 12 months starting 3 15 months starting Prior year’s earnings Firm’s financial year 12 months starting 3 15 months starting
announcement date to months after prior year’s at prior year’s balance announcement date to months after prior year’s at prior year’s balance
current year’s balance sheet date balance sheet date current year’s balance sheet date sheet date
announcement date announcement date
Variables Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
NI 2.406*** 3.82 2.516*** 4.43 2.406*** 3.82 3.517*** 5.76 2.401*** 3.84 3.079*** 6.27 2.453*** 4.62 3.529*** 5.75
Loss -0.011 -0.19 -0.036 -0.66 -0.011 -0.19 0.009 0.27 -0.013 -0.22 0.022 0.67 -0.036 -0.66 0.011 0.31
Loss · NI -2.896*** -3.15 -3.290*** -3.44 -2.896*** -3.15 -4.031*** -4.62 -2.901*** -3.20 -3.062*** -6.78 -3.226*** -3.60 -4.041*** -4.63
Lagged NI -0.496*** -3.39 -0.509*** -4.03 -0.496*** -3.39 -0.577*** -3.86 -0.494*** -3.38 -0.363*** -4.08 -0.499*** -3.96 -0.575*** -3.94
OCI 1.577*** 3.20 1.569*** 3.47 1.577*** 3.20 0.944*** 2.65 1.590*** 3.12 1.159*** 4.22 1.639*** 3.32 0.940*** 2.63
Industry dummys Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Year dummys Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
R2 24.16% 23.68% 23.27% 25.08% 47.68% 44.83% 49.10% 44.83%
Ad justed R2 22.01% 21.51% 21.10% 22.96% 46.20% 43.26% 47.65% 43.27%
Firm − years 688 688 688 688 688 688 688 688
Panel B - Results for the reporting location for different return specifications
Equation No. II II II II II II II II
Dependent variable Abnormal RETit Abnormal RETit Abnormal RETit Abnormal RETit Raw RETit Raw RETit Raw RETit Raw RETit
Calculation period Prior year’s earnings Firm’s financial year 12 months starting 3 15 months starting Prior year’s earnings Firm’s financial year 12 months starting 3 15 months starting
announcement date to months after prior year’s at prior year’s balance announcement date to months after prior year’s at prior year’s balance
current year’s balance sheet date balance sheet date current year’s balance sheet date sheet date
announcement date announcement date
Variables Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
NI 2.079*** 2.80 2.743*** 4.61 2.196*** 2.94 3.170*** 4.33 3.059*** 3.93 3.799*** 6.04 3.069*** 4.61 4.408*** 5.40
Loss -0.022 -0.27 0.022 0.35 -0.064 -0.81 0.009 0.14 0.130 0.91 0.119* 1.76 0.114 0.83 0.125 1.29
Loss · NI -2.710*** -2.77 -2.843*** -5.67 -3.109*** -2.95 -3.821*** -4.09 -3.483*** -3.84 -3.609*** -6.42 -3.782*** -4.47 -4.726*** -5.03
Lagged NI -0.540*** -3.70 -0.371*** -3.99 -0.579*** -4.30 -0.596*** -4.40 -0.883*** -5.10 -0.595*** -3.31 -0.865*** -5.02 -0.910*** -4.73
S CE OCI 1.379 0.68 0.961 0.71 0.879 0.43 1.331 0.80 6.993** 2.28 5.555** 2.03 7.092** 2.3 6.798** 2.24
Prominent OCI 1.452* 1.94 0.717* 1.88 1.478* 1.72 0.527 1.08 3.392*** 2.91 2.884*** 2.77 3.288*** 2.84 2.811* 1.85
Industry dummys Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Year dummys Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
R2 8.64% 12.89% 10.23% 12.95% 15.06% 20.36% 15.52% 19.41%
Ad justed R2 6.60% 10.95% 8.23% 11.01% 13.16% 18.59% 13.64% 17.62%
Firm − years 688 688 688 688 688 688 688 688
Panel A of this table shows the coefficients and t-statistics for estimating Equation I. with different return specifications. The regression is run as an OLS regression that includes fixed effects for financial years and industry (not tabulated). Panel B of this table shows the coefficients and t-statistics
for estimating Equation II with different return specifications. The regression is run as an OLS regression that includes fixed effects for industry (not tabulated). All analyses employ heteroskedasticity-adjusted robust standard errors clustered by firm and year (Petersen (2009)). All regressions
are estimated with an intercept included (not tabulated). ***, **, and * denote p-value significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, based on two-tailed tests. All variables are defined in Appendix B.
Table 10: Robustness – different return specifications
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CHAPTER 5
Short-term and Long-term Effects of IFRS Adoption on
Disclosure Quality and Earnings Management
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5.1 Introduction
Since 2005, many large European companies are required to prepare their consolidated
financial statements according to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).1
This is the result of the so-called “IAS-Regulation” of the European Parliament and of
the European Council (Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002) which formulates two objectives
directly related to financial reporting: (higher) comparability and transparency of finan-
cial statements. Although international accounting standards have been adopted in the
European Union (EU) and many other parts of the world2 for some time, there is still no
consensus about the economic consequences of IFRS adoption.
To date, academics failed to deliver compelling, unambiguous evidence for the effects of
IFRS adoption on financial reporting quality.3 Several studies provide evidence for positi-
ve capital market effects of the adoption of international standards, such as higher liquidity
of stock markets or lower bid-ask spreads, or positive macroeconomic effects, particularly
due to changes in foreign investment behavior. Reviewing the literature on the economic
consequences of mandatory IFRS adoption, Bru¨ggemann et al. (2013) observe that “there
is plenty and almost unanimous evidence of positive capital market and macroeconomic
effects.” While these effects can be regarded as (more or less noisy) indirect measures of
the quality of financial reporting, research has also measured financial reporting quality
directly, especially with regard to comparability (Kvaal and Nobes (2010; 2012), Haller
and Wehrfritz (2013)) and transparency. In our paper, we focus on transparency which
we evaluate by examining the properties of accounting earnings (“earnings quality”) as
1In the following we only use the abbreviation IFRS when referring to the accounting standards that have
been issued by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) or its predecessor, the International
Accounting Standards Committee (IASC). Standards issued by the IASC are called International Accoun-
ting Standards (IAS).
2For the latest information about the use of IFRS around the world, see http://www.ifrs.org/
Use-around-the-world/Pages/Jurisdiction-profiles.aspx.
3See the findings of Soderstrom and Sun (2007) and Bru¨ggemann et al. (2013) who review the literature
related to voluntary and mandatory adoption of IFRS, respectively.
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well as disclosure quality which we understand as two different, but related, dimensions
of transparency. More specifically, we assume disclosures to have a constraining effect
on the degree of earnings management. While Barth et al. (2008) provide evidence for a
higher accounting quality of adopters of international accounting standards compared to
(matched) non-adopters applying domestic GAAP in 21 countries, contemporaneous stu-
dies find no evidence for a reduction in earnings management behavior following IFRS
adoption (e.g. Jeanjean and Stolowy (2008)). Specifically, studies using discretionary ac-
cruals as proxy for earnings management often do not support the general assumption
made by regulatory bodies that the adoption of IFRS leads to higher transparency and
find an increase or no significant change rather than a decrease in the extent of discretio-
nary accruals following IFRS adoption (e.g. van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005), Callao
and Jarne (2010), Ahmed et al. (2013)). On the contrary, research examining disclos-
ure quality provides unanimous support for an increase in transparency in the course of
the switch to international accounting standards (Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), Daske and
Gebhardt (2006), Glaum et al. (2013)).
We examine the effect of IFRS adoption on financial reporting quality in Germany by
both earnings quality, i.e. the degree of earnings management, and disclosure quality,
since we assume the two dimensions to be related. Our focus on a single country removes
the need to put emphasis on country-specific factors that are not related to the financial
reporting system but could potentially be confounding (Barth et al. (2008)) which seems
appropriate in the light of the inconsistent results of prior literature. Furthermore, the
focus on Germany allows us to use a specific proxy for disclosure quality, namely the
disclosure scores of the annual ’beauty contest’ “Best Annual Report” of the German
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business journal manager magazin, which are publicly available from 1995 to 2012.4
Consistent with prior research, we find an increase in disclosure quality accompanying the
transition from German GAAP to IFRS. Contrary, we find a significantly higher level of
earnings management under IFRS compared to German GAAP. Similar to the results of
prior research, our evidence around the adoption of IFRS may be subject to several con-
founding effects, particularly in the first few years of international accounting. Therefore,
we further analyze the degree of earnings management in the period after IFRS adoption
satisfying the obvious demand to study longer time horizons rather than the few years
around the regulatory change (see Callao and Jarne (2010)). Our results indicate a signi-
ficant decrease in earnings management from the early stage of IFRS accounting to the
mature stage. We interpret this as improvement in reporting quality over time attributable
to learning effects of preparers, user, and auditors, developing enforcement, diminishing
effects resulting from the application of IFRS 1 (First-time Adoption of IFRS), and emer-
ging common guidelines and interpretations fostering more consistent application of the
new standards. Finally, we show that disclosures have a constraining effect on earnings
management when accounting standards require comparatively few disclosures and/or
when financial statements are influenced by low compliance, little experience or weak
enforcement.
However, the accounting numbers and disclosures observed are the mot only the results
of accounting standards, but the entire financial reporting system, including accounting
standards, their interpretation as well as enforcement and litigation (Barth et al. (2008))
making it impossible to attribute any effects solely to the change in the standards that have
been applied, notwithstanding our conviction of the importance of accounting standards
4There are two more reasons for our focus on Germany. First, the large differences between German GAAP
and IFRS as well as relatively high compliance levels likely result in more powerful tests on the effects of
IFRS adoption (Bartov et al. (2005), Soderstrom and Sun (2007)). Second, since German firms account for
a substantial part of the firms worldwide that reported under IFRS in the 1990s (see Daske and Gebhardt
(2006) for an analysis of the number of firms adopting IFRS between 1996 and 2004), the effects of the
regulatory change can be studied particularly well in the German setting (see also Glaum et al. (2013)).
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within the financial reporting system. Furthermore, although studying a single-country
setting and controlling for a range of firm characteristics and incentives respectively, we
cannot be sure that our findings can solely be attributed to changes in the financial repor-
ting system.
Our study contributes to the widespread debate on the effects of IFRS adoption on finan-
cial reporting quality in several ways. First, we investigate both the change in disclosure
quality as well as the change in the degree of earnings management. Thereby, we show
that inconsistent results can be obtained using a similar sample and sample period and,
thus, different dimensions of transparency might be affected differently by the regulatory
change. Second, we explicitly address the development of earnings management behavior
under IFRS over time satisfying the demand to analyze longer time series. Our results
may offer an explanation for the increase in discretionary accruals that has been found to
accompany the adoption of international accounting standards by several researchers. We
argue that at least part of the increase in earnings management in the first years of IFRS
application might be attributed to the novelty of the rules and resulting compliance issues,
confounding effects of the application of IFRS 1, and the lack of common guidelines and
interpretations. Thus, we offer a potential alternative explanation to those studies that at-
tribute the inconsistent results of prior research with regard to the association of discretio-
nary accruals and IFRS adoption mainly to methodological and research design issues
(Ahmed et al. (2013)). Finally, our finding regarding the constraining effect of disclosures
on earnings management is of potential interest to both standard setters and analysts. The
former should feel encouraged to demand high quality disclosures, especially with regard
to management’s estimates and assumptions, while the latter should be aware of the use
of discretionary accounting in the absence of disclosures.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 describes the institutio-
nal background by presenting the German accounting environment and its development
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towards IFRS. Section 5.3 reviews related literature and develops our hypotheses, while
section 5.4 explains our research design and describes our proxies for disclosure quality
and earnings management. Section 5.5 presents our data and results next to robustness
checks. Section 5.6 discusses our results and concludes.
5.2 Institutional Background: The Development of the German Accounting
Environment
For our study, we focus on Germany, a continental European country that has been cha-
racterized as a code-law country having had relatively weak investor protection rights
(La Porta et al. (2000)). Overviews of the German accounting system have been provided
by several authors (e.g. Harris et al. (1994), van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005), Fer-
rari et al. (2012)) which is why we limit our remarks to the fundamental characteristics
and developments towards mandatory IFRS adoption. Traditionally, German accounting
according to the German Commercial Code (“Handelsgesetzbuch”, HGB) mostly aims
at protecting the interests of firms’ creditors and is heavily influenced by tax regulations
(van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005), Glaum et al. (2013)). While the dominant valua-
tion principle is prudence (Harris et al. (1994), Ferrari et al. (2012)), German GAAP has
been characterized as providing a multitude of options with regard to recognition and va-
luation of balance sheet items and opportunities to manage earnings (van Tendeloo and
Vanstraelen (2005)).
In the 1990s, the accounting rules of the German system were criticized by Anglo-
American investors and the financial press.5 Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) outline the main
arguments as follows: German GAAP allows too much discretion, especially with regard
to the management of income through the use of large hidden reserves; German GAAP
5See Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) who also provide some examples.
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financial statements are subject to tax optimization incentives to a large extent; and Ger-
man GAAP has deficits regarding disclosure requirements that are not sufficient to meet
the demands of investors and analysts. Over the years, the financing as well as the owner-
ship structure of German firms has changed since companies have been relying more and
more on public equity markets. In the course of this development, the importance of (po-
tential) investors as users of financial statements has risen (van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen
(2005)).
In response to the complaints about German GAAP and the increasing importance of
capital markets, many German firms adjusted their financial reporting and disclosure stra-
tegies and published additional information according to US GAAP or IFRS (Leuz and
Verrecchia (2000)).6 Nevertheless, German groups had to provide consolidated financial
statements according to local GAAP until April 1998. At that time, the German Parlia-
ment and Federal Council decided to allow listed firms to issue consolidated financial
statements that comply with either German GAAP or international accounting standards
(either IFRS or US GAAP) by enacting the “Law to Facilitate the Raising of Capital”
(“Kapitalaufnahmeerleichterungsgesetz”, KapAEG).7 The next important milestone in
the development of the German financial reporting environment was the enactment of the
so-called “IAS Regulation” in 2002 (Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002). For fiscal years
starting on or after 1 January 2005, the regulation requires European companies to pre-
pare their consolidated financial statements in accordance with IFRS, if their securities
are admitted to trading on a regulated market within the EU.8 The aim of the regulati-
6Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) identify three different strategies to report (almost) in compliance with IFRS
or US GAAP. They range from preparing financial statements as close as possible to international stan-
dards while still complying with German GAAP or reconciling their income and shareholder’s equity with
international accounting standards while providing additional disclosures required by international stan-
dards in the notes to the provision of an additional separate set of financial statements in accordance with
international standards.
7See Bundesgesetzblatt, 1998, pt. 1, no. 22, Bonn, April 23, 1998.
8See Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002, Article 4. Firms that were preparing their statements in accordance
with US GAAP were allowed to change to IFRS at latest for fiscal year 2007 (see Regulation (EC) No.
1606/2002, Article 9(b)).
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on is to ensure better comparability and transparency of financial statements within the
EU to allow efficient functioning of capital markets and the Community’s internal market
(Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002, Article 1).
In the meantime, the German stock exchange Deutsche Bo¨rse AG had introduced the
requirement of international financial reporting for selected segments, such as the New
Market (“Neuer Markt”) which required listed firms to publish financial statements in
accordance with internationally recognized standards in 1997. Similarly, companies see-
king to comply with the listing requirements of the prime standard which was introduced
in 2003 had to adopt international accounting standards prior to 2005, if they have not
been listed before 1 January 2003.9 Alongside the adoption of international accounting
standards in the EU, the member states also introduced the requirement to establish, on a
national basis, mechanisms to ensure the appropriate and consistent application of the in-
ternational accounting rules. In Germany, the DPR (“Deutsche Pru¨fstelle fu¨r Rechnungs-
legung” – German Financial Reporting Enforcement Panel) was established in 2004 and
started assessing recent financial statements with respect to compliance with the relevant
accounting rules in 2005. Once a significant error is detected, this finding has to be disclo-
sed by the firm to the public, which may lead to negative capital market effects for the firm
(see the findings of Hitz et al. (2012)).10
In contrast to traditional German GAAP, IFRS aim at providing information that is useful
to investors and creditors in deciding about the provision of financial resources to the re-
porting firm (see Conceptual Framework, OB2). Consequently, IFRS differ substantially
from German GAAP. Importantly, international accounting standards are said to require
a greater amount of disclosures (Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), Ashbaugh (2001)) and pro-
9See Daske and Gebhardt (2006) for a description of the transition process towards IFRS including the role
of listing requirements for Germany, Austria and Switzerland.
10For a good overview of the enforcement of IFRS in the EU in general and, in particular, the specific
German two-tier enforcement system consisting of a private body (the DPR) and the securities regulator
(the federal agency BaFin) we also refer to Hitz et al. (2012).
163
vide fewer accounting choices than German GAAP (d’Arcy (2000)). These are features
potentially constraining earnings management and therefore might lead to the intended
increase in transparency of financial reporting. In this paper, we analyze the effects of
IFRS adoption on disclosure quality and earnings management separately and test the as-
sociation between the two dimensions of transparency in order to further understand the
consequences of the regulatory change.
5.3 Related Literature and Hypotheses Development
5.3.1 Literature Review
Today, European companies are required to prepare their consolidated financial state-
ments in accordance with IFRS, if their securities are admitted to trading on a regulated
market within the EU. This requirement is the result of the announcement of the so-
called “IAS Regulation” in 2002 (Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002). The stated objectives
of the Regulation are “. . . the adoption and use of international accounting standards in
the Community [. . . ] in order to ensure a high degree of transparency and comparabi-
lity of financial statements and hence an efficient functioning of the Community capital
market and of the Internal Market” (Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002, Article 1).11 Thus,
with regard to financial reporting, two objectives can be identified, transparency and com-
parability, which should enhance the functioning of capital markets and, finally, foster
11The stated objectives of the “IAS Regulation” regarding transparency and comparability correspond to
the objectives of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) which develops IFRS. According
to the Preface to IFRSs, par. 6(a), the objectives of the IASB include the development of “a single set of
high quality, understandable, enforceable and globally accepted financial reporting standards . . . [which]
should require high quality, transparent and comparable information in financial statements and other
financial reporting. . . ”.
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macroeconomic developments (Bru¨ggemann et al. (2013)).12
Several studies have been conducted to investigate the effects of the adoption of interna-
tional accounting standards on capital markets, such as changes in bid-ask spreads (Leuz
and Verrecchia (2000), Muller et al. (2011)), stock market liquidity (Daske et al. (2008)),
cost of capital (Daske (2006)) or the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts (Glaum et al. (2013)).
Others have focused on macroeconomic effects, particularly on changes in foreign invest-
ment behavior.13 Bru¨ggemann et al. (2013) who review the literature on the economic
consequences of mandatory IFRS adoption observe that “there is plenty and almost una-
nimous evidence of positive capital market and macroeconomic effects.”
While capital market and macroeconomic effects of IFRS adoption can be regarded as
indirect measures of changes in financial reporting quality, research has also examined
the impact of international accounting standards on financial reporting quality directly.
Consistent with the notion that there is no consensus on the characteristics of high quality
financial reporting (see e.g. Daske and Gebhardt (2006), Glaum et al. (2013)) studies have
focused on different dimensions of comparability and transparency. First, the compliance
of firms’ financial statements with IFRS has been questioned. Street and Gray (2002) pro-
vide evidence for substantial compliance problems in IFRS financial reports for the year
1998. Verriest et al. (2012) and Glaum et al. (2013b) also find a considerable degree of
non-compliance with regard to IFRS disclosures in the first year of IFRS application. All
of these studies further investigate the determinants of compliance and identify factors
such as the strength of a firm’s governance, auditor type or country-specific factors to be
critical. Second, studies have investigated the effects of IFRS adoption on the compara-
12Bru¨ggemann et al. (2013) assume a causal chain derived from the objectives of the IAS Regulation accor-
ding to which mandatory adoption of IFRS should increase transparency and comparability of financial
reporting. This would improve the functioning of capital markets resulting in positive effects (e.g. lower
costs of capital or better capital allocation) that would foster macroeconomic developments (e.g. growth
and employment). Following this causal chain, observing capital market and macroeconomic effects can
be regarded as indirect measurement of financial reporting quality.
13See Bru¨ggemann et al. (2013) for a review of such macroeconomic consequences with regard to manda-
tory IFRS adoption.
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bility of financial statements, e.g. by examining cross-country accounting policy choices
(see e.g. Kvaal and Nobes (2010; 2012), Haller and Wehrfritz (2013)).
Third, the quality of financial statements, especially regarding transparency, has been eva-
luated by measures of the properties of earnings but, to date, results have been inconclu-
sive. For example, some researchers have addressed the value relevance of IFRS financial
statements in capital markets (e.g. Bartov et al. (2005), Hung and Subramanyam (2007),
Jermakowicsz et al. (2007), Aharony et al. (2010), Ahmed et al. (2013)).14 With regard
to Germany, results are mixed. Bartov et al. (2005) provide evidence for earnings com-
puted according to internationally accepted accounting rules (US GAAP or IFRS) being
of higher value relevance than German GAAP earnings. For a DAX-30 sample of firms,
Jermakowicsz et al. (2007) also find support for higher value relevance as a result of the
voluntary adoption of IFRS. However, Hung and Subramanyam (2007) find no evidence
for an increase in value relevance from local GAAP accounting numbers to those that
are presented by German first-time adopters of international accounting standards. In ad-
dition to value relevance, Barth et al. (2008) examine timeliness (timely recognition of
losses) and provide evidence for a higher accounting quality of adopters of international
accounting standards compared to (matched) non-adopters applying domestic GAAP in
21 countries.
Furthermore, the quality of earnings can be evaluated by the degree of earnings mana-
gement whereby earnings management refers to corporate decision makers affecting the
outcomes of financial reporting by either structuring real transactions or using discretion
in recognition or disclosure decisions when preparing financial statements (see e.g. Healy
and Wahlen (1999), Roychowdhury (2006), Ronen and Yaari (2008)). They may do so
in order to achieve certain contractual outcomes that are dependent on accounting figures
or to mislead some of the addressees of financial reporting about the real performance of
14A comprehensive overview of value relevance studies examining the effects of IFRS adoption is provided
by Ahmed et al. (2013) highlighting the mixed evidence delivered by a large body of literature.
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the company (Healy and Wahlen (1999)). Besides such opportunistic reasons, discretio-
nary accounting choices can also be used as a means of signaling private information
to outside investors or other external parties (Watts and Zimmerman (1986), Healy and
Wahlen (1999)). However, in most cases, higher quality earnings are assumed to indicate
less earnings management.15
Prior research reveals inconsistent results. One the one hand, the results of Barth et al.
(2008) generally indicate less earnings management in terms of earnings smoothing and
earnings management towards positive earnings (“loss avoidance”) for firms that adopted
international accounting standards compared to non-adopters. On the other hand, Jean-
jean and Stolowy (2008) who examine the impact of the mandatory adoption of IFRS on
earnings management in Australia, France, and the UK conclude that the pervasiveness
of earnings management behavior has not been reduced by the introduction of the new
accounting standards. For France, their analyses of the distribution of earnings with re-
gard to potential “loss avoidance” reporting techniques actually indicate an increase in
earnings management.
The most widespread approach to measuring the degree of earnings management is to
determine discretionary accruals. Ahmed et al. (2013) provide a comprehensive overview
of studies investigating the association between IFRS adoption and discretionary accruals
and highlight the inconsistency of prior findings which they attribute to methodological
issues.16 They further meta-analyze the results of the empirical studies and conclude that
the regulatory change towards IFRS reporting does not lead to a decrease in discretionary
accruals.
For the German accounting environment, van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) exami-
15For example, Barth et al. (2008) predict companies with earnings of higher quality to exhibit less earnings
management and point out that this prediction is consistent with prior literature.
16In particular, Ahmed et al. (2013) suggest that income-increasing and income-decreasing accruals are
treated equally when estimating the absolute value of discretionary accruals. Thereby, studies would “fail
to capture the real effect of IFRS adoption on earnings management.”
167
ne the effect of voluntary adoption on earnings management measured as the magnitude
of absolute discretionary accruals calculated according to the Jones (1991) model. For a
sample of 636 firm-year observations for the years from 1999 to 2001, the authors provi-
de evidence of a significant increase in earnings management using discretionary accruals
following the adoption of international accounting standards. Additionally, the authors
provide evidence for a significant increase in earnings smoothing by German IFRS ado-
pters which is reduced when the financial statements are audited by a Big4 firm. However,
van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) find no significant differences between voluntary ad-
opters of international standards and firms that still reported under German GAAP with
regard to earnings management and smoothing behavior after inclusion of hidden reserves
into their analyses. Overall, the authors conclude that the application of international ac-
counting standards cannot be associated with a decrease in earnings management. These
results are complemented by the study of Callao and Jarne (2010) which examines the
effects of mandatory IFRS adoption in 11 European countries. Covering a period of two
years before and two years after the mandatory adoption of IFRS in 2005, Callao and
Jarne (2010) state that earnings management has increased with the implementation of
IFRS in Europe as discretionary accruals have increased immediately after the regulato-
ry change. Meanwhile, the detailed results for Germany reveal significant changes only
with regard to long-term discretionary accruals, while there are no significant differences
concerning total accruals and current accruals.
Bru¨ggemann et al. (2013) add a potential supplementary explanation for the inconclu-
siveness of financial reporting effects following (mandatory) IFRS adoption. They argue
that the users of financial reporting are interested in more than aggregate measures of
earnings quality. In a similar vein, Daske and Gebhardt (2006) point out that studies ex-
amining the effects of IFRS adoption on specific properties of accounting measures, such
as earnings, “by their design do not analyze the potential differences and changes in the
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information provided in the actual annual reports of firms adopting IFRS.” Obviously,
the primary contents of the financial statements, income statement and balance sheet, are
not the only means firms have to communicate with capital markets and interested parties
beyond investors and creditors. Accordingly, some researchers have examined the effects
of the introduction of international accounting standards on disclosure quality, a different
dimension of the transparency of financial reporting.
Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), who provide empirical evidence for the economic benefits
of increased disclosure, examine the quality of disclosures for German firms included in
the DAX 100 index during 1998 by comparing ratings of an annual report ’beauty con-
test’ published in the business journal Capital. For the fiscal years ending between July
1997 and June 1998, they find significantly higher mean and median ratings for firms that
have adopted international reporting strategies and therefore report under IFRS or US
GAAP compared to those of firms that provide their financial statements solely according
to German GAAP.17 Daske and Gebhardt (2006) analyze the effects of the adoption of
internationally recognized financial reporting standards, namely IFRS and US GAAP, on
the quality of accounting reports for firms from Austria, Switzerland, and Germany, all
of which have a German accounting origin. Using disclosure quality scores based on the
ratings of yearly “Best Annual Report” ’beauty contests’ published in business magazines
in the three countries for the years from 1996 to 2004,18 they find a significant increase
of disclosure quality in the course of the adoption of international accounting standards,
particularly IFRS. Importantly, their results also hold in multivariate analyses controlling
for individual reporting incentives by a set of firm characteristics.19 In order to examine
changes in the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts due to the introduction of inter-
17Note that these international reporting strategies include not only firms that provide an additional separate
set of financial statements according to US GAAP or IFRS, but also firms that have not fully adopted
international standards. See footnote 6 for these strategies.
18The “Best Annual Report” ’beauty contests’ are published by the business magazines Capital and Focus
Money in Germany (1996-2003), Bilanz in Switzerland (2001-2004), and Trend in Austria (1997-2004).
19For a critical discussion of Daske and Gebhardt (2006) see Gallery (2006).
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national accounting standards and whether such changes can be attributed to increased
disclosures, Glaum et al. (2013) first assess whether the disclosure quality for their sam-
ple of German listed companies for the years 1997-2005 increased. Measuring disclosure
quality with detailed quality scores obtained from a yearly “Best Annual Report” ’be-
auty contest’ organized by the German business journal manager magazin (which also
form the basis for our analyses),20 they find that the quality of disclosures in the notes
to the group financial statements as well as in management reports is significantly higher
for firms reporting under IFRS or US GAAP compared to firms reporting under German
GAAP. Overall, Glaum et al. (2013) conclude that the introduction of internationally re-
cognized accounting standards improved disclosure quality and the accuracy of analysts’
forecasts, whereby the latter effect can to some extent be attributed to the former. Taken
together, the three studies using disclosure quality scores extracted from ratings of yearly
annual report ’beauty contests’ published in business journals provide clear evidence for
an increase in disclosure quality under IFRS compared to traditional German accounting
principles.
We understand earnings quality and disclosure quality as different, but related, dimensi-
ons of transparency. It is a common assumption that disclosure is related to information
asymmetry between investors and managers (e.g. Lang and Lundholm (1993; 1996)) and
that information asymmetry is also related to earnings management (e.g. Dye (1988) or
Trueman and Titman (1988)). Drawing upon these relations, Lobo and Zhou (2001) show
that disclosure quality and earnings management are negatively associated, i.e. the greater
the amount and the higher the quality of disclosures, the smaller the room for (opportuni-
stic) earnings management. For example, enhanced disclosure requirements should limit
management’s discretion over assumptions and accounting estimates thereby reducing the
20For a description of the “Best Annual Report” ’beauty contest’ published by manager magazin see section
5.4.2. Please note that Glaum et al. (2013) have access to more detailed scores which is beyond what has
been published in the business journal and enables them to differentiate between the disclosure quality of
notes and that of management reports.
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scope for earnings management. An exemplary interpretation of the negative relation is
that shareholders of firms with better disclosures are more likely to detect earnings ma-
nagement, which thus limits managers’ willingness to engage in earnings management.
The general result is supported by Francis et al. (2008) who examine the relation between
different proxies for earnings quality (including earnings management proxied by the ab-
solute value of abnormal accruals of the modified Jones (1991) model) and voluntary
disclosure. They find a significant relation that is complementary in nature, i.e. the higher
the quality of earnings the more voluntary disclosures are provided by the firm. However,
pointing out that causation is always a critical matter, Francis et al. (2008) argue that ear-
nings quality is more likely to be a determinant of voluntary disclosure than vice versa,
whereas Lobo and Zhou (2001) interpret the relation in the opposite direction.
5.3.2 Hypotheses Development
Being interested in the effects of IFRS adoption on transparency in Germany, we assess
both the effect on the quality of corporate disclosures and the effect on the quality of
earnings. While prior literature offers a wide range of earnings quality measures, we are
particularly interested in the degree of earnings management. This is because we expect
earnings management to be related to disclosure quality due to the assumption that the
greater the amount and the better the quality of firms’ disclosures are, the tighter the
constraint which they put on (opportunistic) earnings management behavior (Lobo and
Zhou (2001)). Since IFRS require more disclosures than German GAAP and the quality
of disclosures is expected to increase with the adoption of international accounting stan-
dards (Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), Daske and Gebhardt (2006), Glaum et al. (2013)),
there are reasons to assume a decrease in earnings management. In addition to that, in-
ternational standards are supposed to limit accounting choices compared to traditional
German GAAP (d’Arcy (2000)) and, thus, might reduce the scope for earnings manage-
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ment (Barth et al. (2008)). This reasoning is in line with the common assumption that
international accounting standards are of higher quality compared to the GAAP of the
local jurisdictions on which the introduction of IFRS in the EU is based.
However, this seems to be contrary to the results of van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005)
and Callao and Jarne (2010) which do not indicate a decrease in earnings management for
a sample of German firms. Assuming international standards to be of higher quality, the
findings affirm the notion that the application of high quality standards is not necessarily
sufficient for providing high quality financial information (Ball et al. (2003)). In fact, the
accounting numbers observed are the results of the financial reporting system as a whole,
including standards, their interpretation as well as enforcement and litigation (Barth et al.
(2008)). In addition to that, non-compliance with the effective IFRS, as documented by
several studies (e.g. Street and Gray (2002), Verriest et al. (2012), Glaum et al. (2013b)),
could also adversely affect the quality of summary measures of the accounting process,
such as earnings. Moreover, despite the notion that IFRS limit accounting choices compa-
red to traditional German GAAP, it has been acknowledged that there is a range of explicit
and implicit accounting options and vague criteria under IFRS too (Nobes (2006; 2013)),
that offer opportunities to manage earnings (Callao and Jarne (2010)). Also, as emphasi-
zed by Jeanjean and Stolowy (2008), the application of any set of accounting standards
requires substantial judgment and estimates as well as the use of private information, so
that managers are provided with considerable discretion under IFRS as well. Taking eve-
rything into consideration, especially the results of prior research, we expect an increase
in earnings management in the course of the adoption of IFRS in Germany. Therefore, we
formulate the first part of our first hypothesis as follows:
H1a: The degree of earnings management is higher under IFRS than un-
der German GAAP.
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However, we are aware of several issues confounding the analyses of the effects of the ad-
option of international accounting standards, especially in the first years which we refer
to as “early stage” of IFRS accounting. First, we attribute part of the contrary results of
prior literature to the severe compliance problems in the early stage of IFRS accounting
which research, to date, had to focus on due to the lack of longer time series. We expect
IFRS compliance to improve over time assuming that the more experienced accountants,
auditors and users are, the better the quality of IFRS financial statements is. Second, it is
likely that firms preparing to adopt international accounting standards do not change their
accounting dramatically at one point in time. Rather, firms are expected to transition gra-
dually by bringing their domestic GAAP accounting numbers closer to those based on the
new international standards (Barth et al. (2008)). Third, the younger a standard-setting re-
gime is, the more principle-based it likely is, since common guidelines and interpretations
are developed over time (Nelson (2003), Callao and Jarne (2010)). Under the assumption
that shared guidelines and interpretations are expected to enhance consistent application
and reduce the scope for discretionary accounting decisions, comparing GAAP that have
been applied for a long time to a recently adopted reporting regime leaves the latter with a
’disadvantage’. Fourth, the first few years of IFRS application are likely to be influenced
by the first-time adoption rules of the relevant standard IFRS 1 (First-time Adoption of
IFRS) requiring retrospective application in several cases. This can be seen as a “struc-
tural break in the time series of firms’ accounting numbers that will take several years
to wash out” (Bru¨ggemann et al. (2013)). Fifth, an important feature of the financial re-
porting system, the German Financial Reporting Enforcement Panel (FREP), has been
established and examined financial statements starting from the fiscal year 2004. We also
expect enforcement to undergo a learning curve as well as increasing awareness among
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preparers and auditors about the consequences of non-compliance.21 Since the level of
enforcement is key to financial reporting quality (see e.g. Hope (2003)), this leads us to
expect a decrease in earnings management as a result of these effects. All together, we ex-
pect less earnings management in the later years of IFRS accounting (the “mature stage”)
compared to the early stage. Hence, we formulate the second part of our first hypothesis
as follows:
H1b: The degree of earnings management is reduced over time as prepa-
rers, users, auditors and enforcers become more experienced and proficient
in the application of international accounting standards, IFRS compliance
improves, the effects of IFRS 1 on the time series of accounting numbers
diminish, and common guidelines and interpretations of international stan-
dards emerge.
To complement and to question our prediction and results with regard to earnings ma-
nagement, we examine the field of transparency from a second perspective, namely the
quality of disclosures. Among researchers, it seems to be a shared understanding that in-
ternational accounting standards require more disclosures than German GAAP (Leuz and
Verrecchia (2000), Ashbaugh (2001)). This perception is supported by the findings of pri-
or research which indicate an increase in disclosure quality attributable to the adoption
of international accounting standards (Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), Daske and Gebhardt
(2006), Glaum et al. (2013)). Both the enhanced disclosure requirements under IFRS
compared to German GAAP as well as the findings of prior literature lead us to expect
an increase in disclosure quality in the course of the adoption of IFRS. Accordingly, we
formulate our second hypothesis as follows:
21While negative capital market effects resulting from SEC error announcements are well documented in
the literature (e.g. Dechow et al. (1996)), Hitz et al. (2012) provide evidence for negative capital market
effects in terms of abnormal returns, abnormal trading volumes and abnormal bid-ask spreads of FREP
error announcements in Germany as well.
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H2: Disclosure quality under IFRS is higher than under German GAAP.
Having examined the effects of the introduction of international accounting standards on
earnings management and disclosure quality separately, we are interested in the relation
between the two dimensions of transparency. As discussed above, it is assumed that the
greater the amount and the higher the quality of disclosures, the smaller the room for
(opportunistic) earnings management. Prior research supports this notion by delivering
evidence for a negative relation between disclosures and earnings management (Lobo and
Zhou (2001)) and for a complementary relation between disclosure quality and earnings
quality (Francis et al. (2008)). Therefore, we formulate our third hypothesis as follows:
H3: Higher quality disclosures have a constraining effect on earnings ma-
nagement.
5.4 Research Design
We strive to investigate the effect of IFRS adoption on the transparency of financial re-
porting. To this end, we analyze two dimensions of transparency, namely the quality of
disclosures and the degree of earnings management. We do this because firms commu-
nicate to capital markets and interested parties through the primary contents of financial
statements (profit and loss and balance sheet) and through additional information provi-
ded in the notes (Daske and Gebhardt (2006)).
5.4.1 Measurement of Earnings Management
Following prior literature, we principally rely on the Jones (1991) model to obtain a proxy
for the degree of earnings management. However, we use the performance adjusted modi-
fied Jones model as in Kothari et al. (2005) and estimate the accrual process as a function
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of sales growth (adjusted for growth in credit sales), property, plant and equipment (PPE)
and return on assets (ROA).22 Beginning of period total assets (A) serve as denominator
in this equation:
T Ait
Ait−1
= α0 + β1
1
Ait−1
+ β2
∆S alesit − ∆Receivablesit
Ait−1
+ β3
PPEit
Ait−1
(1)
+ β4ROAit + εit
In this model, T Ait is total accruals and is calculated as follows:23
T Ait = (∆Current assetsit − ∆Cashit)
− (∆Current liabilitiesit − ∆Current portion o f long term debtit
− ∆Income tax payableit) − Depreciation and amortization expenseit
We separately estimate this model for each industry in our sample with the industry clas-
sification based on Ernstberger et al. (2013) who adjust the Frankel et al. (2002) SIC
classification for the German setting. The residuals of this model serve as firm-year speci-
fic estimators for the degree of earnings management. As earnings management might be
income increasing or income decreasing, we analyze the absolute value of discretionary
accruals.
22The standard Jones (1991) model, the modified Jones model of Dechow et al. (1995) as well as a further
modification of Salewski and Zu¨lch (2013) will be used as robustness checks.
23Rephrased in Worldscope items total accruals is calculated as [∆WC02201−∆WC02003]−[∆WC03051−
∆WC018232 −WC04828] −WC01151.
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5.4.2 Measurement of Disclosure Quality
To assess the quality of disclosures, researchers have used various proxies such as self-
constructed disclosure indices, external disclosure ratings or disclosure scores from annu-
al report ’beauty contests’ with Artiach and Clarkson (2011) providing a comprehensive
discussion of the first two approaches. Examples of researcher constructed indices inclu-
de Botosan (1997) and Francis et al. (2008). This approach has the disadvantage that it
requires the researcher’s subjective assessment regarding the items to be included and
their weighting. Furthermore, the coding and assessment is labor-intensive which typical-
ly results in small sample sizes. For these reasons, self-constructed indices are typically
hard to replicate. On the other hand, these indices can be applied to any firm which dispo-
ses of one limitation of proxies generated from external ratings which only include firms
covered by the rating agency. Examples of studies using external ratings include Healy
et al. (1999) and Botosan and Plumlee (2002). One concern with these external ratings
is that they reflect analysts’ perception of disclosure quality rather than the firms’ actual
disclosure quality (Lang and Lundholm (1996)). With regard to the most widely used ex-
ternal rating (the disclosure ratings published in the CFA institute (former: Association for
Investment Management and Research (AIMR)) reports), a further limitation lies in the
fact that this rating is not available for all time periods. Further, the committee evaluating
disclosure quality differs by industry and time. On the other hand, this rating is prepared
by analysts who are among the primary users of financial reporting and who should be
familiar with the individual firm and its industry.24
In this study, we follow a third approach by utilizing scores extracted from an annual
report ’beauty contest’, namely the “Best Annual Report” ranking of the German busi-
ness journal manager magazin. Annual report ’beauty contests’ have also been used in
prior research (examples include Daske and Gebhardt (2006), Hail (2002) and Glaum
24See Artiach and Clarkson (2011), pp. 24-32 for a more detailed discussion.
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et al. (2013)). Our measure provides a compromise solution to the trade-off between the
advantages and disadvantages of researcher-constructed and externally provided scores.
By using this measure we avoid some concerns with regard to the self-constructed scores
because we can neither influence the assessment itself nor the weighting. As a matter of
course, the score is still subject to judgment by the scholars who performed the ranking.
As the ’Best annual report’ ranking of the German business journal manager magazin
has been computed for a long time period and for a large number of firms, we have more
than 1,500 firm-year observations in our sample which mitigates another concern with
self-constructed disclosure indices. Furthermore, the time period from 1995 to 2012 is
suitable for our research as it covers both local GAAP requirement periods as well as
international GAAP requirement periods.
The “Best Annual Report” ranking of the German business journal manager magazin has
recently been used in a study of Glaum et al. (2013).25 As they provide an extensive des-
cription of the ranking, we focus on the main characteristics and some differences between
their study an ours. The ’beauty contest’ is conducted annually and includes firms from
the exchange indices DAX, MDAX, SDAX, TecDAX and Nemax-5026 of the German
stock exchange as well as European firms included in the STOXX index. Hence, the ran-
king is biased towards large companies but still provides a reasonable picture of German
IFRS preparers. In each year, annual reports including financial statements are evaluated
with regard to the ’content’ of disclosures as well as with regard to the ’language’ and the
’design’ of the report. To capture the development of accounting and regulation rankings
need to change over time (Daske and Gebhardt (2006)). In some years the aforementioned
categories were complemented with the categories ’financial communication’ and ’repor-
ting efficiency’ and an additional expert jury evaluation. Furthermore, the weighting of
25See Glaum et al. (2013), pp. 91-92.
26The Nemax-50 index included firms from sunrise industries such as IT, biotechnology and telecommuni-
cations. This index has been closed in 2003 as a result of the dot-com bubble.
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the individual categories changed over time. Therefore, we focus solely on the content
score as our measure for disclosure quality. For this score, each annual report is assessed
by analysts and senior analysts of the University of Mu¨nster using a checklist of more
than 300 items. These items are weighted based on surveys of financial experts (Armeloh
(1998)), resulting in a total disclosure score between 0 and 100. We believe that this is a
good approximation for the quality of disclosures because the checklist covers both the
quantity and the quality of disclosures.
5.4.3 Research Approach
5.4.3.1 Univariate Analyses
To test our hypotheses, we start by conducting several t-tests and Mann-Whitney-
Wilcoxon-tests for the differences in means and medians. First, we test the differences
in means and medians of discretionary accruals and disclosure quality scores across the
two reporting regimes. We argue that the degree of earnings management increases as
a result of IFRS adoption based on the notion that IFRS involve considerable judgment
and the use of private information which provides managers with substantial discretionary
choices (Jeanjean and Stolowy (2008)). This would also be in line with the findings of van
Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) and Callao and Jarne (2010), who do not find a decrease
in discretionary earnings management (which is often assumed as a result of IFRS adop-
tion) for Germany but rather the opposite.27 In addition, we expect that disclosure quality
under IFRS is higher than under German GAAP based on the findings of prior research
(Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), Daske and Gebhardt (2006), Glaum et al. (2013)).
27In general, van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) find an increase in discretionary earnings management
as a result of IFRS adoption (see table 9, panel A of their paper) which vanishes once hidden reserves
are included in the calculation of discretionary accruals. Callao and Jarne (2010) find that long-term
discretionary accruals increased as a result of IFRS adoption while there is no effect on total discretionary
accruals.
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In a second step, we analyze the differences across the early and mature phase of the
individual firms’ IFRS accounting. For these analyses, we define ’early’ as the first four
years of the individual firms’ IFRS accounting, irrespective of whether the adoption was
voluntary or not. We choose this cut-off point to obtain a balanced sample size and period
length across the two groups.28 The results are robust to other reasonable specifications
of the phases. We argue that due to less experienced preparers, auditors and users in
the early phase of the individual firms’ IFRS accounting, compliance was relatively low.
Further, firms are expected to gradually transition to new accounting standards, implying
that early IFRS statements are closer to the latest German GAAP statements. Moreover,
the first years of the individual firms’ IFRS accounting are likely to be influenced more
heavily by the first-time adoption rules of IFRS 1, which will take several years to ’wash
out’ (Bru¨ggemann et al. (2013)). Hence, we expect that discretionary accruals decrease
and disclosure quality increases over time.
5.4.3.2 Multivariate Analyses – Earnings Management
The univariate approach does not account for the effects of different firm characteristics
and incentives or for changes over time on our metrics of firm transparency. Therefore,
we also conduct different sets of regression analyses. The first set is intended to test the
effect of IFRS adoption on discretionary accruals, whilst the second set is intended to test
the effect of IFRS adoption on disclosure quality. By combining both models, we aim
to test the constraining effect of disclosures on earnings management. We construct the
following model I to test our earnings management hypotheses. Variables are defined in
Appendix A.
28For firms adopting IFRS mandatorily in 2005, the cut-off point chosen results in four ’early IFRS years’
and four ’mature IFRS years’.
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|DA|it = α0 + β1IFRS it + β2Total Assetsit + β3Leverageit + β4S ales growthit (I)
+ β5C f oit + β6∆PPEit + β7C f oDit + β8LossDit + β9Big4it
+ β10New Marketit +
∑
γiIndustryi +
∑
δiYeari + εit
The choice of control variables is based on prior literature and follows Houqe et al. (2012)
and van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005). IFRS is a dummy variable equal to 1 for firm-
year observations with IFRS reporting.29 We include Total Assets to control for size-
related incentives for earnings management because prior research has shown that larger
firms make more income-decreasing accounting choices in response to greater political
and regulatory scrutiny (Watts and Zimmerman (1986)). However, more recent studies
predict that size is positively associated with earnings quality because of relatively higher
costs for internal control procedures for small firms.30 Given the fact that we analyze the
absolute value of discretionary accruals and interpret earnings management opportuni-
stically, the latter would result in a negative association between |DA| and Total Assets.
Next, we include Leverage to control for the leverage-related incentives for earnings ma-
nagement. The direction of the effect of leverage on earnings management, however, is
not unambiguous. On the one hand, it is argued that higher leveraged firms are closer to
debt covenant violations and are therefore more willing to engage in (income increasing)
earnings management (Watts and Zimmerman (1986), DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994),
Houqe et al. (2012)). On the other hand, it is argued that higher leveraged firms have in-
centives to engage in income decreasing earnings management activities for the sake of
contractual renegotiations (Becker et al. (1998); van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005)).
As we analyze the absolute value of discretionary accruals, this would result in a posi-
29The distinction between IFRS and German GAAP preparers is based on the Datastream item ’Accounting
Standards Followed’ (WC07536) using the coding of Daske et al. (2013), Appendix A.
30See Dechow et al. (2010) for a discussion of the determinants of earnings management.
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tive association between |DA| and Leverage. Prior literature suggests a positive relation
between the degree of earnings management and growth because growth companies have
higher incentives to manage earnings opportunistically in order to attract investors (Houqe
et al. (2012)). To capture this effect we include S ales Growth and the change in property,
plant and equipment (∆PPE) in our model. Furthermore, we include C f o to control for
the association between operating cash flow and accruals. Following van Tendeloo and
Vanstraelen (2005), we expect a positive relation between C f o and the absolute value of
discretionary accruals. Additionally, we include the dummy variables C f oD and LossD
which are intended to control for the higher incentives for firms making losses and experi-
encing negative operating cash flows to engage in earnings management. Next, we include
the dummy variable Big4 to control for the constraining effect of larger auditors on the
degree of earnings management (Francis et al. (1999), Becker et al. (1998)). In Germany,
there are firms which mandatorily adopted either IFRS or US GAAP prior to 2005 becau-
se Deutsche Bo¨rse AG required the financial statements of firms listed on the New Market
– a market segment for innovative and fast-growing firms – to be prepared in accordance
with international standards. For this reason, we include the dummy New Market in our
analyses. Finally, we include dummy variables for years and industries.31 We run the re-
gressions with heteroskedasticity-adjusted robust standard errors clustered by firm and
year (Petersen (2009)) and de-meaned variables. We hypothesize that the introduction of
IFRS leads to an increase in the degree of earnings management. Therefore, we expect
the coefficient β1 in the regression model I to be positive and significant.
To separately analyze the effect of the early and the mature phase of the individual firms’
IFRS accounting on discretionary accruals, we construct model II. Here, the dummy
IFRS is replaced by the two dummy variables Early IFRS and Mature IFRS , which
indicate whether the firm-year observation belongs to the early or mature phase of IFRS
31The industry classification is based on Ernstberger et al. (2013) who adjust the Frankel et al. (2002) SIC
classification for the German setting.
182
reporting. In accordance with our hypothesis H1b, we expect that the coefficient for
Mature IFRS is either non-significant or negatively significant, while the coefficient for
Early IFRS is expected to indicate a positive relation between the adoption of IFRS and
the level of earnings management.
|DA|it = α0 + β1Early IFRS it + β2Mature IFRS it + β3Total Assetsit (II)
+ β4Leverageit + β5S ales growthit + β6C f oit + β7∆PPEit
+ β8C f oDit + β9LossDit + β10Big4it + β11New Marketit
+
∑
γiIndustryi +
∑
δiYeari + εit
5.4.3.3 Multivariate Analyses – Disclosure Quality
Furthermore, we construct the following model III to test for the effect of IFRS adoption
on disclosure quality:
DQit = α0 + β1IFRS it + β2Total Assetsit + β3Leverageit + β4ROAit (III)
+ β5Foreign S alesit + β6Closeit + β7Betait + β8Big4it + β9US Listingit
+ β10New Marketit +
∑
γiIndustryi +
∑
δiYeari + εit
In this equation, DQ is the score of the category ’content’ of the best annual report ’be-
auty contest’ of manager magazin. For details about the calculation of all other variables
please refer to Appendix A. The selection of control variables is again based on prior lite-
rature and follows Glaum et al. (2013).32 In general, disclosure quality is associated with
32In addition to the control variables used in this analysis, there are other candidate variables, e.g. number
of analysts following or capital intensity (Daske and Gebhardt (2006)). We limit the control variables to
those presented in this section to minimize the risk of multicollinearity.
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firm size, financing needs, and performance (Lang and Lundholm (1993), Leuz and Ver-
recchia (2000)). Therefore, we include Total Assets to proxy for company size, Leverage
to capture the incentives of more highly leveraged firms, and ROA to control for firm per-
formance. Furthermore, the ratio of a firms’ foreign sales to its total sales (Foreign S ales)
is included to proxy for the higher incentives for disclosure of more internationally active
firms, whereas the percentage of closely held shares (Close) is included to proxy for ow-
nership concentration. Beta is included to proxy for company risk. In addition, we include
the dummy variables Big4 and US − Listing to control for the effects of two firm-specific
choices, i.e. the choice of a large auditor and the choice to cross-list overseas, on disclos-
ure quality. We expect that both decisions have a positive influence on disclosure quality.
Finally, we also include the dummy New Market in these analyses. As in models I and II,
we include fixed effects for years and industries (Ernstberger et al. (2013)) classification),
employ heteroskedasticity-adjusted robust standard errors clustered by firm and year (Pe-
tersen (2009)) and use de-meaned variables. In accordance with hypothesis 2, we expect
the coefficient β1 for the dummy variable IFRS in model III to be significantly positive.
As in our analyses of discretionary accruals, we analyze the effect of the early and ma-
ture phase of the individual firms’ IFRS accounting on disclosure quality separately by
estimating model IV:
DQit = α0 + β1Early IFRS it + +β2Mature IFRS it + β3Total Assetsit (IV)
+ β4Leverageit + β5ROAit + β6Foreign S alesit + β7Closeit
+ β8Betait + β9Big4it + β10US Listingit + β11New Marketit
+
∑
γiIndustryi +
∑
δiYeari + εit
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5.4.3.4 Multivariate Analyses – Effect of Disclosures on Earnings Management
To test our notion of a constraining effect of disclosures on earnings management, we
include the variable DQ into our first model and estimate the following model V. In ac-
cordance with our hypothesis, we expect the coefficient β2 to be significantly negative.
Furthermore, we estimate equation V separately for the German GAAP observations and
for the early and mature IFRS observations. We do this to test whether the assumed as-
sociation between disclosures and earnings management differs across reporting regimes
and time.
|DA|it = α0 + β1IFRS it + β2DQit + β3Total Assetsit + β4Leverageit (V)
+ β5S ales growthit + β6C f oit + β7∆PPEit + β8C f oDit + β8LossDit
+ β10Big4it + β11New Marketit +
∑
γiIndustryi +
∑
δiYeari + εit
5.4.4 Data Description
As discussed earlier, we limit our sample to Germany for several reasons. First, our fo-
cus on a single country removes the need to put emphasis on potentially confounding
country-specific factors (Barth et al. (2008)). Second, German companies accounted for a
substantial part of IFRS adopters prior to 2004 (Daske and Gebhardt (2006)). Third, the
focus on Germany allows us to use a specific proxy for disclosure quality, the disclosure
scores of the annual report ’beauty contest’ of the German business journal manager ma-
gazin. Hence, our sample composition is based on the companies included in this ’beauty
contest’ and covers a time period from 1995 to 2012. The disclosure scores are merged
with financial data taken from Thompson Reuters Datastream. In order to strengthen our
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database for the analyses of the degree of earnings management, we include informati-
on for the whole sample period for all companies that have been covered at least once
by the contest, if available. Due to the fact that not all firms are continuously included
in the annual report competition published by manager magazin, the sample for the ana-
lyses of disclosure quality is smaller. Firm-year observations from countries other than
Germany are excluded. Furthermore, we exclude companies reporting in accordance with
US GAAP,33 banking institutions and insurance firms as well as observations with miss-
ing data for the prior year. In total, we end up with 2,590 firm-year observations for the
analyses of the degree of earnings management and 1,502 firm-year observations for the
analyses of disclosure quality.
5.5 Results
5.5.1 Univariate Analyses
Panel A of table 1 shows the development of mean, median and standard deviation of the
disclosure score from 1995 to 2012 differentiated by the reporting regime. Simple eyeball
statistics show no clear trend for mean and median with local peaks and local valleys.
With regard to the two reporting regimes, IFRS statements exhibit higher values in most
years.34 Panel B of table 1 shows overall mean (median) values and the results of t-tests
(Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon-tests) for German GAAP compared to IFRS and for the early
vs. mature phase of the individual firms’ IFRS accounting for the disclosure score (DQ)
as well as for the degree of earnings management (|DA|). This analysis shows significantly
higher means and medians under IFRS for disclosure quality and, remarkably, also higher
33Other researchers often treat IFRS and US GAAP equally and analyze the effect of the adoption of ’in-
ternational standards’ (e.g. Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) or Daske and Gebhardt (2006)). We solely focus
on the adoption of IFRS in our main analyses and use US GAAP observations for additional robustness
checks.
34There are two companies in our sample which reported in accordance with German GAAP in the year
2005 because the fiscal year of these companies started in late 2004.
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values for the degree of earnings management. This result holds when German GAAP is
compared to the early phase of the individual firms’ IFRS accounting. When comparing
the early phase of the individual firms’ IFRS accounting to the mature phase, there is no
statistically significant increase in the disclosure quality score, whereas the t-test shows a
decrease significant at the 1% level for the degree of earnings management. In summary,
these simple analyses provide first evidence that IFRS adoption leads to better disclos-
ure quality in terms of the content of disclosures. Moreover, our analyses show that the
extent of discretionary earnings management increases as a result of the change in the
reporting regime and decreases afterwards. However, a comparison of mean and median
values across reporting regimes does not account for alternative determinants of disclos-
ure quality and the degree of earnings management, such as reporting incentives, firm
characteristics and, most importantly, time effects. For this reason, the next subsection
discusses our multivariate results.
[Table 1 about here]
5.5.2 Multivariate Analyses
Panel A of table 2 exhibits summary statistics of the variables used in our multivariate
analyses and panel B shows frequencies of the dummy variables used. All variables are
defined in Appendix A. For the majority (69%) of our firm-year observations, financial
statements are prepared in accordance with IFRS, whereas 31% are prepared under Ger-
man GAAP. We differentiate between the early and the mature phase of the individual
firms’ IFRS accounting by assuming that the mature phase of IFRS reporting begins in
the fifth year after the adoption. By doing so, we classify 45% of IFRS observations as
early, and 55% as mature. Furthermore, 64% of the financial reports are audited by a Big4
auditor, while 15% of the firm-year observations stem from firms that are cross-listed in
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the United States.35 With regard to the degree of earnings management, average (medi-
an) absolute discretionary accruals are at 0.107 (0.044). This indicates that discretionary
accruals make up 10.7% (5.5%) of beginning of period total assets.
[Table 2 about here]
The lower (upper) triangle of table 3 presents Pearson (Spearman) correlations of the va-
riables used in our analyses. The correlation between the degree of earnings management
and the disclosure score is significantly negative. This is a first indication in support of our
hypothesis of a constraining effect of disclosures on earnings management. With regard
to the dummy variable IFRS , we see a significantly positive correlation with the disclos-
ure score which further strengthens the results from the univariate analyses by means of
t-tests and Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon-tests. Moreover, the correlation between IFRS and
|DA| is significantly positive. As the latter result seems to be driven by the early phase of
the individual firms’ IFRS accounting, the correlation matrix provides further support for
our hypothesis H1b.
[Table 3 about here]
Table 4 shows the results of estimating equations I and II with discretionary accruals as the
dependent variable.36 First, when we solely compare IFRS reporting observations to Ger-
man GAAP observations, the estimation of equation I shows that discretionary accruals
are higher under IFRS even when controlling for firm characteristics, reporting incentives
and time, as the coefficient for IFRS is positive and significant at the 5% level. In addi-
tion to our univariate results, this provides further support for our first hypothesis. With
35Following Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), we include observations which are either listed in the United
States or are available on the US OTC market.
36With regard to our control variables, the insignificance of Leverage and S ales Growth is surprising. We
attribute this to collinearity, which, however, should not cause trouble here because variance inflation
factors are smaller than 3 for all control variables (except industry and year dummies).
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regard to the distinction between the early phase of the individual firms’ IFRS reporting
and the mature phase, the estimation of equation II shows that the early phase exhibits
significantly higher discretionary accruals as compared to German GAAP, whereas the
mature phase does not. This result holds, when we estimate the equation without the ear-
ly phase observations, which leads us to conclude that there is no significant change in
the earnings management behavior of firms in the long run as the increase in earnings
management through discretionary accruals in the first years of IFRS application cea-
ses to exist. We suggest that this results from improving compliance, learning curves of
preparers and auditors, emerging common guidelines and interpretations as well as the
increased effectiveness of enforcement.
[Table 4 about here]
In a next step, we investigate the effect of IFRS adoption on disclosure quality by esti-
mating equation III as presented in table 5.37 As the coefficient for IFRS is positive and
significant, we conclude that IFRS adoption has a positive effect on the quality of disclos-
ures. Together with our findings from the univariate analyses, this evidence supports our
hypothesis 2 as well as prior research (Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), Daske and Gebhardt
(2006), Glaum et al. (2013)). Table 5 further shows the results of estimating equation
IV which differentiates between the early and the mature phase of the individual firms’
IFRS accounting. This analysis shows that both the firms’ early phase and the firms’ ma-
ture phase exhibit significantly higher disclosure quality scores as compared to German
GAAP. Moreover, the coefficient for Mature IFRS is significantly higher than the coeffi-
cient for Early IFRS at the 5% level, indicating that disclosure quality not only increases
37Again, the insignificance of Total Assets, Leverage and ROA is surprising. However, Leverage is strongly
correlated with Total Assets (ρ = 0.665) and ROA (ρ = −0.266). Without controlling for Leverage, the
coefficients for Total Assets and ROA become significant, while our overall results remain unchanged.
Furthermore, variance inflation factors are smaller than 3 for all control variables (except for the industry
and year dummies). Therefore, we are not concerned about collinearity in the data. The coefficients for
Close and US Listing are insignificant. Exclusion of these variables does not change the results either.
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as a result of IFRS adoption but continues to increase in the more mature phase of IFRS
reporting.
[Table 5 about here]
Finally, table 6 shows the results of estimating equation V with discretionary accruals
as the dependent variable. In these regressions, the disclosure quality score serves as an
additional explanatory variable. For the full sample, the coefficient for IFRS is still si-
gnificant but only at the 10%-level and the coefficient for DQ is significantly negative at
the 1% level, indicating that better disclosures limit the scope for earnings management
through discretionary accruals. This is in line with the results of Francis et al. (2008), who
show that there is a complementary association between disclosures and earnings quality,
which translates into a negative relation between disclosures and earnings management.
Together with our univariate results, this result supports the notion that the greater the
amount and the higher the quality of disclosures, the smaller the room for discretionary
earnings management. However, when estimating equation V for the three subsamples
German GAAP, early IFRS and mature IFRS, the results show a constraining effect of
disclosures on the degree of earnings management only when German GAAP or early
IFRS observations are used. We interpret this as follows: When accounting standards re-
quire a comparatively low level of disclosures (as under German GAAP) and/or when
financial statements are influenced by low compliance, little experience or weak enforce-
ment (as in the early IFRS phase), disclosures help to limit earnings management. When
compliance, experience and enforcement improve in the course of IFRS application, the-
se factors likely help to limit earnings management so that the marginal effect of better
disclosures is reduced.
[Table 6 about here]
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5.5.3 Robustness and Additional Analyses
We conduct various robustness checks to validate our results. First, we use alternative
models of discretionary accruals, namely the standard Jones (1991) model, the modified
Jones model from Dechow et al. (1995) and a further modification as proposed in Sa-
lewski and Zu¨lch (2013). The latter approach adjusts model 1 for amortizable intangible
assets. This is based on the notion that the other side of the estimation equation includes
depreciation and amortization expense as explanatory variables. All discretionary accrual
models show similar results (not tabulated). Second, there are several companies which
adopted US GAAP prior to 2005. To focus on IFRS, we exclude these observations in
our initial analyses. Table 7 presents the results of estimation equations I, II and V for the
entire sample including US GAAP observations.38 To this end, we construct the dummy
variables International, Early International and Mature International which follow the
same logic as before but consist of both IFRS and US GAAP observations. For equati-
on I, International is significantly positive though this association seems to be driven by
the early phase of the individual firms’ adoption of international standards as indicated in
the results for equation II. As the coefficient for Mature International is not significant,
we conclude that there is no statistically significant difference in discretionary accruals
between German GAAP and the mature stage of accounting under internationally re-
cognized standards.39 With regard to equation V, we again see a significantly negative
coefficient for the disclosure quality score, which underpins our notion of a constraining
effect of disclosures on earnings management. In this equation, however, the coefficient
for International becomes insignificant. As the correlation between International and
DQ is low (ρ 0.059), we do not attribute the loss of significance to collinearity. Rather, a
38Univariate results and results of the estimation of the disclosure models do not change due to the inclusion
of US GAAP observations. Therefore, these results are not tabulated.
39Please note that the proportion of IFRS observations as compared to US-GAAP observations especially
within the Mature International dummy increases over time as a result of the mandatory requirement to
adopt IFRS in Germany.
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possible explanation is the following: When controlling for disclosure quality, the effect
of the accounting regime on the degree of earnings management may be reduced. This
is also in line with our results above where the significance of the IFRS dummy drops
from the 5% level to the 10% level once the disclosure quality score is included. Another
possible explanation lies in the lower number of observations in equation V as compared
to equation I.
[Table 7 about here]
Third, we check the robustness of our results for alternative sample compositions. To this
end, we run our analyses only with firm-year observations which are included in the an-
nual report ranking and without the individual adoption year, respectively. The latter is
based on the notion that the adoption year is likely to be influenced by one-off effects
which may influence our results. Both approaches show results similar to our main ana-
lyses (not tabulated). Last, we take into account that discretionary accruals, despite their
widespread use, are only one possible approach to proxy for earnings management. An
alternative measure is the PM/ATO diagnostic of Jansen et al. (2012). This diagnostic is
based on the notion that contemporaneous changes of profit margin (PM) and asset tur-
nover (ATO) in opposite directions could signal earnings management. For example, if
a firm manages earnings downwards by overstating bad debt allowance, both net income
and accounts receivable on the balance sheet will decrease. For a given level of sales,
this results in a decreasing profit margin and in an increasing asset turnover. Therefo-
re, we construct a dummy variable PM/ATO equal to 1 if ∆PM > 0 and ∆ATO < 0
or ∆PM < 0 and ∆ATO > 0 and zero otherwise. Table 8 shows univariate and multi-
variate results with regard to this measure. In general, the mean of PM/ATO increases
significantly from 0.34 to 0.37 as a result of IFRS adoption. When comparing the mean
for early and mature IFRS accounting, we see a further increase. This is in contrast to
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our main result of a decrease in earnings management in the mature phase of IFRS re-
porting. However, the increase here is statistically not different from zero. In panel B of
table 8, PM/ATO serves as dependent variable of logistic regressions with fixed effects
for industries and years. Although the Pseudo − R2 is low, the goodness of fit measures
of Pearson and Hosmer-Lemeshow indicate that our model fits reasonably well. In gene-
ral, our results are supported by this analysis. The IFRS dummy is positively significant
in equation I while this seems to be driven by the early IFRS observations as indicated
in equation II. Furthermore, we also find a negative coefficient for the disclosure quality
score in equation V which supports our notion of a constraining effect of disclosures on
earnings management for this alternative earnings management proxy.
[Table 8 about here]
In addition to these robustness tests, we run further analyses with regard to earnings per-
sistence and with regard to the distinction between voluntary and mandatory adoption. In
general, research on earnings persistence is motivated either by the view that more su-
stainable earnings are of higher quality as they will yield better inputs to equity valuation
models or by the broader view that earnings are decision useful when improving equity
valuation outcomes (Dechow et al. (2010)). We test for differences in earnings persistence
across reporting regimes and across the early and mature phases of IFRS accounting by
estimating the following model which is based on Atwood et al. (2011). Using either Ger-
man GAAP, IFRS, early IFRS or mature IFRS observations, we estimate model VI four
times and compare the coefficient β1 across the regression results. The analysis employs
heteroskedasticity-adjusted robust standard errors clustered by firm and year (Petersen
(2009)). All variables are defined in Appendix A.
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NIit+1 = α0 + β1NIit + β2LossDit + β3LossD · NIit (VI)
+
∑
γiIndustryi +
∑
δiYeari + εit
The results of this estimation are shown in table 9. The coefficient for net income (NI) is
the measure for earnings persistence with a higher coefficient signifying more persistent
earnings. In general, the coefficient decreases from German GAAP to (early) IFRS and
from early IFRS to mature IFRS. However, the test for coefficient equality shows that only
the overall decrease from German GAAP to IFRS is statistically significant, whereas the
decrease from early IFRS to mature IFRS is not. Xie (2001) finds that the persistence pa-
rameter on discretionary accruals is lower than that of non-discretionary accruals. Given
the fact that our initial analyses show an increase in discretionary accruals from Ger-
man GAAP to IFRS, the decrease in the persistence parameter is reasonable. However,
Dechow et al. (2010) point out that earnings persistence likely is a function of both the
fundamental firm performance and the accounting system. Hence, changes in earnings
persistence should not solely be attributed to changes in the accounting system – in our
case: the change from German GAAP to IFRS. For this reason, we are also cautious in the
interpretation of the development of the persistence parameter from early IFRS to mature
IFRS. While the insignificance of the change does not contradict our initial results, it is
also no support for them.40
[Table 9 about here]
Prior research has shown that the effect of IFRS adoption may differ for voluntary and
mandatory adopters (see e.g. Soderstrom and Sun (2007)). For this reason, table 10 re-
40A decrease in discretionary accruals in the late phase of IFRS reporting accompanied by increased persis-
tence would be stronger support.
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peats our univariate analyses for voluntary and mandatory adopters. In this analysis, we
define ’early’ voluntary (mandatory) as the first four years of the individual firms’ IFRS
reporting as long as this period has been entirely voluntary (mandatory). For example,
if a firm voluntarily adopted IFRS in the year 1997, the years 1997-2000 are defined as
early voluntary, whereas the years 2000-2004 are defined as mature voluntary. In case the
firm adopted IFRS in 2003, this firm is excluded from this analysis as we do not have suf-
ficient mature voluntary observations.41 In general, both voluntary and mandatory IFRS
accounting years exhibit (significantly) higher means and medians for the disclosure qua-
lity score and for discretionary accruals as compared to German GAAP. When comparing
the early and the mature phase of IFRS reporting, this analysis shows a significant in-
crease in the disclosure quality score and a significant decrease in discretionary accruals
for both voluntary and mandatory adoption years. Hence, we conclude that our overall
result of a decrease of earnings management, likely as a result of learning effects, higher
compliance with IFRS, developing enforcement and emerging common guidelines and
interpretations, does not differ between voluntary and mandatory adopters.
[Table 10 about here]
5.6 Conclusion
The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of IFRS adoption on two different but
related measures of the transparency of financial reporting, namely the degree of earnings
management and the quality of disclosures. Based on a German sample ranging from
1995 to 2012, we investigate whether discretionary accruals changed in the course of
IFRS adoption and whether there is a difference in discretionary accruals in the long
41The same logic applies for mandatory adopters, e.g. for firms which mandatorily adopted IFRS in 2005
and are continuously included in our sample, the early phase is defined as the years 2005-2008 and the
mature phase as 2009-2012.
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run. Furthermore, we test for changes in disclosure quality and for the relation between
disclosure quality and earnings management. The focus on a single country prevents us
from putting emphasis on potentially confounding country-specific factors and permits
the use of a specific proxy for disclosure quality, namely scores from an annual report
’beauty contest’ of a German business journal. These scores are suitable for our analyses,
because they provide a reliable picture of both the quantity and quality of disclosures and
mitigate some concerns with self-constructed disclosure indices.
In general, prior results for the effect of IFRS adoption on earnings management are mi-
xed. While Barth et al. (2008) find evidence for a reduction of earnings management
patterns in 21 countries as a result of IFRS adoption and attribute this to IFRS limiting
accounting choices compared to local GAAP, van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) and
Callao and Jarne (2010) find no decrease of discretionary accruals in Germany but rather
the opposite. We attempt to reconcile these conflicting results by studying a longer time
period. Our results indicate that IFRS adoption initially leads to an increase in earnings
management through discretionary accruals, which is reduced in the more mature phase
of IFRS reporting. We attribute this to the following: In the early stage of IFRS accoun-
ting, compliance was lower as all parties involved (preparers, auditors, users) were in the
process of accumulating the necessary experience. Moreover, firms likely did not change
their accounting dramatically at one point in time but transitioned gradually towards IFRS
which might have impacted comparisons of the last years of local GAAP accounting to
the first years of accounting under IFRS. Additionally, the extraordinary effects of the
first-time adoption rules of IFRS 1 diminish over time. Further, both emerging guidelines
and common interpretations and the creation of the German Financial Reporting Enfor-
cement Panel in 2004 are likely to have contributed to a stepwise increase in accounting
quality and, hence, a decrease in discretionary accruals.
With regard to the quality of disclosures, we find a positive effect of IFRS adoption which
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is in line with the notion of enhanced disclosure requirements under IFRS as compared
to German GAAP and supplements prior research (Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), Daske
and Gebhardt (2006), Glaum et al. (2013)). In addition, we also investigate the relation
between the two dimensions of transparency and show that there is a negative association
between disclosure quality and earnings management. We interpret this as evidence for
a complementary relation between disclosure quality and earnings quality (Francis et al.
(2008)), as the greater the amount and the higher the quality of disclosures are, the smaller
the room for earnings management is. This relation holds for German GAAP and early
IFRS observations. When compliance, experience and enforcement improve in the mature
phase of IFRS application, these factors are likely to help to limit earnings management
so that the marginal effect of better disclosures is reduced.
Our results are robust to various specifications of discretionary accruals, to alternative
measures for earnings management and to other reasonable specifications of the early
and the mature phase of IFRS accounting. Furthermore, we show that our results do not
differ substantially for voluntary and mandatory adopters of IFRS and for the broader
application of ’international standards’ (IFRS and US GAAP).
With our study, we satisfy the demand for studying a longer time horizon after IFRS
adoption (Callao and Jarne (2010)) which might help to reconcile the conflicting results
of prior research and the underlying assumption of the European regulators introducing
IFRS to improve comparability and transparency of financial statements. However, future
research should conduct similar research for countries other than Germany and different
proxies for financial reporting quality. Moreover, by showing that disclosure quality can
have a constraining effect on earnings management, we shed light on the apparent associa-
tion between these two constructs. This association and how standard-setting can benefit
from it could also be a worthwhile area for future research.
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Variable definitions
Variables used in discretionary accruals models
T Ait Total accruals of firm i at time t calculated as change in current assets adjusted for change in cash less
change in current liabilities adjusted for change in current portion of long term debt and change in
income tax payable less depreciation and amortization expense.
Ait Total assets of firm i at time t used as denominator.
∆S alesit Change in sales of firm i from t-1 to t.
∆Receivablesit Change in receivables of firm i from t-1 to t.
Transparency variables
|DA|it Absolute value of discretionary accruals of firm i at time t calculated using the performance adjusted
modified Jones Model (Kothari et al. (2005)).
DQit Disclosure quality score of firm i at time t from the best annual report ’beauty contest’ of the German
business journal manager magazin.
Control and other variables
Total Assetsit Total assets of firm i at time t divided by beginning of period market value of equity.
Leverageit Total liabilities of firm i at time t divided by beginning of period market value of equity.
S ales growthit Change in sales of firm i at time t divided by beginning of period sales.
C f oit Cash from operations of firm i at time t divided by beginning of period market value of equity.
∆PPEit Change in property, plant and equipment of firm i at time t divided by beginning of period market value
of equity.
Foreign salesit Ratio of foreign sales to total sales of firm i at time t.
ROAit Return on assets of firm i at time t calculated as net income before extraordinary items plus interest
expenses divided by total assets.
Closeit Percentage of closely held shares of firm i at time t .
Betait Measure of systematic risk based on how returns co-move with the market of firm i at time t.
IFRS it Dummy variable equal to 1 if the financial statements of firm i at time t are prepared in accordance with
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and 0 otherwise.
Early IFRS it Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i applies IFRS at time t and the observation belongs to the first four
years of the individual firms IFRS reporting and 0 otherwise.
Mature IFRS it Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i applies IFRS at time t and the observation does not belong to the
first four years of the individual firms IFRS reporting and 0 otherwise.
German GAAPit Dummy variable equal to 1 if the financial statements of firm i at time t are prepared in accordance with
German GAAP and 0 otherwise.
US Listingit Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i at time t is cross-listed (either directly or OTC) in the United States
and 0 otherwise.
LossDit Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i encounters losses at time t and 0 otherwise.
C f oDit Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i encounters negative operating cash flows at time t and 0 otherwise.
Big4it Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i’s financial statements of time t are audited by a Big4 auditor (Ernst
& Young, PriceWaterhouseCoopers, KPMG, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu) and 0 otherwise. Financial
statements audited by Arthur Anderson prior to its demise are also treated as audited by a Big4 auditor.
New Marketit Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i is listed at the German New Market at time t and 0 otherwise.
Internationalit Dummy variable equal to 1 if the financial statements of firm i at time t are prepared in accordance with
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) or US GAAP and 0 otherwise.
Early Internationalit Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i applies IFRS or US GAAP at time t and the observation belongs
to the first four years of the individual firms IFRS/US-GAAP reporting and 0 otherwise.
Mature Internationalit Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i applies IFRS or US GAAP at time t and the observation does not
belong to the first four years of the individual firms IFRS/US-GAAP reporting and 0 otherwise.
NIit Net income of firm i at time t before extraordinary items divided by beginning of period total assets.
Appendix A: Variable definitions
198
Panel A - Development of disclosure quality score from 1995 to 2012
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
German GAAP 60.74 56.61 55.51 58.04 58.94 57.72 59.72 57.59 59.90 55.55 53.48 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
IFRS 66.48 64.57 67.03 63.17 62.59 60.90 59.41 57.10 61.47 58.35 59.96 56.92 59.88 57.12 60.13 57.11 58.33 56.92
Mean Total 61.70 57.33 56.74 58.86 59.91 59.00 59.54 57.18 61.17 57.91 59.84 56.92 59.876 57.12 60.13 57.11 58.33 56.92
German GAAP 64.16 56.00 53.54 56.18 56.57 56.76 57.41 56.17 61.92 56.08 53.48 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
IFRS 67.54 65.60 67.05 65.39 62.24 60.73 61.03 58.11 61.06 58.87 59.69 55.8 59.37 56.96 59.92 57.44 57.63 56.45
Median Total 64.62 56.65 54.67 56.62 57.96 57.76 59.01 57.35 61.18 58.28 59.69 55.80 59.37 56.96 59.92 57.44 57.63 56.45
German GAAP 10.03 6.75 7.12 6.40 6.09 6.88 7.62 8.51 9.82 9.53 9.40 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
IFRS 4.07 7.72 8.81 10.02 6.44 9.38 6.82 8.82 6.96 9.17 8.39 8.37 8.21 7.54 7.45 8.30 8.57 8.79
Std. dev. Total 9.49 7.16 8.09 7.27 6.35 8.00 7.10 8.70 7.46 9.22 8.41 8.37 8.22 7.54 7.45 8.30 8.57 8.79
Panel B - Comparison of means and medians
Variable German GAAP IFRS Difference German Early IFRS Mature IFRS Difference German Difference Early
GAAP / IFRS GAAP / Early IFRS IFRS / Mature IFRS
Mean 57.47 58.88 1.40** 58.04 58.89 0.56* 0.85
DQ Median 56.33 58.43 2.11*** 57.48 58.78 1.15* 1.30
Mean 0.062 0.087 0.03*** 0.100 0.076 0.038*** -0.024***
|DA| Median 0.034 0.048 0.01*** 0.048 0.048 0.014*** -0.000
Panel A of Table 1 exhibits the development of disclosure quality over time, Panel B shows mean and median values of the disclosure quality score and discretionary accruals for German GAAP, IFRS,
early IFRS and mature IFRS, respectively. Early IFRS is defined as the first four years of the individual firm’s IFRS adoption, whether this adoption was voluntary or not. Data for the disclosure quality score
has been extracted from the annual report ’beauty contest’ of manager magazin. ***, ** and * indicate that the means (medians) are significantly different at the 1%-level, 5%-level and 10%-level, respectively,
using a two-tailed t-test with Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom (Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test). All variables are defined in Appendix A.
Table 1: Development of disclosure quality scores and comparison of means and medians
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Panel A - Descriptive statistics of variables used in multivariate analysis
Continuous variable Mean Std. Dev. Min p(25) p(50) p(75) Max Firm-years
DQit 58.32 8.15 39.33 52.67 57.76 63.52 79.83 1577
|DA|it 0.078 0.107 0.000 0.015 0.044 0.094 0.614 3095
Total Assetsit 2.39 2.57 0.18 0.97 1.67 2.89 39.86 2594
Leverageit 1.76 3.20 0.02 0.40 0.91 1.97 45.86 2882
S ales growthit 0.23 1.86 -0.91 -0.01 0.07 0.17 57.92 2821
C f oit 0.14 0.22 -0.62 0.04 0.11 0.21 1.22 2594
Foreign salesit 39.84 30.45 0.00 7.96 40.45 67.28 94.60 3095
ROAit 0.02 0.12 -0.65 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.26 3092
Closeit 32.43 30.59 0.00 0.00 28.80 56.76 98.74 3095
Betait 0.60 0.49 -0.15 0.07 0.60 0.98 1.67 3095
∆PPEit 0.02 0.16 -0.76 -0.01 0.01 0.04 0.92 2594
Panel B - Frequencies of dummy variables
Dummy variable Firm-years 0 1 1 in %
IFRS it 3095 854 2130 69%
Early IFRS it 2130 1174 956 45%
Mature IFRS it 2130 956 1174 55%
German GAAPit 3095 2130 965 31%
US Listingit 3095 2631 464 15%
LossDit 3095 2495 600 19%
C f oDit 3095 2648 447 14%
Big4it 3095 1118 1977 64%
New Marketit 3095 3053 42 1%
Panel A of Table 2 exhibits the summary statistics of the main variables used in our analysis, Panel B summarizes
the frequencies of dummy variables. Data for the disclosure quality score has been extracted from the annual report
’beauty contest’ of manager magazin. The data for all other variables is based on the Thomson Reuters Worldscope
database. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics
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Pearson-Spearman Correlation among Regression Variables
DQit |DA|it Total Leverageit S ales C f oit Foreign ROAit Closeit ∆PPEit IFRS it Early Mature German US LossDit C f oDit Big4it New Betait
Assetsit growthit S alesit IFRS it IFRS it GAAPit Listingit Marketit
DQit 1 -0.179 0.151 0.114 -0.076 0.236 0.148 0.031 -0.101 0.060 0.270 0.000 0.255 -0.270 0.081 -0.115 -0.190 0.181 -0.163 0.290
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.31) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (1.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
|DA|it -0.160 1 -0.119 -0.138 0.106 -0.165 -0.121 0.022 0.046 -0.029 0.030 0.012 0.017 -0.030 -0.018 0.089 0.228 -0.079 0.090 -0.151
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.48) (0.13) (0.34) (0.33) (0.69) (0.58) (0.33) (0.55) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Total Assetsit 0.113 -0.085 1 0.857 -0.204 0.542 0.021 -0.532 -0.029 0.119 -0.142 -0.116 -0.029 0.142 -0.073 0.102 -0.035 0.116 -0.164 0.223
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.50) (0.00) (0.35) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.35) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.25) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Leverageit 0.059 -0.040 0.665 1 -0.211 0.394 0.013 -0.619 -0.090 0.104 -0.124 -0.105 -0.022 0.124 -0.086 0.206 0.036 0.099 -0.060 0.217
(0.02) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.67) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.47) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.23) (0.00) (0.05) (0.19)
S ales growthit -0.103 0.182 -0.007 -0.029 1 -0.111 -0.016 0.276 -0.033 0.311 0.023 0.056 -0.029 -0.023 0.062 -0.215 -0.007 -0.037 0.104 0.040
(0.00) (0.00) (0.71) (0.13) (0.00) (0.60) (0.00) (0.28) (0.00) (0.46) (0.07) (0.34) (0.46) (0.04) (0.00) (0.82) (0.23) (0.00) (0.00)
C f oit 0.154 -0.110 0.320 0.080 0.006 1 0.050 -0.100 0.001 0.087 -0.021 -0.040 0.016 0.021 0.037 -0.147 -0.524 0.108 -0.155 0.219
Foreign S alesit 0.165 -0.173 -0.006 -0.011 -0.058 0.043 1 0.108 -0.066 0.029 0.189 0.034 0.147 -0.189 0.101 -0.122 -0.094 0.096 -0.140 0.228
(0.00) (0.00) (0.76) (0.56) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (0.34) (0.00) (0.26) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ROAit 0.023 -0.053 -0.129 -0.266 0.006 0.169 0.074 1 0.064 0.026 0.122 0.026 0.092 -0.122 0.048 -0.593 -0.243 -0.002 -0.118 -0.033
(0.37) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.76) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.40) (0.00) (0.40) (0.00) (0.00) (0.12) (0.00) (0.00) (0.94) (0.00) (0.29)
Closeit -0.066 -0.024 -0.056 -0.084 -0.011 -0.009 0.046 0.083 1 0.013 -0.181 -0.168 -0.019 0.181 -0.061 -0.083 -0.120 -0.030 -0.111 -0.195
(0.01) (0.18) (0.00) (0.00) (0.57) (0.66) (0.01) (0.00) (0.67) (0.00) (0.00) (0.54) (0.00) (0.05) (0.01) (0.00) (0.32) (0.00) (0.00)
∆PPEit -0.003 0.051 0.012 -0.130 0.208 0.036 0.010 0.132 0.021 1 -0.032 0.011 -0.040 0.032 0.025 -0.160 -0.037 0.000 -0.029 0.112
(0.90) (0.01) (0.54) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.62) (0.00) (0.29) (0.30) (0.72) (0.19) (0.30) (0.42) (0.00) (0.22) (0.99) (0.34) (0.00)
IFRS it 0.058 0.106 -0.080 -0.092 -0.013 -0.038 0.070 -0.044 -0.181 -0.037 1 0.419 0.565 -1.000 0.098 -0.007 -0.017 0.141 0.001 0.302
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.49) (0.05) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (1.00) (0.00) (0.81) (0.57) (0.00) (0.98) (0.00)
Early IFRS it -0.021 0.134 -0.024 -0.045 0.049 -0.019 -0.044 -0.019 -0.145 0.029 0.450 1 -0.513 -0.419 -0.006 -0.006 0.007 -0.011 0.079 0.043
(0.40) (0.00) (0.21) (0.02) (0.01) (0.34) (0.02) (0.29) (0.00) (0.20) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.85) (0.85) (0.83) (0.71) (0.01) (0.16)
Mature IFRS 0.068 -0.026 -0.050 -0.045 -0.058 -0.018 0.108 -0.024 -0.035 -0.059 0.526 -0.523 1 -0.565 0.098 -0.002 -0.023 0.143 -0.071 0.246
(0.01) (0.14) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.37) (0.00) (0.19) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.96) (0.46) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00)
German GAAPit -0.058 -0.106 0.080 0.092 0.013 0.038 -0.070 0.044 0.181 0.037 -1.000 -0.450 -0.526 1 -0.098 0.007 0.017 -0.141 -0.001 -0.302
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.49) (0.05) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.81) (0.57) (0.00) (0.98) (0.00)
US Listingit 0.039 -0.011 -0.120 -0.094 -0.013 -0.021 0.103 0.039 -0.068 0.017 0.066 0.017 0.047 -0.066 1 -0.096 -0.059 0.104 -0.055 0.083
(0.12) (0.56) (0.00) (0.00) (0.51) (0.29) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.37) (0.00) (0.34) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.07) (0.01)
LossDit -0.075 0.090 0.162 0.294 -0.020 -0.142 -0.092 -0.659 -0.098 -0.204 0.097 0.054 0.041 -0.097 -0.037 1 0.327 -0.002 0.131 -0.046
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.30) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.10) (0.00) (0.13)
C f oDit -0.146 0.227 0.051 0.129 0.030 -0.509 -0.118 -0.401 -0.090 -0.051 0.052 0.054 -0.001 -0.052 -0.039 0.345 1 -0.095 0.111 -0.067
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.12) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.95) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Big4it 0.143 -0.101 0.058 0.017 -0.049 0.066 0.127 -0.005 0.127 -0.003 0.062 0.001 0.058 -0.062 0.001 -0.011 -0.078 1 -0.052 0.161
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.35) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.77) (0.00) (0.89) (0.00) (0.98) (0.00) (0.00) (0.95) (0.55) (0.00) (0.09) (0.00)
New Marketit -0.106 0.093 -0.072 -0.030 0.033 -0.073 -0.092 -0.020 -0.048 -0.067 0.025 0.091 -0.063 -0.025 -0.041 0.048 0.071 -0.040 1 -0.091
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.11) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) (0.27) (0.01) (0.73) (0.17) (0.00) (0.00) (0.17) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00)
Betait 0.217 -0.039 0.069 0.000 0.018 0.106 0.189 -0.049 -0.185 0.074 0.157 0.019 0.132 -0.157 0.087 -0.001 -0.018 0.135 -0.085 1
(0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (1.00) (0.35) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.30) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.98) (0.31) (0.00) (0.00)
Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficients are shown in the lower (upper) triangle of the table. Two-tailed p-values are presented in parentheses. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
Table 3: Correlation matrix
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Results for the effect of IFRS adoption on the degree of earnings management
Equation No. I II
Dependent variable |DA| |DA|
Variables Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
IFRS 0.017** 2.25
Early IFRS 0.018** 2.35
Mature IFRS 0.012 1.23
Total Assets -0.004** -2.02 -0.004*** -2.03
Leverage 0.001 0.30 0.001 0.30
S ales growth 0.005 1.38 0.005 1.38
C f o 0.028*** 2.75 0.028*** 2.73
∆PPE 0.035*** 3.01 0.035*** 3.01
C f oD 0.063*** 8.55 0.063*** 8.56
LossD 0.011 1.48 0.011 1.51
Big4 -0.013** -2.37 -0.014** -2.38
New Market 0.028 1.01 0.028 1.03
Industry dummys Included Included
Year dummys Included Included
R2 14.81% 14.86%
Ad justed R2 13.61% 13.62%
Firm − years 2,590 2,590
This table shows the coefficients and t-statistics for estimating equations I and II as an
OLS regression that includes fixed effects for fiscal year and industry (not tabulated).
The analysis employs heteroskedasticity-adjusted robust standard errors clustered by firm
and year (Petersen (2009)). The regression is estimated with an intercept included (not tabulated).
***, **, and * denote p-value significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, with two-tailed
tests. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
Table 4: Results for the effect of IFRS adoption on the degree of earnings management
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Results for the effect of IFRS adoption on disclosure quality
Equation No. III IV
Dependent variable DQ DQ
Variables Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
IFRS 2.381** 2.00
Early IFRS 2.025* 1.71
Mature IFRS 3.608** 2.32
Total Assets 0.100 0.50 0.077 0.41
Leverage 0.121 1.41 0.119 1.40
ROA 4.959 1.22 5.145 1.30
Foreign S ales 0.034** 2.44 0.035** 2.47
Close -0.012 -0.78 -0.013 -0.86
Beta 2.675*** 3.32 2.683*** 3.34
Big4 1.672** 2.07 1.694** 2.14
US Listing 1.253 1.05 1.335 1.14
New Market -4.839** -2.13 -4.81** -2.31
Industry dummys Included Included
Year dummys Included Included
R2 21.53% 21.99%
Ad justed R2 19.65% 20.08%
Firm − years 1,502 1,502
This table shows the coefficients and t-statistics for estimating equations III and IV as an
OLS regression that includes fixed effects for fiscal year and industry (not tabulated).
The analysis employs heteroskedasticity-adjusted robust standard errors clustered by firm
and year (Petersen (2009)). The regression is estimated with an intercept included (not tabulated).
***, **, and * denote p-value significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, with two-tailed
tests. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
Table 5: Results for the effect of IFRS adoption on disclosure quality
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Results for the effect of disclosure quality on the degree of earnings management
Equation No. V using the full V using German V using early IFRS V using mature IFRS
sample GAAP observations observations observations
Dependent variable |DA| |DA| |DA| |DA|
Variables Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
DQ -0.001*** -2.73 -0.001* -1.74 -0.002** -2.31 -0.000 1.10
IFRS 0.014* 1.75
Total Assets -0.002 -1.27 -0.000 -0.32 0.004 0.50 -0.003* -1.73
Leverage -0.002* -1.71 -0.003*** -3.35 -0.008* -1.69 0.001 0.28
S ales growth 0.042*** 5.37 0.009 0.24 0.045*** 4.42 0.042*** 4.37
C f o 0.028*** 2.56 0.051*** 5.18 -0.019 -0.46 0.020 1.06
∆PPE 0.009 0.65 0.042* 1.89 0.029 1.12 -0.023 -1.33
C f oD 0.046*** 5.05 0.056*** 5.33 0.035 1.20 0.035** 2.35
LossD 0.015** 1.97 0.004 0.34 0.028** 2.00 0.010 0.81
Big4 -0.013* -1.71 0.003 0.045 -0.018* -1.71 -0.017 -1.23
New Market -0.019 -0.79 -0.009 -0.19 -0.024 -0.55 0.027*** 2.73
Industry dummys Included Included Included Included
Year dummys Included Included Included Included
R2 18.77% 19.05% 29.23% 16.30%
Ad justed R2 16.77% 12.17% 22.33% 12.62%
Firm − years 1,502 346 395 761
This table shows the coefficients and t-statistics for estimating equations I and II as an OLS regression that includes fixed effects
for fiscal year and industry (not tabulated) for the full sample and separately using either German GAAP, early IFRS or mature IFRS
observations. The analysis employs heteroskedasticity-adjusted robust standard errors clustered by firm and year (Petersen (2009)).
The regression is estimated with an intercept included (not tabulated). ***, **, and * denote p-value significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% levels, with two-tailed tests. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
Table 6: Results for the effect of disclosure quality on the degree of earnings management
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Robustness of earnings management results: The effect of the adoption of international standards
Equation No. I II V
Dependent variable |DA| |DA| |DA|
Variables Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
International 0.017* 1.90 0.013 1.57
Early International 0.025*** 3.60
Mature International 0.010 1.31
DQ -0.001*** -3.17
Total Assets -0.004** -2.30 -0.004*** -2.38 -0.002 -1.53
Leverage 0.000 0.26 0.000 0.25 -0.001 -0.76
S ales growth 0.007* 1.65 0.007* 1.67 0.039*** 5.52
C f o 0.028** 2.40 0.028** 2.33 0.038*** 4.28
∆PPE 0.034*** 3.49 0.032*** 3.38 0.015 1.11
C f oD 0.063*** 9.30 0.063*** 9.14 0.063*** 9.14
LossD 0.010* 1.73 0.011* 1.84 0.009 1.30
Big4 -0.013** -2.28 -0.012** -2.15 -0.012* -1.87
New Market 0.043 1.31 0.044 1.35 0.049 1.39
Industry dummys Included Included Included
Year dummys Included Included Included
R2 16.92% 17.29% 19.64%
Ad justed R2 15.88% 16.23% 17.90%
Firm − years 2,913 2,913 1,698
This table shows the coefficients and t-statistics for estimating equations I, II and V as an OLS
regression that includes fixed effects for fiscal year and industry (not tabulated). The analysis employs
heteroskedasticity-adjusted robust standard errors clustered by firm and year (Petersen (2009)). The
regression is estimated with an intercept included (not tabulated). ***, **, and * denote p-value significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, with two-tailed tests. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
Table 7: Robustness of earnings management results: The effect of the adoption of international standards
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Panel A - Robustness of earnings management results: PM/ATO-diagnostic based on Jansen et al. (2012) – Comparison of means
German IFRS Difference Early Mature Difference Difference
Variable GAAP German GAAP / IFRS IFRS German GAAP / Early IFRS /
IFRS Early IFRS Mature IFRS
PM/ATO 0.34 0.37 0.03* 0.36 0.39 0.02* 0.03
Panel B - Robustness of earnings management results: PM/ATO-diagnostic based on Jansen et al. (2012) – Multivariate analysis
Equation No. I II V
Dependent variable PM/ATO PM/ATO PM/ATO
Variables Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
IFRS 0.204* 1.73 0.525*** 3.84
Early IFRS 0.239** 2.14
Mature IFRS 0.067 0.48
DQ -0.012** -2.17
Total Assets 0.019 0.88 0.020 0.91 0.061 1.31
Leverage -0.002 -0.12 -0.002 -0.13 -0.025 -0.97
S ales growth -0.150* -1.23 -0.152 -1.24 -0.483 -1.15
C f o -0.328 -1.24 -0.331 -1.24 -0.483 -1.15
∆PPE 0.054 0.23 0.051 0.22 -0.225 -0.85
C f oD -0.168** 2.19 -0.170** -2.22 -0.416*** -3.19
LossD 0.001 0.02 0.006 0.07 -0.068 -0.39
Big4 0.013 0.18 0.009 0.13 -0.048 -0.74
New Market -0.850 -2.26 -0.849** -2.27 -0.517 -1.06
Industry dummys Included Included Included
Year dummys Included Included Included
p-value for Pearson
Goodness of fit χ2 (0.27) (0.27) (0.23)
p-value for Hosmer-Lemeshow
Goodness of fit χ2 using 10 groups (0.87) (0.95) (0.63)
Percent correctly predicted 60.42% 60.62% 61.72%
Firm − years 2,590 2,590 1,502
Panel A of this table shows mean values for another indicator for earnings management: The PM/ATO diagnostic based on Jansen et al. (2012). This measure is based
Jansen et al. (2012). This measure is based on the notion that contemporaneous increases (decreases) in profit margin and decreases (increases) in asset turnover are a
potential indicator for earnings management. ***, ** and * indicate that the means are significantly different at the 1%-level, 5%-level and 10%-level,
respectively, using a two.tailed t-test with Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom. Panel B presents regression results with the PM/ATO diagnostic
as dependent variable. The regressions have been run as logistic regressions that include fixed effects for fiscal year and industry and an intercept (not
tabulated). The analysis employs heteroskedasticity-adjusted robust standard errors clustered by industry. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
Table 8: Robustness of earnings management results: PM/ATO-diagnostic based on Jansen et al. (2012)
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Earnings persistence of German GAAP vs. (early and mature) IFRS
Equation No. VI using German VI using IFRS VI using early IFRS VI using mature IFRS
GAAP observations observations observations observations
Dependent variable NIt+1 NIt+1 NIt+1 NIt+1
Variables Coefficient z-statistic Coefficient z-statistic Coefficient z-statistic Coefficient z-statistic
NI 0.78*** 9.32 0.59*** 10.92 0.61*** 7.72 0.57*** 12.29
LossD -0.04** -2.55 -0.01 -1.12 -0.01 -0.92 -0.01 -1.22
LossD · NI -0.94*** -4.22 -0.07 -0.55 -0.11 -0.78 -0.04 -0.64
Industry dummys Included Included Included Included
Year dummys Included Included Included Included
R2 32.91% 36.85% 43.28% 33.84%
Ad justed R2 30.20% 35.89% 41.00% 32.34%
Firm − years 618 1,873 699 1,174
Test for coefficient German GAAP - German GAAP - Early IFRS -
equality of NI IFRS Early IFRS Mature IFRS
Difference -0.19 -0.17 -0.04
Wald χ2 test statistic 3.38 1.79 0.11
(0.07) (0.18) (0.74)
This table shows the coefficients and z-statistics for estimating Equation VI as seemingly unrelated regressions that include fixed effects
for fiscal year and industry (not tabulated) using either German GAAP observations, IFRS observations, early IFRS observations or mature
IFRS observations. The analysis employs heteroskedasticity-adjusted robust standard errors clustered by firm. The regression is estimated with
an intercept included (not tabulated). ***, **, and * denote p-value significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, with two-tailed tests.
All variables are defined in Appendix A.
Table 9: Earnings persistence of German GAAP vs. (early and mature) IFRS
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Panel A - Distinction between German GAAP and voluntary/mandatory IFRS
Variable German Voluntary Mandatory Difference German Difference German
GAAP IFRS IFRS GAAP / Voluntary GAAP / Mandatory
IFRS IFRS
Mean 57.47 60.18 58.14 2.71*** 0.67
DQ Median 56.33 60.75 57.63 4.42*** 1.31**
Mean 0.062 0.099 0.081 0.038*** 0.020***
|DA| Median 0.034 0.048 0.048 0.013*** 0.013***
Panel B - Distinction between early and mature voluntary adoption and between early and mature mandatory adoption
Variable Early Mature Difference Early Early Mature Difference Early
Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary / Mature Mandatory Mandatory Mandatory / Mature
Voluntary Mandatory
Mean 59.44 61.84 2.40** 56.92 58.57 1.65**
DQ Median 60.02 62.96 2.94** 56.39 58.41 2.02***
Mean 0.107 0.067 -0.039*** 0.094 0.075 -0.019***
|DA| Median 0.048 0.049 0.001 0.050 0.047 -0.003
Panel A of this table shows mean and median values of disclosure quality scores and discretionary accruals for German GAAP as compared to
voluntary and mandatory IFRS adoption, Panel B shows means and medians for early voluntary/mandatory versus mature voluntary/mandatory
IFRS adoption. In this analysis, ’early’ is defined as the first four years of the individual firms’ IFRS adoption as long as this has been entirely
voluntary or entirely mandatory. Data for the disclosure quality scores has been extracted from the annual report ’beauty contest’ of manager
magazin. ***, ** and * indicate that the means (medians) are significantly different at the 1%-level, 5%-level and 10%-level, respectively,
using a two-tailed t-test with Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom (Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test). All variables are defined in Appendix A.
Table 10: Comparison of means and medians for voluntary and mandatory adopters
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